BETWEEN THE ARROWS AND THE OLIVE BRANCH:
THE TORTURED PATH OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
IN THE REAGAN YEARS (1981-1987)
Terrence Edward Paupp*
Two distinct components of the issue are addressed in this paper. The first component is the constitutional question surrounding the legality, force, and impact of the War Powers Resolution. The constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution will be dealt with briefly. The second component is a foreign policy question and is the central focus of this paper.
This paper will examine the relationship between the Reagan Administration's foreign policy and its lack of fidelity to the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.
The Reagan Presidency has been characterized by its proclivity to intervene in the affairs of Third World States. In doing so, serious and fundamental questions have been raised about the administration's fidelity to the War Powers Act (Resolution) of 1973. The War Powers Act was designed chiefly to restore the balance of power between the Executive and Legislative branches of government with regard to declaring and waging of war. The problems associated with resolving this issue are multi-faceted. This paper, therefore, addresses several issues together. First, has the post-1945 era made the 1787 definition of war inoperable? It is essential to understand that "formal" declarations to engage in a more formal or traditional type of war is what the Constitution addresses and upon which the War Powers Act has had to try to expand. The 20th Century has turned into the age of "subterranean wars," of covert war, of guerilla war. In such an age, formal declarations of war become almost superfluous. Add to that the technological capacity of great powers and the variations of military involvements literally mushroom.
Second, the War Powers Act can address the procedural issues associated with military involvements, but is incapable of resolving the substantive issues that lay behind decisions of the Executive Branch to engage militarily in the world. It can, therefore, only require that wherever "imminent hostilities" will expose American combat troops to physical danger that the Congress must be consulted. The problems behind this requirement lay much deeper. The issues range from a consideration of what the foreign policy of the United States should be to larger issues such as American hegemony in the world, our alliance systems, and our strategic maneuverability in the balance of power game. All of these issues converge to make the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative branches even more tenuous with regard to American military involvements and commitments.
The War Powers Resolution was passed over President Nixon's veto. Since that time, the question of whether the Resolution is even constitutional has dominated debate over whether Congress or the President has the real power to declare war, engage in covert wars, or support U.S.-backed interventions in the Third World. Arguing the merits or demerits of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 demands an explanation of the purpose of Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, of the Constitution. That provision expressly grants to Congress the power "To declare War."' (The opponents of the War Powers Resolution, such as Professor Eugene V. Rostow,2 claim that Clause 11 confers upon Congress only a narrow piece of war power. Defenders of the Resolution, such as Professors Raoul Berger and Francis Wormuth,3 argue that the Resolution constitutes a legitimate exercise of congressional authority under the clause.)
The position taken in this paper is that the War Powers Resolution is not an "exercise" of Congressional authority under the clause but rather a "definition" of it. Viewed in that light, the War Powers Resolution serves to maintain the integrity of Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, of the Constitution. In addition, this paper asserts that a definition of this kind, coupled with a reasonable enforcement mechanism, is sufficiently within the Constitutional mandate that Congress holds to legitimately restrain, regulate, supervise, and oversee the President regarding the declaration and waging of wars. This paper also asserts that the enforcement mechanism of the War Powers Resolution is well within a proper understanding of the constitutional system of checks and balances.
The central focus here will be to examine the path of the War Powers Resolution through the Reagan years, using the events in Lebanon, Grenada, El Salvador and Nicaragua as "case studies" with respect to the Reagan Administration's compliance/non-compliance with the Resolution. Before turning attention to
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these issues, however, it is essential to supply a background for the discussion of these cases and the Reagan Administration's performance. Therefore, Part I of the paper will briefly consider the question: How does the Constitution contemplate the allocation of responsibility for war power? While addressing the relevance of the system of checks and balances, this question raises certain sub-issues such as the battle over the "Original Understanding" and strict intentionalism. Part II will trace the growth of Presidential power since World War II. Part III will cover Congressional reassertion of its war powers prerogative. Part IV is devoted to a contemporary assessment of President Reagan's compliance/non-compliance with the War Powers Resolution in Grenada, El Salvador, Lebanon and Nicaragua. Finally, Part V is a series of reflections on the dimensions of power and will address the issue of the potential gap between Executive privilege and prerogative as being at odds with the national interest.
I. HOW DOES THE CONSTITUTION CONTEMPLATE THE
ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR POWER?
Both the opponents and defenders of the War Powers Resolution invoke the blessing of the Framers of the Constitution. They seek to invoke that blessing by bringing their interpretations of the war-making power within the sanction and mandate of both the plain words of the Constitution and the statements of the Framers themselves as to their intentions. The defenders of the Resolution claim that it restores the original balance between the Executive and the Legislative branches. The opponents of the resolution charge that it is precisely this very balance that the Resolution has hopelessly upset. For example, Eugene Rostow has asserted that, "The War Powers Resolution is in profound conflict with the necessities of governance in the turbulent world of the late twentieth century." He comments that, "The War Powers Resolution will become a footnote to history, either through repudiation or desuetude."4 Professor Raoul Berger rejects Rostow's assertion that since the world of the 20th Century is contracting, the President's constitutional powers are correspondingly expanding5 because the Constitution itself withheld from the President the powers that Rostow has claimed for the President.6
In reflecting on the battle over the "Original Understanding," Stephen Carter has astutely noted that, `As with any other battle over what the Framers planned or expected, this one threatens to exhaust the ammunition on both sides long before a conclusion is reached."7 Despite the vast array of ammunition, the battle is still worth examining. It is from this stockpile of ammunition on original intent that our understanding is fortified by the repository of history. In that repository there is meaning, and that meaning is the heart of the matter in the war powers controversy.
A. The War Powers and "Original Understanding"
In numerous law review articles and in his book, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth,8 Professor Berger has relied heavily on what the Framers actually wrote. His central contention in doing so is that, "The cardinal index of constitutionality is the Constitution itself, not what others have said about it."9 Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitution explicitly vests in Congress the power "To declare War" and in Clause 18 the power "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers...." Finally, in Section 10, Clause 3, the Constitution asserts that "No state, shall without the Consent of Congress ... engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." These Article I provisions are supported by the Framers' statements in The Federalist papers. Hamilton viewed the Commander-in-Chief in a less-than-kingly role. "As Commander-in-Chief," said Hamilton, "the President's authority would be much inferior" to that of the British King; "it would amount to nothing more than supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral . . . while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies--all of which, by the Constitution . . . would appertain to the legislature.i10
According to Berger, the writings of the Framers suggest that the Constitution was drafted against a background of the "repudiation of royal prerogative."" Such an assertion seems to be adequately supported when viewed against the vast array of statements from Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Mason, Monroe, Patterson, and others.'2 Jefferson explicitly asserted that: "We have already given in example one effectual check to the Dog of war by; transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay."13 By viewing the statements of the Framers from the perspective of governmental structuring, it may be possible to see their work as more than merely

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setting forth an enumeration of governmental powers or a collection of political institutions. The Constitution outlines the framework of the war-making power so that certain institutional powers and responsibilities are held exclusively by one branch but not by the other. To be sure, circumstances and situations will arise in which the system of "checks and balances" will be put into operation, but the basic arrangement allows that check and balance process to be dynamic, effective, and fluid.
Of political structures, Kenneth Waltz has written that, "Structure defines the arrangement, or the ordering of the part of a system. Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of them.s14 Waltz suggests that the various elements of this domestic political structure may be divided into three components or areas: "First, according to the principles by which it is ordered; second, by specification of the functions of formally differentiated units; and third, by the distribution of capabilities across those units."15
The ordering principles for the war powers, established by the Framers, vests the power to declare war exclusively in Congress. The President is only permitted to repel sudden attacks under the scheme set up by the Framers. This theory, derived from the Framers, has been called the "defensive/offensive war theory." The theory assumes that the President has the exclusive constitutional authority to defend U.S. citizens, territory, troops, and property against sudden attack or when the threat of attack is imminent. The key qualification is that the President's actions remain "defensive" in nature. That is the first principle of the President's exclusive war power. The second principle of the President's war power is that once such conduct becomes "offensive," the President lacks constitutional authority to proceed further without Congressional authorization obtained through either a declaration of war or other legislation.
This leads to the second point--the specification of the functions of formally differentiated units. The "defensive/offensive war theory," inferred from the Framers, contains two dimensions: (1) the defensive/offensive character of military hostilities and (2) the duration of such hostilities. This theory assumes that both diplomatic and military actions can be arrayed along a continuum from exclusively "defensive" in nature to exclusively "offensive" conduct. According to this scenario, the escalation of military activity transforms the nature of the President's actions from defensive into offensive conduct.16
Waltz's third point, the distribution of capabilities across these units, allows juxtaposing the defensive/offensive characterization of the military activity with the Congressional and Presidential allotment of responsibility as specified in the Constitution. But here problems arise. Is it possible to develop adequate criteria for distinguishing defensive from offensive military conduct? The real point, according to Edward Keynes, is that "Neither the language of the Constitution nor the record of the Federal Convention suggests that the Framers intended to restrict congressional discretion in authorizing or ratifying military hostilities."17 If the Constitution neither prescribes nor proscribes a particular form for ratifying or authorizing hostilities, how shall the issue of the war power be resolved? This leads to a consideration of checks and balances.
B. The Dynamic Relevance of the System of Checks and Balances: A Zone of Twilight
The very nature of the Constitutional allocation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative establishes what has been referred to as "zones of concurrent authority." That is, the two branches share a collective and concurrent responsibility for any and all outcomes that affect the national interest. Not the least of these reponsibilities is the power to commit the nation to war. By both sharing and separating certain powers of war, defense, and foreign affairs, the Framers created zones of exclusive legislative and executive authority as well as a zone of concurrent constitu,tional authority with boundaries that are rather imprecise. Indeed, this "zone of concurrent authority" has been characterized by one jurist as a "zone of twilight."'s
How should this zone resolve into a coherent constitutional scheme? What is the meaning of a "zone of concurrent authority" with regard to the system of checks and balances? Carter has suggested that the system of checks and balances should be viewed as dynamic, "as constantly in flux." What matters most, in his view, is that "the balance of power among the three branches remain sufficient to check and punish any abuses by any one of them."19 This conceptual scheme of checks and balances seems to be, in large measure, what the War Powers Resolution seeks to accomplish. That is, to restore a balance between the Executive and Legislative branches that had been previously, from the time of the American Civil War until the Nixon Presidency,20 tilted in favor of the Executive branch. The key point for Carter is that "the precise disposition of authority is subject to change." The key to maintaining constitutional balance, however, is in assuring that the changes do not so alter the balance that the Constitutional scheme loses its essential shape.21

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Conceptions of political reality do change with time. The way information is selected, organized, and interpreted will result in different paradigms and in different policies. Waltz asks: "How can we decide which materials to select and how to arrange them? No inductive procedure can answer the question, for the very problem is to figure out the criteria by which induction can usefully proceed."22 The Constitutional scheme, under the system of checks and balances, seems to argue for a mutually established criteria for how the war power should be exercised. The very fact that a "zone of concurrent authority" or a "zone of twilight" exists suggests that the President and the Congress must search together, in the darkness, for. the light of reality. Therefore, sharing information with, consulting with, and seeking the advice and consent of the Congress, before embarking upon a course that could lead to war, is incumbent upon the Executive.
Keynes has noted that, "There is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the Framers intended the sweeping clause (Art.1, Sec.8, C1.18) as an unqualified grant of power that Congress could manipulate to reduce the executive to a mere ministerial agency."23 At the same time, the checks and balances system kicks in so that once a war is initiated, Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate and control the magnitude, scope, and duration of military hostilities. In this important regard, "Congress can employ its auxiliary war powers to restrict or terminate military actions that exceed the President's defensive authority."24
The "threshold theory" addresses the level of military action that shall exceed the President's authority and defines the zones of exclusive and concurrent powers. The threshold theory is a product of the 20th Century, the age of insurgency warfare and the "Imperial Presidency." Although elements of the "defensive/ offensive" war theory constituted Congressional legislation terminating U.S. military action in Laos and Cambodia on August 15, 1973, and its invocation of the War Powers Resolution during the Lebanon crisis under President Reagan, the threshold theory has increasingly come to replace the "defensive/offensive war theory."25
The threshold theory defines the zones of exclusive and concurrent power regarding the magnitude of military and diplomatic action. The theory places military and diplomatic actions on a continuum based on (1) the level of escalation and (2) the duration of hostilities. At one end of the continuum (Table I), the President maintains discretionary power to initiate limited military actions of short duration (categories 1-4). At the far end of the continuum (category 9), Congress exercises exclusive authority to initiate major actions of a long duration. Between these two categories lies the twilight zone of concurrent power (categories 5-8).

1.	Covert intelligence operations and clandestine paramilitary operations.
2.	Diplomatic actions that imply subsequent military operations, e.g., severing diplomatic relations.
3.	Deployment of armed forces in nonhostile situations, e.g., rotation of troops to meet alliance commitments.
4.	Mobilization of military forces, e.g., call up of army reserves.
5.	Deployment of armed forces in hostile situations, e.g., commitment of armed forces to combat zones.
6.	Limited military engagements, e.g., protection of U.S. citizens, property, and public ships, seizures, and reprisals.
7 Limited military interventions, e.g., civil commotions, claims settlements, border disputes, and preemption of third party interventions.
8.	Material wars, i.e., undeclared wars: the Naval War with France, the Barbary Wars, the Civil War, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.
9.	Publicly declared wars: the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1846-1848, the Spanish-American War of 1898, World War One, and World War Two.

Table I: An Array of Military and Diplomatic Actions in Order of Ascending Magnitude. (Source: E. Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power 91 (1982).

II. SINCE WORLD WAR II, THE PRESIDENT HAS ASSUMED MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAKING WAR THAN THE CONSTITUTION ALLOCATES
The phenomenon of "undeclared war" has characterized America's post-World War II era. Korea and Vietnam immediately come to mind. Yet, even between these two instances, a distinction exists. The Second World War did not officially terminate until April 1952, when the Japanese peace treaty went into effect. President Truman initiated military operations under operative wartime statutes and in compliance

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with a United Nations resolution when he dispatched combat forces to Korea. Truman was actually enforcing the United Nations Charter, a treaty that has the force of law in the United States. The Vietnam War was different. It was the first truly modem undeclared war. Arthur Schlesinger wrote that the net effects of America's Indochina policy under Johnson and Nixon were the ultimate usurpation of the Congressional war-making power. The Presidency, in those years, asserted an unprecedented authority to make international commitments without either the consent or knowledge of Congress.26
The principles of constitutional government were often in abeyance during the Vietnam War years of 1964-1972. If the idea of the rule of law includes the proposition that the Executive is subject to law, then the Vietnam War years stood for the proposition that the Executive could act without reference to the rule of law and could do so with impunity. The Vietnam experience demonstrated a number of key factors with respect to the Constitutional history of the country in general and the power of the Executive branch in particular.
With respect to America's constitutional history, the Vietnam War years under Johnson and Nixon had vested almost absolute power in the Executive and, therefore, had come to reflect a greater deal of fidelity to the European monarchies existing at the time the Constitution was written than to the Framers themselves. If, for example, the Executive is not subject to the rule of law, then that Executive is, in Hamilton's words, no different from "the full-grown progeny of that detested parents27--the Monarchy.
With respect to the power of the Executive branch in particular, Kennedy's under-Secretary of State, Roger Hilsman, has noted that, ". . . the Executive . . . has the greater command of experts. As a consequence, it is the Executive who sets the framework in which policies are discussed, who defines the problems we will essay as a government and the alternatives from which we choose the courses of action to meet them. This command of both information and expertise gives the Executive the intellectual initiative in making foreign policy."28
The Vietnam War Years, under the Johnson Administration, created the credibility gap. Congress and the nation's people were deceived. Operating under the "Commander-in-Chief' Clause (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution), Johnson sought to commit the nation to war, using the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as affirmative authorization. When, as Justice Jackson said, the clause is invoked for the "power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy,s29 the commander-in-chief, as conceived by the Framers, bears slight resemblance to the role played by the President today.
The argument that the President has certain "inherent powers" under the commander-in-chief clause was rejected in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952). That case is the one notable exception, since the end of World War II, where the courts did not sustain presidential war-making and congressional ratification of the President's military actions. Justice Jackson, in Youngstown, noted:
The appeal . . . that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessitate to meet an emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise, although it is something the forefathers omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engendered for authoritative action, knew too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.3o
Jackson then discussed historical precedents where the rise of authoritative action led to the abrogation of constitutional rights. He mentioned Germany's Weimar Constitution, under which individual rights were suspended, without concurrence of the Reichstag, if the public safety was thought to be either endangered or disturbed. He cited the French Republic which created an emergency government under the title of "state of siege." Finally, he referred to Great Britain and its endorsement of a temporary dictatorship created by legislation during the dark days of the Second World War.
America's Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was different. According to Kolko:
What was crucial about the Tonkin affair was the precedent of manipulation that it created for future administration relations with Congress and the public . . . White House decisions . . . could now increasingly reflect external considerations rather than internal needs and constituencies, and for three years it could ignore the Congress' and the public's potentially decisive roles in vetoing the thrust of the executive's foreign policy .... 1
Kolko points out that the involvement of both Congress and the public was much more of a vital element
in American foreign policy before 1950 than after (with the exceptional interlude after the Korean War).
Between the end of World War II and the birth of the Vietnam War, by the Senate's passage of the

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Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, are found the glimmerings of Executive usurpation with judicial and Congressional consent and acquiescence. Arguments for increasing the President's powers were set forth under the banner of "adaptation by usage." According to Berger, "'Adaptation by usage' is a label designed to render palatable the disagreeable claim that the President may by his own practices revise the Constitution, that he may disrupt the constitutional distribution of powers, considered inviolable under the separation of powers."32 He concludes his analysis of the notion by stating that: "In plain words, usurpation of power by the President, if repeated often enough, is legitimated."33 The problem of maintaining the constitutional balance with respect to the war powers is that, in the words of Henry Monaghan, "the military machine has simply become an instrument for achieving presidential foreign policy objectives."34

A.	The Commander-in-Chief Clause
The Commander-in-Chief clause was used by Madison and Hamilton to identify a role for the President once hostilities were already undertaken. In a relevant passage by Madison, the clause merely gives "the supreme Executive authority . . . to have the direction of war when authorized or begun. ..."35
In the 20th Century, the President can initiate wars through the intelligence apparatus of the Central Intelligence Agency.36 Critics of covert war have tried to legislate a requirement that any resort to paramilitary activity be congressionally authorized. Proponents of covert wars have argued against such congressional authorization because they feel that the obstacles to obtaining such authorization would be so great as to render paramilitary activities extremely difficult to achieve. Their analysis is correct. In fact, according to Lobel, the the primary reason that the Framers left the constitutional power to declare war to Congress was because of their substantive judgment that entry into war should be difficult, despite the perceived value of democratic decision-making and open debate.37
Part of the argument against Executive secrecy, and allowing the CIA free reign without Congressional oversight, is that such secrecy makes war inevitable and unconstitutionally delegates a war-making power to the Executive that Congress has no right to delegate. Cases, such as Martin v. Mott,38 are sometimes cited to support the notion of broad presidential war power under the commander-in-chief clause.39 To the contrary, the Mott language, like that of the Prize cases,40 stands for a good deal less than the proposition for which it is usually cited.41
B.	Congressional Authority and Executive Secrecy
Until the passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, Congress acquiesced in Presidential war-making by passing facilitative legislation and appropriations. The net effect of this course of action was to provide "retroactive" legitimacy if the President acted prior to a congressional session. Joint resolutions backing Presidents include the Formosa Resolution of 1955, the Mideast Resolution of 1957, the Cuban Resolution of 1962, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, and the Santo Domingo Resolution of 1965. The Mideast, Cuba and Tonkin Resolutions, however, did not state that Congress was delegating its own war powers to the President.42
A key note is that below the threshold of a declaration of war, Congress can employ its auxiliary war powers to check executive conduct of foreign policy and war making.43 In the absence of a formal declaration of war, Congressional oversight through statutes and joint resolutions defines presidential authority to conduct war-like military activities. Under these circumstances, Congress determines the aims of the war, controls its scope and pace, and has the last word over how the forces are to be deployed. Congressional action ranges from a determination of how the war powers are to be exercised to subsequent legislation, appropriations, or a joint resolution. The problem is that presidents view this approach as unworkable.
Presidents continue to invoke the commander-in-chief clause so often as to vitiate Congressional control or even full consultation. The result has been a growing enclave of secrecy within the Executive branch. As the findings of The Tower Commission Report reveal,
Presidents become so preoccupied with the desire for secrecy, the leaks of classified information, that they tend to blame Congress disproportionately. While the Tower Commission Report maintains that Congress is no more to blame than the Executive Branch itself, the very fact that leaks could endanger a covert operation provides a convenient rationale for avoiding congressional consultation.44
The avoidance of Congressional consultation has become, for some scholars, the central lesson of the Vietnam experience. It has, more recently, become integral to the Reagan Administration as evidenced by

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the Iran/Contra Affair. According to Berger, ". . . the lesson of Vietnam is that Executive secrecy nourishes the very arrogance of power which the Founders sought to avoid; it shields gigantic miscalculations, and in the end it conduces to one-man decision-making that cost the nation dear."45 Similarly, Lobel has asserted that, "Without directly violating the letter of the congressional power to declare war or the War Powers Act, the president can independently involve the nation in large-scale military engagements contrary to its will through the use of paramilitary operatives."46

C. A Bipartisan Consensus on Foreign Policy and the Drift Toward Covert War (1945-1972)
The vital difference between the early republic and the Imperial Presidency resides not in what Presidents did but in what Presidents believed they had the inherent right to do . . . . And, when Presidents initiated military action in the nineteenth century, it was typically against brigands, pirates, revolutionaries and other non-governmental groups; not, as in the twentieth century, against sovereign states.
In the late twentieth century Presidents made sweeping claims of inherent power, neglected the collection of consent, withheld information ad libitum and went to war against sovereign states.47
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

By the end of the Second World War, America's place in the world had changed forever. The United States took over most of Britain's old colonies and along with them, Britain's colonial heritage--a legacy of wealth and of violence merged into one. Africa, Asia, and Latin America became the new battleground for the Cold War, in addition to Eastern Europe. The United States not only inherited the responsibilities of maintaining a far flung British empire, under the auspicious label of the "Free World," it also inherited military and diplomatic commitments from other countries, as well. One such commitment was Vietnam.
Between the pressures of defending the Free World Empire and fighting the Cold War, the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch also had to uphold the Constitution and deal with its problematic war-making provisions. To, do so effectively, building a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy was necessary. The problems of policing a large financial empire and fighting a Cold War resulted in what Reichard described as a "short-circuiting of democratic processes and of a whole system of shared powers delineated by the Constitution."48 Administration policy makers were quite aware of and appreciated the benefits which were attached to keeping the congressional opposition in line through periodic appeals to the norm of bipartisanship. The door to Constitutional abuses was being slowly opened as policy makers began to grasp the potential for dealing with foreign challenges to American hegemony by engaging in covert wars without a formal Congressional declaration on the subject. The norm of bipartisanship would help to insure political fidelity to the new and secret undertakings.
Covert war and Congressional abdication of Constitutional responsibilities arose together and reinforced one another. As the war-making power slipped toward the Executive, Congress seemed to merely watch as escalation followed escalation. The Imperial Presidency was ascendent, and the Congressional war power was unused, unwanted, unreserved.
III. CONGRESS REASSERTS ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVE
IN THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
The War Powers Act of 1973 was criticized for two reasons. First, the Act was forced on a weakened President Nixon in the wake of the Watergate scandals. Second, the Act was a way for Congress to pretend that it had not participated in the decision-making process with respect to the Vietnam War. Yet, the Act was much more than that and, in the years of the Reagan Presidency, remains more than that. The War Powers Resolution states in its introduction, Section 2(a), its actual goals:
It is the purpose of this joint resolution to fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.49
Congress incorporated the intent of the Framers in the three propositions set forth in Section 2. Section 2(a) emphasizes the "collective judgment of the Congress and the President." This emphasis is a direct

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refutation of President Theodore Roosevelt's "Stewardship Theory" of the Presidency which, according to some critics, converts the Presidency into a reservoir of crisis authority.
The Resolution's "collective judgment" emphasis seeks to restore cooperation between the Legislative and Executive branches in the aftermath of the Vietnam experience which was itself the most clear indication of the fissure between the two branches. Section 2(b) explicitly refers to the "necessary and proper" clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution) which asserts that Congress has the power to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers of the President. This requirement seems to underlie Justice Jackson's observations in the Youngstown Steel case where he wrote of the dangers of dictatorship in the absence of legislative deliberations and stated that: "The Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power." His bold assertion concluded with the admonition that: "With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. "50
Finally, Section 2(c) of the Resolution declares that the constitutional powers of the Commander-in-Chief can be exercised by the President to introduce the nation's forces into hostilities or into situations where their imminent involvement in hostilities is "clearly indicated by circumstances" only pursuant to a declaration of war, "specific" statutory authorization, or a national emergency. Making certain that the President does not commit troops without the consent of Congress is the primary goal of Section 2.51
To accomplish this end, Section 3 of the Resolution requires that the President "in every possible instance shall consult with Congress" before sending American troops "into hostilities or into situations where inuninent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."52 Use of the word "consultation" in Section 3 has stirred the most debate. The issue is legislative intrusiveness versus Congressional possession of authority to define the substantive content of its war powers.
Professor Eugene Rostow has asserted that: "`Consultation' between the President and Congress is not a term of constitutional import" and that "the injunction requiring the President to `consult' with Congress is meaningless piety.s53 Stephen Carter has appropriately countered Rostow's assertions in noting that: "To determine whether the War Powers Resolution does intrude too deeply, it is first necessary to identify the legitimate executive prerogative that the Congress might have infringed."54 Rostow argues for strict construction and strict intention when he asserts that: ". . . Congress can act only as a collective body, by enacting legislation. The Constitution confers certain legislative powers on Congress, and it can have no other powers."55 Rostow seems to rely on the Commander-in-Chief clause of the Constitution in making his assertions. Yet, as Carter has countered, the language of that clause sheds little light and "it is perhaps most remarkable for what it does not say: it does not say when, it does not say where, it does not say how." In short, the authority for the Executive prerogative to deploy troops outside the U.S. in defense of some version of the "nation's vital interests" is not clear.56 To support the argument that the War Powers Resolution actually intrudes on a traditional presidential power (in the face of legislative opposition to the deployment of troops) one must look beyond the Constitution, its language, and its history.
Section 4 of the Resolution requires the President to send a report within 48 hours when, without a declaration of war, he introduces United States forces into combat or a dangerous situation. Three categories are expressly outlined:
(1)	into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2)	into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for
deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3)	in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already
located in a foreign nations'
This reporting requirement is critical. It is the limitation that Reagan, Carter, Ford, and Nixon found the most vexing. Within sixty days after the report is submitted or required to be submitted (whichever comes first), Section 5 of the Resolution directs that "the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted)." The key point is that, within this 60-day period, unless Congress has declared war or enacted a specific authorization for the use of American Armed Forces in another form, or extended the 60-day period to not more than 90 days upon certification by the President, "such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution."58 In that regard, subsections (b) and (c) of Section 5 are the heart of

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the Resolution. They are, in Rostow's phrase, "the guillotine provisions.''"
Sections 6 and 7 of the Resolution bind future sessions of Congress to consider issues arising under Section 5 in an expeditious manner. Section 8 prescribes that Presidential authority to use the armed forces shall not be inferred from any statute unless it "specifically authorizes the introduction of United States armed forces into hostilities, . . . and states that it is intended to constitute `specific' statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint resolution:"60

A. A Formalization of the Practice of Consultation and the Assertion of Constitutional Prerogative
Until the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, Congress had surrendered much of its power to the Executive. Reasons ranged from the pressures of the Cold War to the internal workings of Congress itself. All too often committee selections and committee chairs forged partnerships with the military. An easy collusion between the Pentagon and the appropriations process resulted in the failure of Congress to check the drainage of its power. In this sense, the Vietnam War ensued from Congressional Powers that were unseized and unexercised. Hence, the net result was Congressional default.
The War Powers Resolution was supposed to correct the long historical process of decline and default. The Resolution assumed that vital decisions would still be made by the President. According to Professor Schlesinger, "the efficacy of the statute depended altogether on the presence of a congressional will to bring fighting to an end. If such a will existed, Congress could gain the same result, as it had finally done in Indochina, by using the power of the purse to cut off appropriations. Without such a will, the Resolution was persiflage.s61
The Resolution was also a rejection of Justice Sutherland's opinion in Curtiss-Wright which implied that governmental power can be arrayed along a continuum from exclusively domestic to exclusively external powers and, in dicta, that the scope of judicial inquiry varies inversely with the degree of externality.62 The War Powers Resolution more closely follows the reasoning articulated in Youngstown by Justice Jackson. Youngstown stands for the proposition that the scope of power conferred by the, Commander-in-Chief clause is too broad and that war cannot be authorized by implication. Because the Constitution proposes that the war-making power is a shared power between the Executive and Legislative, it is important for the respective branches to clearly delineate the respective scopes of that power as they share in the decision-making process. Schlesinger has noted that neither the Congress nor the President should try to transform what the Constitution states as concurrent authority into exclusive authority. Moving away from a mutual accommodation between the branches would result in a collision, harmful to both branches of government.63 In much the same vein, Kenneth Waltz, of the Neorealist school of political thought, has maintained that a constant fear with respect to the use of force exists both within states (domestically) and among states (internationally). The Constitutional requirement establishing a shared war power between the Executive and the Legislative is critical when the two branches must navigate the nation's course in a "zone of twilight" and formulate foreign policy for the "external realm."64
The 20th Century has become an age of "subterranean wars," covert wars, and guerilla war, where the formal declarations of war have become superfluous. Correspondingly, the requirement of an Executive and Congressional consultation process, as mandated by the War Powers Resolution, is even more critical. If presidents act unconditionally, breaking or circumventing domestic laws in the name of Executive Privilege, then a corresponding danger exists that international laws may be violated in the name of National Security.
In his opinion in Reid v. Covert65, Justice Black argued that all governmental power flows from the Constitution and is subject to Constitutional limitations. The War Powers Resolution has sought to make precisely that principle clear, by statute. In Reid, Justice Black denied the government's inherent, sovereign, or extraconstitutional power in external affairs and implicitly broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of congressional policy and presidential conduct in this vast external realm.66
The War Powers Resolution also furthers Justice Jackson's analysis of the twilight zone of concurrent constitutional power. Jackson established several conditions which determine the scope of congressional and presidential authority: (1) When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum. At that point, the scope of judicial power is then limited. The consultation clause of the War Powers Resolution is designed to effectuate this condition. (2) Congress is

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entitled to the presumption that its delegations are valid. (3) The Presidency is also entitled to the assumption that its actions have been authorized unless Presidential conduct clearly exceeds a delegation _statute. (4) Unless Congress and the President manifestly exceed their power, the judiciary should not interfere with either their joint exercise of power or with the performance of their constitutional functions.67
The crucial question posed by this discussion, in considering the Reagan years, is: why has a strengthening of the imperial presidency renewed its pattern in the face of what appeared to be a major societal effort in 1972-1974 to reduce its effects? According to Professor Schlesinger, "post-Watergate congressional bravado had a way of sputtering out in the face of crisis" and "a good deal of the much-vaunted congressional reclamation of power after Watergate . . . turned out to be make believe."68 He also attributes much of a renewal of Executive power to Reagan himself, for "Reagan warmly embraced latter-day theories of inherent presidential power, including the inflation of the title of Commander-in-Chief into a source of extra constitutional authority . . . Reagan was a stout defender of the `almost royal' prerogatives."69 This exercise of extra-constitutional power will be examined in relation to the tortured path of the War Powers Resolution in the Reagan Years.
IV. REAGAN'S FAILED COMPLIANCE WITH THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
IN EL SALVADOR, NICARAGUA, GRENADA, AND LEBANON
In this section, Reagan's actions, without Congressional authorization, will be examined in several contexts. Reagan invaded Grenada and bombed Libya. Reagan renewed the CIA's power so that it has become a private army (often operating beyond Congressional oversight) and then sent the CIA (without Congressional approval) to illegally overthrow the sovereign government of Nicaragua. This paper will also argue that Reagan failed to comply with the War Powers' requirements in supplying U.S. "advisers" to El Salvador, and that less than strict compliance with the reporting mandates of the Resolution were followed in relation to Lebanon.
Evidence suggests that the Reagan Administration is distinguished from earlier post-World War II administrations more as a matter of degree than one of kind. The Reagan Presidency has clearly exceeded the Constitutional boundaries for the conduct of war and foreign policy in the cases of Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Ideology has, in large measure, served as Reagan's chief criteria in calibrating policy and responses to perceived "national interest" threats in the Third World. This shift from Constitutional compliance to a foreign policy predicated on ideological assumptions resulted in a domestic political crisis as well as a foreign policy crisis in the form of the Iran-Contra Affair. In this regard, "this Administration has moved the country on a fast track, but the line has been heading in the same direction for some time."70 Theodore Draper has asserted that while this is supposed to have been the era of the Imperial Presidency, "it has turned out to be the era of presidencies that have tried to make themselves imperial and failed."71 Final judgments on this question must await future interpretations by historians, for it is by no means clear that Reagan has failed in bolstering the strength of the Executive branch and the intelligence community throughout his tenure. Indeed, the very fact that numerous instances of non-compliance with the War Powers Resolution are attributable to Reagan's tenure in the White House would seem to indicate that his efforts have resulted in a resurgence of the Imperial Presidency. What such a result will have on both domestic law with respect to the war-making power and upon international law with respect to notions of sovereignty, neutrality, and human rights is unclear. These legal questions are the very heart of this paper. A resurgent imperial presidency has effectively dismantled national and international norms with respect to the role of law and legal sanctions in the execution of national policies.
Numerous authors have tried to frame the problem of the imperial presidency within the wider historical context. The same must be done with the Reagan presidency in particular. In large measure, the sweep of Cold War history demonstrates that U.S. relations with the Third World have been in crisis since the Vietnam War. It stems, in part, from the breakdown in the system of informal controls that the United States has exercised over large sectors of the Third World since the end of the Second World War.
Interrelated concerns of policy makers are found in (1) the determination to prevent Soviet-backed movements from obtaining power and (2) an unwavering insistence that the underdeveloped nations maintain an "open door" to business and political interests from the United States.72 During the Reagan Presidency, the buildup of military force has been directly related to the declining position of American hegemony with a corresponding reliance on force and the ideology of force to prop up a precarious international

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position. In short, the United States has found itself in a weakened position but has sought to present an image of strength to the Third World.
The common denominator between the situations in Grenada and Libya was a revolutionary movement which was antithetical to U.S. interests. Therefore, force was directed against them to make the point that countries following their lead may be subject to either invasion or bombardment.
The problem with respect to maintaining fidelity to the Constitution or the War Powers Resolution is that those actions were not, by definition, a genuine response to a military threat against the United States. Grenada and Libya represented the nationalistic expression of revolutionary movements in a nationalistic and revolutionary age. How could Congress be expected to justify an invasion or an attack which was premised on strictly ideological conclusions? Obviously, it could not. Therefore, Reagan and his Executive branch would have to smash revolutionary and nationalistic movements without Congressional approval. For Nicaragua, the Reagan administration would even have to act contrary to Congressional stipulations against supplying arms to the Contras (the Boland Amendment). If anything is clear, it is that ideology has replaced Congressional authorization and Constitutional sanction within the inner circles of the Reagan Administration. The problem with reliance on ideology, as Professor Schlesinger has noted, is that ideology "offers a field day for self-fulfilling prophecies."73 Such reliance effectively destroys not only Congressional oversight and consultation on vital matters and issues of foreign affairs but also sabotages the inner workings of the Executive branch itself. The Tower Commission Report has noted that:
The Iran initiative ran directly counter to the Administration's own policies on terrorism, the Iran/Iraq War, and military support to Iran. This inconsistency was never resolved, nor were the consequences of this inconsistency fully considered and provided for. The result taken as a whole was a U.S. policy that worked against itself . . . Established procedures for making national security decisions were ignored. Reviews of the initiative by all the NSC principals were too infrequent. The initiatives were not adequately vested below the cabinet level. Intelligence resources were underutilized. Applicable legal constraints were not adequately addressed. The whole matter was handled too informally, without adequate written record of what had been considered, discussed, and decided.74
Insofar as Constitutional limitations on the power to initiate war have been circumvented by the Reagan Administration's own claims of an ideological mandate to conduct foreign affairs vis-a-vis its own perception of the national security, the rule and role of law have been diminished at the national and international levels. Instances in which a war power based on Congressional consultation has been circumvented range from a "weapons-for-hostages" policy in the Middle East to expanding a covert war to illegally funding the Contras in an attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan government in direct opposition to the Congressional prescriptions of the Boland Amendment.
The Boland Amendment itself was a response to actions taken by the Reagan Administration in the absence of Congressional consultation. The Amendment resulted from the aftermath of the CIA's mining of Nicaragua's harbors and the subsequent condemnation of that activity by the World Court75--at the international level--while Congressional debate about our increasingly militarized presence in Central America was just being publicly initiated--at the domestic level. The conclusion reached in examining the Reagan Administration's treatment of the War Powers Resolution, relative to its foreign policy initiatives, is that the Executive branch seems to have decided to embark upon unilateral action until Congress reclaims the war-making power for itself. Even if Congress reclaims the war power, will a strong enough Congressional voice materialize and endure to not only proscribe the power of the Executive to act unilaterally but to also insure compliance with Congressional prescriptions?
A. Nicaragua: The Vietnamization of Central America
It can be easily argued that the war against Nicaragua was illegal from the outset. After the appearance of Newsweek's cover story, "America's Secret War" (November 8, 1982) and the public disclosure that the Reagan Administration had undertaken efforts to overthrow the government of the Sandinistas, Congress was persuaded to pass the Boland Amendment. Adopted in December of 1982, the Boland Amendment prohibited the use of any United States funds to overthrow the government of Nicaragua or to provoke any hostilities between Nicaragua and Honduras.76 It states that:
None of the funds provided in this act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other sport for military activities for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua and Honduras.

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The Amendment was passed because of President Reagan's non-compliance with Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution which deals with reporting to Congress "in the absence of a declaration of war." Yet, even before the Boland Amendment was passed in an effort to curtail President Reagan's illegal intervention in Nicaragua, the congressional intelligence committees had already added a secret annex to the Intelligence Authorization Act which provided that funds "were not to be used to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. "78
The CIA Assassination Manual, made public a full two years later, clearly indicated, however, that its purpose was to develop a struggle against the Nicaraguan government so that "a commandante of ours will literally be able to shake up the Sandinista structure, and replace it.s79 The CIA manual, a product of an agency of the Executive branch, directly contradicted an Executive Order on the subject of assassination.80 The Reagan Administration ignored its own Executive Order, violating the Neutrality Act and violating the laws of war (which makes such violations "war crimes").81 More importantly, the Reagan Administration ignored the Boland Amendment and illegally circumscribed the Congressional war-making power on numerous occasions.
In addition, the CIA financed illegal arms shipments from New Orleans and southern Florida (the old training ground for the Bay of Pigs operation) to the Contras, in violation of the Neutrality Act.82 As early as November of 1986, The New Republic had billed 011ie North as the "NSC official who proposed the network to evade a Congressional aid ban.s83 By December of 1986, The New Republic's lead article by Charles Krauthammer brought the question of foreign policy back home again: "Can A Democracy Be A Great Power?"84 In the January 26, 1987, issue of The New Republic, Leon Wieseltier published a related article entitled: "Democracy and Colonel North: Oliver's Apologists and the American Idea." The same questions would again be discussed by Time in its December 8, 1986, issue when its essay addressed the issue: "When Secrecy Meets Democracy."
Further, the secret annex to the Intelligence Authorization Act was ignored on the issue of funding. The Reagan Administration's actions directly conflicted with Congressional powers of the purse with respect to appropriations and Congress' concomitant concern with keeping the Executive branch in line with respect to its war-making powers in Nicaragua. In a well-researched article entitled, "The Secret Team Behind Contragate," Peter Dale Scott identified the real role of the Reagan Administration's "small but highly determined army of covert operations specialists in the United States, and their Cuban cohorts. . John is at the very heart of the conspiracy to keep U.S. funds flowing to the contras in defiance of a Congressional prohibition. "85
A more detailed record of the Reagan Administration's exploits appeared in the Spring 1987 issue of Foreign Policy, in which Doyle McManus noted that: "Only when the Sandinistas shot down one of Secord's cargo planes on October 5, 1986, did the secret supply system begin to unravel seriously." McManus concluded his article with a larger issue in mind:
The strange two-year episode of the private covert war may have uncovered a power of the presidency that has never before been fully illuminated: the power to persuade private citizens and friendly governments, each eager to cultivate Washington, to do what Congress will not. It is a blunt and unwieldy instrument, but it is not easily susceptible to legislative restriction--and that alone may recommend it to future presidents and open up a new field of conflict between executive and legislative branches.86
The practice had been developed before Reagan. The Kissinger/Nixon Doctrine, as developed for Asia in the waning years of the Vietnam War, had been revitalized and updated for use in Central America. The use of client armies87 in place of U.S. armed forces personnel is a key element of the strategy. The deliberate camouflaging of defense expenditures88 and the strategy of Vietnamization, have also been translated into "Nicaraguaization" by the use of the Contras.89
B. El Salvador: Reagan Policy in Central America
The 1975 report of the Church Committee (the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities) produced a report entitled, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders."90 Its shocking findings supposedly led to greater Congressional oversight over covert activities--activities that could easily lead the United States into war by accident. Yet, the Reagan Administration in 1981 was committed to beefing up the CIA's special (covert) operations.91 U.S. covert capabilities expanded substantially in the years that followed. America's unconventional warfare units, including the Navy's SEAL (sea/air/land) commandos, the Army's Special Forces, the Air Force's First Special Operations

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Wing, all assumed a heightened significance under Reagan policy. Even though confined to training and non-combat missions, these special forces were the tools that enabled the Reagan administration to follow a course of militarization in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, in violation of the War Powers Resolution.
The War Powers Resolution requires that a report be filed with Congress when hostilities are expected to occur at a location to which U.S. Armed Forces personnel are assigned. When President Reagan sent advisors to El Salvador in early 1981, he did not provide Congress with a War Powers notification.92 In fact, a War Powers report was never filed.93 The U.S. Army, however, treated El Salvador as if it had been designated as a hostile fire pay zone.94
Between 1981 and 1982, the Government Accounting Office auditors discovered that the U.S. personnel in El Salvador were receiving hostile fire pay for exactly 97 percent of the person-months involved.95 The net result of the State Department's cover-up of the hostile fire issue as well as its filing false reports with Congress was several violations of existing law, including violations of the Arms Export Control Act. The Department of Defense also made misleading representations.96
The Reagan Administration's non-compliance with the War Powers Resolution have to do with both (1) the requirements regarding reporting, and (2) an unwillingness to admit the failure of its policy of militarization in the Third World. The policy is built on a global paradigm whose central premise is that relations with the Third World must be viewed within the context of East-West confrontation and competition. That paradigm ignores another that may be closer to the current realities of international life--a North-South paradigm that emphasizes cooperation, trade and negotiation between the poor South (underdeveloped) and the rich North (industrial and post-industrial societies).
In 1983, Congress attempted to ameliorate the impact of the administration's East-West conflict model with respect to El Salvador when the House of Representatives considered H.R. 3778, entitled, "To Require Congressional Consent Before the Introduction of United States Combat Forces into Central America." The Congress had begun to put the Executive branch on notice. In spite of H.R. 3778, however, the Reagan Administration refused to comply with the reporting provisions contained in the War Powers Resolution (Section 4, subsections a,b,c). Evidence of this failure appeared on the front page of the New York Times, April 23, 1984, when the paper reported that the Pentagon was in a position to assume a combat role in Central America if President Reagan gave the order.97 The article also revealed that a rapid development of a network of bases in Honduras had been undertaken, that war games were being conducted in the Caribbean, that the State Department's role had been weakened so that the CIA's paramilitary forces could take a larger role, that advisors' exposure to fire had been reported, that Israel had denied that it had plans for Salvador military aid, and that an envoy denied that there was a conflict with the War Powers Resolution.98
While the Reagan Administration has postured as the defender of global freedom and democracy, it has failed to protect democracy at home by not complying with the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution. In so doing, it has aided and abetted the starting of brush fire wars in the Third World.99 The Reagan Administration's failure to abide by the letter and the spirit of the War Powers Act demonstrates the almost tragic inevitability of allowing American power and arms to be subverted toward an alignment of interests. This failure is counterproductive to the broadest articulation of American foreign policy aims and objectives.100 In this regard, James Madison's wisdom endures to this day. He noted, during the debate over the war-making power, that: "Those who feared a blazing forest fire were little disposed to authorize the President to start brush fires."101
C. Grenada: The Price for Non Alignment in an Age of Super Power Alignments
In this age of Third World Revolutions, there has been a problem of perception among Washington's elite about the nature of those revolutions. In the case of Grenada, as well as Nicaragua, the revolution included an ideological challenge to American hegemony in the region.102
The Reagan Administration's foreign policy toward the Caribbean and Central America maybe interpreted as an ideological response to a contradictory ideological revolution emanating from the Third World itself. In Nicaragua, part of that challenge embodies a latent but now-actualized hostility to United States military intervention in its domestic affairs. Nicaragua now asserts its right to enjoy the principles of sovereignty and to embark upon an indigenous course of social and political evolution. Washington perceives this as the creation of a model of Third World reform, capable of imitation elsewhere in the region.'°3
The underlying premise that emerges is that Nicaragua set an example, within international society, of how change might be undertaken and that the discontent which the Nicaraguan revolution revealed is

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present elsewhere in the Third World where American business has a vested interest. '04 This latent discontent is the common denominator for the state-type regimes that emerged in Grenada and Nicaragua and that are struggling to the surface in El Salvador. Washington, though, has persistently accused Managua of exporting revolution even as Nicaragua moved to solidify its infant government and to secure its borders. Washington's preoccupation with Third World revolutions has created within the United States foreign policy apparatus a bureaucratic impetus towards intervention.105 The Reagan Administration's reactions reflect how the impetus to intervene can easily remove Congressional consultation and oversight from determining the nature and shape of the United States' response.
The problems created by such revolutions impact directly on the rule and role of law. Since crucial decisions by the actors for--and against--the revolution cannot be made merely on the basis of adherence to already existing norms and legal obligations, the normative order of international law is left to suffer.106 The real problem is that "the stakes of conflict are so large that they induce antagonists to adopt any expedient means to protect their interests" and "such an atmosphere generates lawlessness."107 Crucial norms of "non-aggression" and the respect for sovereignty diminish when Washington perceives itself or its interests threatened by these revolutionary situations. The central interest of Washington policy makers is linked to the assumed sanctity of foreign investment.
Many commentators and legal observers have noted that the concept of intervention took on new meaning with the invasion of the small Caribbean island of Grenada in October of 1983.108 The ascendent political movement in Grenada, the New Jewel Movement led by Maurice Bishop, sought to become a part of the non-aligned world. It sought neither Soviet nor U.S. interference or involvement as it embarked upon a path of social reform after years of neglect and exploitation.109 In this respect, Grenada shared a common goal with the revolutionary struggle in Nicaragua--a shared determination to wipe out past misery and neglect for the lower classes, to increase literacy, and to improve housing and health care for the majority. In addition, the movement sought to embark upon an economic experiment that would not be strangled by political elites whose business interests outweighed the concerns of the new government for the community.110 The Reagan Administration viewed Grenada's actions as a significant departure from the "free trade/free market" ideology that President Reagan had reaffirmed to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in September of 1984, and earlier."' Grenada's experiment was perceived as a threat.
The non-aligned movement is a third alternative for the underdeveloped nations. To snap the dependency relationship engendered by imperialist practices and exploitation, the non-aligned nations movement stresses finding new ways of achieving a more just and peaceful world than the one which now exists. Over two-thirds of mankind lives in the Third World but they have no effective voice or vote over their own future. They want to be more than the ping-pong balls of the superpowers.' 12
Grenada's revolution was smashed by the Reagan Administration not because of a Soviet presence or a Cuban presence or because of some ostensibly endangered medical students. Rather, it was smashed because the Reagan Administration was locked into an old bi-polar world view that is threatened in a revolutionary political system. Also, the Grenada invasion followed the disaster in Beirut where so many American marines had died. Both the Reagan administration and the American people were anxious to see their nation's armed forces in a successful combat role. Grenada afforded that opportunity. Similarities between the Grenada invasion of 1983 and the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965 are rather stark. The chief difference is that the War Powers Resolution did not exist in 1965.
First, the Grenadian Government offered no official invitation to any party for external intervention. 113 Second, no effort was made by Organization of Eastern Caribbean States members, or the U.S., to bring the matter before the Organization of American States or the United Nations Security Council for any kind of action even bordering on achieving a peaceful settlement.t14 Third, the operative provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance were not invoked nor were any statements made by the Reagan Administration alleging that the action upheld the principles enumerated in the Monroe Doctrine in some significant way. Fourth, Latin American states outside of the immediate Caribbean Basin area were not consulted.115
Significantly, the Reagan Administration has had the worst record of performance under the War Powers Resolution. While no president has ever formally conceded the constitutionality of the Resolution, at least Presidents Ford and Carter complied with its terms. Specifically, the Administration has not complied with the reporting requirements under Section 4(a)(1) of the Resolution. Clearly, President Reagan failed to deliver the required report to Congress and this failure was duplicated by President Reagan in regard to El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Lebanon.116

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Congress' attempt to declare the time limit operative following Grenada's invasion was not very successful because of a stall by a procedural impasse. As a result, no triggering provision was ever sent to the White House.1'7 Even if the provision had been triggered, at that point, the very act of engaging it would have amounted to an implicit assumption and admission that the Resolution had failed.118
D. Disaster in Lebanon: From Non-Compliance to Imminent Hostilities
In October of 1986, the then White House National Security Advisor, John M. Poindexter, was exposed as being the author of a controversial memo that outlined a disinformation campaign against Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi. Poindexter asserted that the government has an inherent right to use deception to protect the national security.119 In such a political environment, public expectations were guided and manipulated. Interpretations and symbolic images of Libya and its leadership were presented in terms that often failed to square with the reality of the situation. Those images were directly suited to the administration's plans and its own ideological doctrines.120
The Reagan Administration accepted, even promoted, the burden of post-1945 Cold War history in which the U.S. became the protector of the Free World. As Professor Schlesinger noted in his classic work, The Imperial Presidency: "the Constitution could not easily sustain the weight of the indiscriminate globalism to which the Korean War gave birth."121 A decade later, he would write: "The secrecy system and the presidential claim to inherent war-making power are potent weapons of the Imperial Presidency."'22 Even more serious are the doubts that the debate over the Imperial Presidency has raised about the adequacy of the constitutional system.'23
Clearly, the legal requirements in Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution are abrogated by Executive-sanctioned disinformation campaigns. The Resolution requires that the President consult with Congress "in every possible instance." That means "before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."124 Congress was not given this opportunity with regard to Libya, Grenada, El Salvador or Nicaragua.
The manifest results are destructive of both America's own internal adherence to democratic principles and of its external credibility. In this atmosphere, the right of the public to be informed has been sacrificed in the name of the "national interest." "Government by a self-designated elite--like that of benevolent despotism or of Plato's philosopher kings--may be a good form of government for some people, but it is not the American way."125 An elite rationale that justifies lying, in the name of national security, compromises American institutions and their integrity.
In this respect, Chen is correct in noting that "self-determination is an integral part of a more comprehensive sive social process in which groups and individuals employ strategies, affecting resources, through institutions to attain their goals."126 Self-determination is affected negatively at the national level when governmental elites suspend constitutional practices. Insofar as the removal of that right compromises the domestic constituency of the American public, it compromises and sacrifices the self-determination of the international community as well. The removal of that right allows the President to embark upon a path of military interventionism that is at odds with both the domestic and international mandate of Congress.
The danger of removing Congress from the war-making process is that the Executive easily adopts the mentality of the "quick fix" matched to the attendant evils of "non-disclosure." Such a combination is deadly for the principles requiring prior consultation established by the War Powers Resolution. Non-compliance with the various elements of the Resolution works to effectively remove Congress from deliberations on war and peace.
Correspondingly, non-compliance with the mandate to consult with Congress reallocates power within the government itself. The net result of non-compliance with the Resolution, then, has been the strengthening of the Executive and its internal bureaucratic mandate while foreclosing any dialogue between the various branches of government. This initially led to the illegal mining of Nicaragua's harbors by the CIA in 1984.
With regard to the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces, the Resolution establishes several time-frames for consultation ranging from: (1) initial commitment, to (2) the conduct of hostilities, to (3) the termination of hostilities.127 This allocation and articulation of Congressional participation in the decision-making process recognizes the fact that war may be viewed on a continuum. In that regard, powers, other than the power to declare war, become clear.128 The Resolution acknowledgees the fact that a declaration of war can include a number of limiting causes. Section 3 allows exactly that when it demands that the President consult with Congress after every introduction of troops "until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations."

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By getting our forces out of Lebanon, Congress accomplished precisely this with its so-called "Lebanon Resolution." This was the result even though Secretary Shultz told Congress that the "Lebanon Resolution" would not affect the President's power.129 Two American marines were killed "in action in mid October, after the passage of this act. Two hundred forty-one marines were killed on October 23 in a terrorist bomb explosion at the Marine compound.
The President would not admit that Congressional authorization was needed for an extension of the Marines' stay in Lebanon beyond the eighteen month period.130 The "Lebanon Resolution" limited military activities to the protection of U.S. soldiers, but U.S. air strikes continued. By December of 1983, American fighter bombers had hit Syrian positions.131 Clearly, the events in Lebanon fell under Section 4(a)(1): "In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced--(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances . . .." Similar circumstances existed in the cases of Lebanon, Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
During the episode in Lebanon, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Charles Percy, maintained that: "We have people up there in helicopters, we're shooting rockets and artillery--if that isn't imminent hostilities, I don't know what is."132 This leads to the issue of Reagan's compliance (or lack thereof) with Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.
Reagan's failure to report to Congress under the requirements of this section, combined with his assertion of an inherent Executive authority to authorize military activities, was repeated during the invasion of Grenada.133 The perennial albatross of non-disclosure and non-compliance wreaks havoc on Congressional oversight and participation. The kind of inter-governmental dialogue required by the Resolution's Section 4 was effectively ignored by Reagan's refusal to comply with the law--both in letter and in spirit.
The same failure to submit a Section 4(a)(1) report on the situation in El Salvador characterized Reagan's treatment of the resolution in general. It is not difficult to understand why Reagan ignored the requirement of submitting a Section 4(a)(1) report to the Congress. The reason is found in referencing that requirement to Section 5(b) of the Resolution which requires: "Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to Section 4(a)(1), whichever is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or required to be submitted)."
The fact that Congress had to act affirmatively with respect to the Lebanon situation, in order to invoke the War Powers Resolution and trigger the automatic provision (the 60-day requirement), shows that the Resolution's purpose was frustrated by the administration's non-compliance with Section 4(a)(1). Congress, to its credit, has worked vigorously to extend and expand the sweep and meaning of the Resolution in the Reagan era. The question remains, however: Is Congressional initiative enough in the war-peace/war-powers area to overcome the recalcitrance of Executives committed to the maintenance of an Imperial Presidency?
The approach to the Lebanon situation, ultimately adopted by Congress, represented a compromise between the Legislative and Executive branches. The President signed a joint resolution which invoked the War Powers Resolution and limited the Marines' mission to peacekeeping. In return, Congress authorized the presence of troops in Lebanon for an additional eighteen months.134 Congress passed the compromise measure after securing private assurances from the Administration that the President would abide by the terms of the Resolution and would seek the approval of Congress if it either became necessary to extend the length of the Marines' stay or expand the scope of their duty.135
The compromise between Reagan and the Congress was significant because it placed the discussion on projected military involvement within a wider context of foreign policy goals and objectives. In the case of Lebanon, it resulted in a consideration of broader policy implications. In terms of the future value of such a process, a larger question is addressed: "What issues will characterize a particular situation when the guns are silent?" Also, "May arming insurgents, such as the Contras, be counter-productive to both regional security and to economic development?" "What possibilities exist for a widening of the discussion on unresolved disputes which led to a consideration of armed forces in the first place?" And, finally, "May our understanding of events lead us to consider more than military operations and focus on the dual nature of political problems?" "Is it possible to look beyond a merely military component to foreign policy problems and delineate the diplomatic component a little more clearly?"
The point is that the world view from which purely Executive-controlled initiatives works is too limited. The proclivity of presidents to intervene does not need to be enhanced. Too often, Executive-controlled

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initiatives are premised on assumptions and models and paradigms that could easily be out of focus. The real relevance and applicability of military solutions to foreign policy problems may be more limited than previously imagined. Genuine problems may cry out for negotiation instead.136 The point is well articulated by Chief Justice Hughes in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States:
The Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is vested . . . We pointed out in the Panama Refining case that the Constitution has never been regarded as denying to Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards.137
The reality which lies behind the wisdom of the War Powers Resolution itself is well articulated by Theodore Lowi's observation to the Congress in open hearings, "My concern is for how to make democracy safe for the world, how to make democracy a rational and restraining force in world affairs rather than the goading and volatile force it has so often been.s138
V. THE DIMENSIONS OF POWER: A RESOURCE AND
THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE OTHERS
Robert Keohane observed that to imply "governments act rationally . . . means that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light of both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality."139 To the contrary, governments are motivated by bureaucratic competition and the struggle for power. Governmental perceptions are clouded by too much ideology and too little substance. Even more than this, governments are made up of men. And as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., reminded his readers in The Imperial Presidency,
... since Americans had not found angels in the form of presidents to govern them, the principle that one man could decide better than many was, as Jefferson pointed out in his first inaugural, philosophically defective. It was also incompatible with the democratic ideal. Indeed, if decisions of war andjeace were not subject to popular control, how much scope and substance did democracy really have?1
A. The Scope and Substance of Democracy: The Alliance, Domination, and Domestic Interests in Shaping Policy
Ideology alone cannot provide substance to governance. Ideology's role is to rationalize, to explain, to be that conceptual bridge between faith and action. Yet, a foreign policy undertaken behind the banner of an ideological mandate not only runs the danger of failing to reflct and mirror the realities of the world outside of the borders of its domain, it threatens to corrupt government and governmental practices within its domain. This constitutes, in large measure, the current crisis of the Reagan Presidency.
Berger noted, during the Watergate crisis, that: "If present exigencies demand a redistribution of power vested in Congress--a Presidential power to propel the nation into war without consulting Congress--that decision ought candidly to be submitted to the people in the form of a proposed amendment, not masked by euphemisms."tai Over a decade later, The Tower Commission Report had to squarely face the same issue. In the wake of the Iran-Contra-Scandal, the Report spoke of Congressional oversight and accountability, noting that:
The Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director of CIA, head agencies of government that have specific statutory responsibilities and are subject to Congressional oversight for the implementation of U.S. national security policy. To the extent that the National Security Advisor assumes operational responsibilities, whether by negotiating with foreign governments or becoming heavily involved in military or intelligence operations, the legitimacy of that role and his authority to perform it may be challenged.142
The key point is that unilateral Executive action of this type has historically sought to sanction a pattern of international behavior by Executive decree that Congress would not have sanctioned. To justify this Executive action by relying on isolated events in dur own history as precedent, or for the judiciary to supply the mandate is to accept the general proposition that the Constitution does not apply in foreign affairs. That general proposition was expressly repudiated by Justice Black in Reid v. Covert: "The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.s143 Significantly, although Justice Black wrote for only four Justices, neither the two concurring Justices nor the two dissenting Justices differed with this statement.

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Three years later, in Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton,144 both Justices Stewart and Wittaker announced their fidelity to the proposition stated by Justice Black in Reid. Finally, in Zemel v. Rusk, Chief Justice Warren quoted the Curtiss-Wright case but went on to observe that: "This does not mean that simply because a statute deals with foreign relations, it can grant the Executive totally unrestricted freedom of choice."145 Given this history of judicial precedents, Berger noted that: "Decisions can be made by executive fiat; but fiat cannot supply constitutional sanction."146
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, however, the foreign-policy makers of the Executive Branch are creating a new military and sense of national security to deal with liberation movements in the Third World. According to Burbach, "a southern ring of `hostile or nonaligned states' (the two being considered virtually synonymous) was simply unacceptable to the leaders of the United States."147 In the case of Central America and the Caribbean:
The region has historically been at the center of the U.S. informal empire, the extensive investments in the region, and the reality that counter-revolution has been more than once at the core of U.S. national security thinking--all these factors lock the United States in a prolonged period of conflict with the revolutionary movements and governments in the region.148
Within the ideological framework of this doctrine, labeled the Kissinger-Brezinski-Kirkpatrick-Linkage-Doctrine,"149 all global conflicts are neatly collapsed into the paradigm of East/West conflict. This new military and security design has grown and expanded in the Reagan years. One major casualty of this growth and expansion has been the Constitution (as well as various provisions of the War Powers Resolution). The problem for foreign policy and fidelity to Constitutional principles is that this structural linkage of revolutionary movements to the East/West conflict leaves no room for non-aligned nations (Nicaragua, Libya, Grenada) to adopt policies which are independent of the interests of the Western alliance system.
Hence, indigenous movements for social change and justice are too easily translated by the administration into a manifestation of a wider communist conspiracy. This fundamental realization allows the framing of problems associated with implementation of the War Powers Resolution in a larger conceptual matrix made up of: (1) the Constitutional mandate, (2) a national security doctrine defined more in terms of ideology than reflective of Third World realities or Constitutional restraints on the use of power, (3) the pressures upon the Executive and Legislative branches to intervene from United States business interests having a corporate stake in Third World areas that are seeking a non-aligned path, and (4) the objective struggle between the Superpowers. As a result, the legal requirements of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution are juxtaposed to the ideological doctrines of the Reagan Administration. The Administration's ideological doctrines have guided foreign policy processes more than reality, more than constitutional mandate.
The Administration's views associated with this doctrine were spelled out early in the Reagan years in the Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America'50 (also known as: the Kissinger Commission Report on Central America). The word "bipartisan" in the title of the report is significant in that, historically, the call to bipartisanship has often had the net result of emasculating and short-circuiting the democratic process and the Constitution. The significance of this insight seems to lie in the realization that ideology and its place in the thinking of policy makers has often superceded both Constitutional restraints and a clear picture of the national security.
Clearly, the War Powers Resolution has sharpened the focus on the relationship between the requirements of the Constitution and the dangers inherent in a limited bipolar world view. The question must be asked, in regard to U.S. foreign policy for the 1980s and 1990s, what shall the nation's relationship be to a revolutionary world? To a non-aligned world that refuses to be placed within the bipolar paradigm of the 1950s? Does this nation not have an obligation to respect the independence and sovereignty of other states, even if those states choose to follow a different course of economic and political evolution than our own?
Those questions cannot begin to be answered without the realization that U.S. foreign policy is not merely a reaction to the world outside. United States' domestic politics are linked to the foreign policy choices that are implemented. Foreign policy emanates from the aspirations and desires of various American constituencies--especially corporate business interests. The point is that by allowing the Executive to operate in a constitutional vacuum, devoid of Congressional input, oversight, and consultation, all other domestic constituencies are effectively eliminated from having an input into the foreign policy process via the Congress. National dialogue and discourse becomes undemocratic at that precise moment when certain groups and constituencies are allowed to dictate to the Executive what they want done.

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The history of the Reagan years seems to indicate that foreign policy has been largely shaped by the interests of a vast corporate constituency. As Burbach has noted:
An analysis of the business organizations also reveals that there is a special alliance of business interests which is mobilizing support for Reagan's policies in the Caribbean Basin. Business interests in the South and West, which comprise the hard core of Reagan's general support in the business community, are clearly taking an aggressive stance with him in the Caribbean Basin. But what is interesting to observe is that the Rockefellers, the old leaders of the eastern establishment, are collaborating closely with Reagan and his southern and western business allies.151
This process has continued even at the expense of the more broadly defined "national interest", international law, and the Constitution. Yet, this historical realization seems to confirm the wisdom of requiring, under the War Powers Resolution, "consultation" between the Executive and the Legislative so that a narrowly defined set of domestic interests will not lead the nation into war. For that reason, Congress cannot and should not delegate its war-making powers granted under the Constitution. As Francis Wormuth observed:
The rule against the delegation of legislative power is not a kind of spendthrift trust for the protection of the prerogatives of Congress. It exists for the benefit of the people rather than of Congress. It is intended to ensure that major decisions of policy are taken by a numerous and representative body rather than by a single man and his small clique of counsellors.'S'
Congress, as an institution, reflects many different domestic constituencies. In so doing, Congress is capable of articulating a more restrained and diversified view of foreign policy options than, for example, the Committee on the Present Danger. That Committee was set up by the New Right in 1976 to wage a political campaign for a massive new armaments program to confront what it viewed as the growing Soviet threat. Its leadership, including Paul Nitze, Richard Pipes, and Eugene Rostow, worked to declare what President Reagan would come to depict as the central foreign policy issue--the threat of Soviet military power and its "adventurism" in the Third World.153
That administrations adopt the views of such groups is problematic because the practice eliminates Congress as a co-equal partner in the Constitutional scheme, seriously compromising the national debate and distorting our view of what constitutes national interest. Arthur Schlesinger summed up the problem well:
The separation of powers is most deplored in the field of foreign policy. Yet here it is the indispensable engine of consent, and consent is never more indispensable than on questions of peace and war. Congressional criticism alerts a President to flaws in his policies. Congressional support strengthens his hand and increases his authority. After Vietnam, an intelligent President would surely wish to secure congressional consent to any course on foreign affairs carrying the risk of war.154
In assessing the Reagan administration's fidelity to the War Powers Resolution, the domestic element of foreign policy must also be addressed. As this paper has argued, the President should not, in the American constitutional scheme, undertake abroad any effort that Congress will not endorse or for which Congress will not appropriate funds vis-a-vis its power of the purse and the processes of budgetary appropriations. Since the 1947 chartering of the CIA, many major problems have arisen in this area as covert operations have escaped close scrutiny.'55 The lack of Congressional oversight capabilities with respect to the CIA is precisely one more link in that chain of events which necessitated a reworking of the Constitutional mandate regarding the war powers. The construction of a foreign policy which truly reflects the "national interest" will have a tremendous impact on how the nation either demonstrates its fidelity to the Constitution or embarks upon a deviation from those principles in the name of "national security". Hence, the domestic formulation of foreign policy cannot be understood without seeing the link that exists between "national interest" and "national security" or the elaboration of our foreign policy initiatives in the international arena. As Richard Falk has noted: "International law as a perspective on world order . . . suffers from its tendency to neglect the influence of domestic public order systems."156
In a real sense, the domestic and foreign policies of the nation are not isolated but are integrated into a total vision of the nation's place in the world. Foreign policy purposes actually grow from domestic desires to protect, deepen and solidify the interests of a very specific domestic system that has its own domestic paradigm. Therefore, as global commitments are made, their design becomes linked with the protection of a particular definition and "agenda for the system at home.s157 Foreign policy is motivated by the nature and mandate supplied by this particular "domestic paradigm."158 In its turn, this paradigm becomes a part of the working agendas of the President and members of Congress. They must figure out how to make the domestic paradigm operational as they shape both foreign policy, on the one hand, and the federal budget, on the other.159

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Indicative of the difficulties that the domestic paradigm imposes on the formulation of foreign policy is the classic statement from the Trilateral Commission, The Crisis of Democracy.160 As the authors viewed the domestic paradigm, the greatest threat to democracy is democracy itself. They asserted that the "vulnerability of democratic government in the United States . . . comes not primarily from external threats .. . but rather from the internal dynamics of democracy itself in a highly educated, mobilized, and participant society."161
Samuel Huntington, quoting James Madison's contribution to The Federalist on the internal dynamics of governance, wrote that we must first "enable the government to control the governed" and then "oblige it to control itself." He asserted that, "never before in American history . . . have the citizens and citizen organizations been more assertive and effective, in other words, more uncontrollable."162 However, it is essential to realize that both citizen and Congressional power is predicated upon maintaining this very assertiveness and effectiveness (an idea in disrepute for the members of the Trilateral Commission). Both citizen and Congressional power (contrary to Huntington's view) is also vital to curtail the President's war-making power. Madison observed, in The Federalist, No. 10:
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole.
The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.'63
B. Establishing a "Principled Realism" in Foreign Policy
In the last analysis, the record of the Reagan Administration's noncompliance with the various mandates of the War Powers Resolution points toward the irrelevance of an over-emphasis upon East/West confrontation. An emerging consciousness within the new global order demands a shift in emphasis to the debt crisis, the resurgence of Nationalism, and the legal categories of sovereignty, non-intervention, and inter-dependence!
Such an emerging consciousness means institutional restructuring with an unwavering fidelity to legal norms which reinforce predictability and mutual respect. Therefore, the War Powers Act can effectively reduce the American proclivity to intervene and put in its place a foreign policy consciousness that does not sabotage non-aligned Third World interests while helping to ensure that the international community debates emerging standards of cooperation absent an interventionary drive.164 The Reagan Administration, however, has been a promoter of an interventionist pattern associated with American multinational investment in Central America and has sought to downplay human rights and social reform in favor of an exclusive military approach.165
The Administration's entire series of unilateral actions undertaken since 1981, in violation of the War Powers Resolution, would have been unnecessary if it had supported the Contadora Peace Process in Central America. The Contadora Group (Panama, Venezuela, Mexico, and Columbia), working hard to achieve a negotiated settlement, has called for: (1) a renewal of negotiation efforts; (2) a cessation of support for irregular forces in the region (i.e., Contras and Cubans); (3) the removal of all foreign military advisors and installations from the region; (4) a freeze on the procurement of armaments; and (5) respect for the principles of self-determination, territorial integrity, political pluralism and human rights.
The Contadora Peace Plan has been endorsed by no fewer than thirteen Latin American Nations (Panama, Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua), as well as the European Economic Community and Japan. 166 For its part, the Reagan Administration has embarked upon a deception-ridden policy under which the President has accused his Congressional adversaries of "distortions" and "falsehoods".167 This is not the kind of Executive activity that the War Powers Act contemplated when it authorized and mandated "consultation" between the President and the Congress.
In June 1985, Senator Edward Kennedy issued a statement in support of an amendment prohibiting U.S. combat troops in Nicaragua without advance approval of Congress. His press statement noted that:

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We do not want to slip-slide into a war in Central America without full consultation with the Congress ... What this particular amendment provides is that, prior to the involvement of American combat troops in combat ... the President must obtain positive approval, by the Congress, before sending those troops. We are simply asking that the Congress be permitted to act prospectively, not after the fact.168
On March 27, 1986, Senator Kennedy's office again released a statement in support of the amendment, noting that: "Congress has a responsibility to the people that elected us, and we have a duty to the Constitution." Kennedy argued for an American approach that depicted us not as the "colossus from the North" but "as one member of the community of nations in the Western Hemisphere." In a clear attack on the Reagan policy of intervention, he asserted that: "For too long, we have been cavalier with the Contadora nations; for too long, we have ignored the Organization of American States."169
In a 1986 "News Release", the Council on Hemispheric Affairs offered its own program for disengagement which would allow the gradual implementation of Contadora.170 Yet, the Reagan Administration, according to former CIA analyst David Mac Michael, could only give "lip service to Contadora."171 In terms of its overall foreign policy design, the reluctance of the Reagan Administration to cooperate with the Contadora nations is not proof of U.S. strength, but rather is proof of its failed policy of intervention.172
The net effect of the Reagan Administration's policy is to empower non-public, secretive elements within the U.S. Government, by draining dry the authoritative mechanisms of Congressional oversight, Congressional participation, and Congressional consultation. The problem is that Reagan's emphasis upon the military option component is neither a workable option nor a legal one. It is weighted on the side of intervention in an ideological war or cause of maintaining "security-interests" and fortifying the geopolitical rationale of "stability" within the framework of a bipolar worldview. And interestingly enough, as Schlesinger notes: "The historian is bound to note that unilateral action by the United States in Latin America is nearly always a mistake."173
The military option component is flawed insofar as it ignores the fact that the old ideological worldview suffers from its discourse-dependency on the themes of a dead past. In so doing, the paradigm it presents actually supplants new knowledge, wisdom, and experience that is often contradictory with past "truths." Hence, it forecloses open dialogue. As dialogue is foreclosed, so too are options. Historical opportunities (such as Contadora) become missed opportunities. As options vanish, so too does the value of Congressional consultation. When the unilateral military actions of the Executive harden opposition to peace processes and generate a momentum of its own, war is the likely outcome. As negotiation becomes more remote, so too, peace becomes more improbable.174
Can democracy be made safe for the world? Can the War Powers Resolution act as a force for peace as well as Executive constraint? The answer to both questions may be placed in the affirmative, but this requires a double-step in the political process. First, the President must act in compliance with and in fidelity to the War Powers Resolution. Second, the Congress and the President must work together to redefine their global vision in accordance with the nations of the Third World. In this regard, the War Powers Resolution could be used as a tool to help assess the nation's foreign policy decision making. Instead of reflexively allowing the military option or component to own the center stage of decision making, the nation may move toward an incorporation of more humane values; for example, support of the International Bill of Human Rights. Such an emphasis may prove more powerful in the world than any "Armada" of weapons.
The mandate of the War Powers Resolution reaffirms Congressional power and Congress' rightful authority to terminate the interventionist policies of an American-Imperium. The effects of the Cold War created an unconstitutional assumption: that Washington's Executive establishment could act in the arena of foreign policy oblivious to legal standards which did exist and were enforceable. Yet, because those standards were not enforced, there was "a presumption of legality to the illegal."175
A humane role for American democracy must evolve and may evolve in a framework of mutual compliance with the laws of the land and the international community.176 The War Powers Resolution is more than mere restraint on the prerogatives of the Executive. It should also provide a basis for the actions and the policies of the Executive. When Congress endorses the actions of the President, it must be able to do so knowing that the Constitutional requirements have not been circumvented.
Congressional consultation allows political integrity to be manifested in the consultative-process. It acts as a bar to impropriety and poor judgment. It serves to legitimate Presidential action as it also works to assure allies and allay fears of indiscriminate action without reflection. In sum, it restores Constitutional principles to their rightful preeminence.

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ENDNOTES
*University of San Diego School of Law. Master of Theological Studies, 1978 Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago. BA, 1974 San Diego State University. The author wishes to thank Professor Larry Alexander, University of San Diego School of Law, for his assistance in this project. The author also wishes to dedicate this article to the memory of President John Kennedy.
1.	U.S. Coast. art. I, § 8, cl: 11.
2.	Rostow, Once More Unto the Breach: The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 Val. U.L. Rev. 1-52 (1986).
3.	Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 29 (1972); Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 Calif. L. Rev. 623 (1972).
4.	Rostow, supra note 2, at 43.
5.	Berger, supra note 3, at 50.
6.	Id. at 30.
7.	Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 Va. L. Rev. 109 (1984).
8.	See, e.g., Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1972-73); R. Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (1974).
9.	Berger, supra note 3, at 31.
10.	The Federalist No. 69, 448 (Bantam Books).
11.	Berger, supra note 3, at 41.
12.	Refer to The Federalist on the topic of war-making powers.
13.15 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 397 (J. Boyd ed. 1955) quoted in S. Rep. No. 797, 90th Cong. ,1st Sess. 9 (1967).
14.	K. Waltz, "Political Structures," Neorealism and its Critics 73 (R. Keohane ed. 1986).
15.	Id. at 74.
16.	E. Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power 88-90 (1982).
17.	Id. at 144.
18.	See U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (using J. Sutherland's phrase).
19.	Carter, supra note 7, at 114.
20.	R. Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (1974).
21.	Carter, supra note 7, at 114.
22.	K. Waltz, "Laws and Theories," Neorealism and Its Critics, supra note 14, at 31.
23.	Keynes, supra note 16, at 164.
24.	Id.
25.	Id. at 164; S.J. Res. 159, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
26.	A. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency 198 (1974).
27.	The Federalist No. 67, 436 (Bantam Books).
28.	R. Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs 79 (1971).
29.	343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
30.	Id. at 579-642.
31.	G. Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, The United States, and the Modern Historical Experience 125 (1985).
32.	Berger, supra note 3, at 54.
33.	Id.
34.	Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.L. Rev. 19, 31 (special issue 1970).
35.	Wormuth, supra note 3, at 633.
36.	J. Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (1986).
37.	Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power 134 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1089 (1986).
38.	25 U.S. 19 (1827).
39.	Carter, supra note 7, at 121.
40.	67 U.S. 635 (1863).
41.	Carter, supra note 7, at 121.
42.	R. Pious, The American Presidency 397 (1979).
43.	Keynes, supra note 16, at 124.
44.	The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board, New York Times, 98 (Special 1987).
45.	Berger, supra note 20, at 317.
46.	Lobel,	supra note 37, at 1091.
47.	A. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History 297 (1986).
48.	G. Reichard, "The Domestic Politics of National Security," The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960 268 (1986).
49.	War Powers Resolution § 2(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1976).
50.	343 U.S. at 579-642 (Jackson, J.).

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51.	H.R. Rep. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2346, 2349.
52.	War Power Resolution § 3, 50 U.S.C. S 1542 (1976).
53.	Rostow, supra note 2, at 41.
54.	Carter, supra note 7, at 118-119.
55.	Rostow, supra note 2, at 41.
56.	Carter, supra note 7, at 118-119.
57.	War Powers Resolution § 4(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1976).
58.	War Powers Resolution § 5(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c) (1976).
59.	Rostow, supra note 2, at 41.
60.	War Powers Resolution §§ 6-8, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1545-1547 (1976).
61.	Schlesinger, supra note 47, at 290.
62.	Keynes, supra note 16, at 85.
63.	Schlesinger, supra note 26, at 386.
64.	K. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," Neorealism and its Critics, supra note 14, at 99.
65.	354 U.S. 1 (1957).
66.	Keynes, supra note 16, at 86.
67.	Id. at 91-94.
68.	Schlesinger, supra note 47, at 291.
69.	Id. at 297.
70.	Blachman & Sharpe, De-Democratising American Foreign Policy: Dismantling the Post-Vietnam Formula, 8 Third World Quarterly 1308 (Oct. 1986).
71.	Draper, Reagan's Junta, N.Y. Review of Books 5 (Jan. 29, 1985).
72.	R. Burbach & P. Flynn eds., The Politics of Intervention: The United States in Central America 67 (1984).
73.	Schlesinger, supra note 47, at 60.
74.	The Tower Commission Report, supra note 44, at 62.
75.	Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 Va. J. Int'l Law 639, 683-689 (1985).
76.	A. Neier, "The Legal Implications of the CIA's Nicaragua Manual," The CIA's Nicaragua Manual--Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare 101 (with essays by J. Omang & A. Neier) (1985).
77.	See P. Rosset & J. Vandermeer eds., Nicaragua: Unfinished Revolution))The New Nicaragua Reader 294 (1986).
78.	H.R. Rep. No. 122, Part I, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1983).
79.	Neier, supra note 76, introduction.
80.	Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981).
81.	M. Dixon ed., On Trial: Reagan's War Against Nicaragua--Testimony of the Permanent People's Tribunal (1985).
82.	Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sovereignty and Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1 (1983).
83.	Parry & Barger, Reagan's Shadow CIA, The New Republic, November 24, 1986, at 23-27- see especially, Who's
Who in the Contra Network, at 25.
84.	In 1984, The New York Times and The Washington Post raised questions regarding the CIA's role. See Brinkley, Legislators Ask if Reagan Knew of CIA'sRole, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1984, atA-1, col. 2. See also, Brinkley, President Orders 2 Investigations on CIA Manual, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1984, atA-1, col. 4; Washington Post, Dec. 7, 1984,
at A-44, col. 1.
85.	Scott, The Secret Team Behind Contragate, The Nation 97 (Jan. 31, 1987).
86.	McManus, Dateline Washington: Gipperdammerung, Foreign Policy 170-172 (Spring 87).
87.	V. Brodine & M. Selden eds., Open Secret: The Kissinger-Nixon Doctrine in Asia (1972); Reisman, Private Armies
in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision 14 Va. J. Int'l Law 1, 1-55 (1973).
88.	J. Dower, "Asia and the Nixon Doctrine: The New Face of Empire," Open Secret: The Kissinger)Nixon Doctrine
in Asia 141 (V. Brodline & M. Selden eds. 1972).
89.	M. Dixon ed., On Trial: Reagan's War Against Nicaragua--Testimony of the Permanent People's Tribunal (1985); Atlas, Contra Aid Pipeline Goes Private after Covert U.S. Funds Dry Up, Chicago Tribune, March 24, 1985; One Minute on `Contra' Corruption 132 Cong. Rec. 88 (daily ed. June 25, 1986).
90.	Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, AnlnterimReport, 347 (Nov. 18, 1975) U.S. Government Printing Office.
91.	J. Pearce, Under the Eagle: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean (1981).
92.	R. Banner, Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador 272 (1984).
93.	Id. at 273.
94.	Id. at 274.
95.	Id. at 275.
96.	Id.
97.	N.Y. Times, April 23, 1984.
98.	Id.

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99.	Klare, The Reagan Doctrine--Reagan's $1.5 Trillion Military Buildup Goes Hand in Glove with a New, Aggressive War-Making Stretegy, Inquiry (March/April 1984).
100.	Church, America's New Foreign Policy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1981, (magazine) at 30.
101.	War Powers Legislation, 1973: Hearings on S. 440 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1973) (to Make Rules Governing the Use of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Absence of a Declaration of War by the Congress).
102.	Burbach & Flynn, The Politics of Intervention 11-27 (1984).
103.	Falk, "World Revolution and International Order," NOMOS VIII 154, 155 (C.J. Friedrich ed. 1966).
104.	Id. at 155.
105.	Id.
106.	Id. at 160.
107.	Id.
108.	A. Singham & S. Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments 358ff (1986).
109.	Singham, Nonaligned Voices, The Nation 268-69 (Sept. 27, 1986).
110.	J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double-Standards--Rationalism and Reason in Politics (1982).
111.	See Text of President's Remarks to I.M.F. and World Bank and Free Trade Backed by Reagan, N.Y. Times 35 (Sept. 26, 1984).
112.	New England Regional Office of the American Friends Service Committee, Nuclear War and U.S. Intervention: The Deadly Connection (J. Gerson ed. 1986).
113.	See Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada--Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 Am. J. Int'l Law 143 (1984).
114.	Id. at 143. See also Ratner & Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Power Resolution, 17 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 744 (1984).
115.	Joyner, supra note 113, at 143.
116.	Ratner & Cole, supra note 114, at 744-745.
117.	Glennon, The War Powers Resolution Ten Years Later: More Politics than Law, 78 Am. J. Int' l Law 573 (1984).
118.	Id. at 573.
119.	N. Kempster, Poindexter Defense Deception on Security Issues, L.A. Times, Oct. 15, 1986, Part I at 16.
120.	R. Rothman, "The Symbolic Uses of Public Information," Government Secrecy in Democracies 75 (I. Galnoor ed., Introduction by C. Friedrich 1977).
121.	Schlesinger, supra note 26, at 168.
122.	Schlesinger, supra note 47, at 300-301.
123.	Id. at 301.
124.	See War Powers Resolution § 4(a)(1), 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (1976).
125.	McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: H, 54 Yale L.J. 534, 577-578 (1945).
126.	L. Chen, "Self-Determination as a Human Right," Toward World Order and Human Dignity: Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal (W. Reisman & B. Wester eds. 1976).
127.	Congress, the President, and the War Power, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. , 2d Sess. at 125 (1970) (Statement ofJ. Moore, Professor of Law, The University of Virginia School of Law).
128.	Id. at 288 (Statement of Professor T. Lowi, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago).
129.	41 Cong. Q. 2095(1983); see, 129 Cong. Rec. 13,033 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
130.	41 Cong. Q. 2142 (1983).
131.	130 Cong. Rec. S737 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1984).
132.	41-Cong. Q. 1876 (Sept. 3, 1983).
133.	Ratner & Cole, supra note 114, at 749.
134.	41 Cong. Q. 2015-20 (Oct. 1, 1983).
135.	S.J. Res. 159, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Both Houses of Congress passed the Joint Resolution on Sept. 29, 1983. President Reagan signed the measure into law on Oct. 12. (Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983)).
136.	See Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy 1962 (1959).
137.	295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935).
138.	T. Lowi, "President and Congress: War and Civil Liberties," War Powers Legislation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. at 109 (1971).
139.	R. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics," Neorealism and Its Critics 11 (R. Keohane ed. 1986).
140.	Schlesinger, supra note 26, at 274.
141.	Berger, supra note 20, at 111.
142.	The Tower Commission Report, supra note 44, at 11.
143.	354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957); Berger, supra note 20, at 86.

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144.	361 U.S. 234, 259-277 (1960).
145.	381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); Wormuth, supra note 3, at 695.
146.	Berger, supra note 20, at 86.
147.	Burbach & Flynn, supra note 72, at 16.
148.	Id. at 17.
149.	A. Singham & S. Hune, supra note 108, at 361.
150.	The Report of the President's National Bipartisan Commission On Central America, Established by Exec. Order 12433 of July 19, 1983, U.S. Government Printing Office.
151.	Burbach & Flynn, supra note 72, at 208.
152.	Wormuth, supra note 3, at 685.
153.	Burbach & Flynn, supra note 72, at 72.
154.	Schlesinger, supra note 47, at 311.
155.	See P. Agee, Inside The Company: CIA Diary (1976); C. Robbins, Air America (1985); D. Garwood, Under Cover: Thirty-Five Years of CIA Deception (1985).
156.	R. Falk, "The Role of Law in World Society: Present Crisis and Future Prospects", Toward World Order and Human Dignity 159 (W. Reisman & B. Weston eds. 1976).
157.	B. Andrews, The Domestic Content of International Desire, 38 Int'l Organization 327 (Spring 1984).
158.	Klare, American Arms Supermarket (1984).
159.	J. Cohen & J. Rogers, Rules of the Game: American Politics and the Central America Movement (PACCA Series on the Domestic Roots of United States Foreign Policy 1986).
160.	M. Crozier, S. Huntington, J. Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report On The Governability of Democracies To The Trilateral Commission (1975).
161.	Id. at 115.
162.	S. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (1981).
163.	The Federalist No. 10: Madison 45 (Bantam Books).
164.	J. Petras, Latin America---Bankers, Generals, and the Struggle for Social Justice (1986).
165.	Id. at 3-72, 87-155.
166.	See Introduction of a Resolution in Support of the Contadora Process, Senate Resolution introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy, March 4, 1986.
167.	Council On Hemispheric Affairs---News And Analysis (for weekend release) April 15, 1986.
168.	Press Release, Senator E. Kennedy, June 6, 1985.
169.	Press Release, Senator E. Kennedy, March 27, 1986.
170.	Council On Hemispheric Affairs, April 12, 1980.
171.	MacMichael, Lip Service To Contadora, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 29, 1985.
172.	M. Blachman & W. Grande eds., Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America 355 (1986).
173.	Schlesinger, supra note 47, at 60-61.
174.	See Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua: Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 Va. J. Int'l Law 621 (1985).
175.	M. Raskin, "From Imperial War-Making To A Code of Personal Responsibility: The Erosion of Congressional Power", Washington Plans An Aggressive War: A Documented Account of the U.S. Adventure in Indochina 275 (R. Stavins, R. Barnet, & M. Raskin eds. 1971).
176.	See I-II The International Dimensions of Human Rights (K. Vasak ed. 1982).

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