Development Bank in Latin America: Towards a So-Called Radical Emancipatory Project?

By: Clemént Doleac, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

The End of Mainstream International Conditional Loans?

Mainstream lenders such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the World Bank (WB) have proposed in regional loans that development projects to Latin America being made.[1] These loans and projects proposed to Latin American countries associated with international lenders are mostly based in Washington, D.C., and scheduled to be accompanied by conditionalities. These conditions could include the privatization of the public sector, openness of the local economy, promotion of free trade agreements, and the end of public subventions to support local producers.[2] These conditions will be based on a neoliberal ideology, a mainstream international economic ideology in the hemisphere during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s that continues to dominate development throughout the southern hemisphere.[3] However, in the past, these conditions have failed to consistently lead the region to more prosperity, reduce poverty, and improve quality of life.[4] If conditions are rejected or disrespected by potential borrowers, then the lender will most likely deny the possibility of future loans.[5] As a result of rejecting these conditional loans that hide the U.S. Government’s act of financial hegemony behind an approach that emphasizes the mainstream, some South American governments are likely to choose to promote new institutions in order to provide loans without conditions, or even ones that are beneficial for their own countries rather than their less privileged neighbors. The Bank of the South (Banco del Sur) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA, Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América) Bank are two of the dedicated new institutions for such new project.

Founding Concepts and Ideology of the Banco del Sur

The Banco del Sur was created in December 2007, in order to specifically finance economic and social development projects.[6] This bank has tried to capture  private funds mostly concentrated in the United States in order to finance productive investments and industrialization projects; small, medium, and large manufacturing production units at intra and extra-regional levels; social projects. Also, the construction of infrastructure, energetic projects, trade integration projects, have been aimed at reducing regional disparities.[7] The Banco del Sur is also supposed to promote projects based on social justice and respond to a string of environmental emergencies. The bank has therefore been conceived as an alternative project aimed against hegemonic institutions such as the IADB, the WB, or the Development Bank CAF and their conditional loans that has led to structural adjustment projects during the 1980s and 1990s, not one but two economic lost decades in Latin America.[8]

Former Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez inspired the creation of the Banco del Sur. In the course of speaking at a series of international forums, he advocated for the repatriation of Latin American countries’ international reserves deposited in bank reserves in a number of Northern countries, such as U.S.-based financial institutions. Ideally, he intended to use these funds to finance development and poverty eradication projects. He constantly highlighted the dire need for a new international financial system in which the Banco del Sur could have its own prominent location. The ideology behind the project can be quickly described as contra-hegemonic and was supported by actors of civil society such as the Committee for the Abolition of the Third World Debt (Comité pour l’Annulation de la Dette du Tiers-Monde, CADTM). CADTM director Eric Toussaint as well as non-mainstream scholars, and Bolivarian members (ALBA which include as member states Ecuador, Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Santa Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines) also have supported it to one degree or another.[9] Another objective of the Banco del Sur is aimed at coordinating the macro economic and monetary regional policies. It was therefore designed as a fundamental pillar of integration and funding of the South American Nation’s Union (Union de las Naciones Sur-Americanas, UNASUR).[10]

The Banco del Sur Capital and Institutions

The bank will have an authorized capital of $20 billion USD, with 20,000 trade shares, each with a par value of $1 million USD. The subscribed capital is $7 billion USD and the authorized capital is $20 billion USD, twice as much as the financial capacities of the lending multilateral agency, CAF.[11] While only UNASUR member states may hold the main shares, every state in the world may be a purchaser of secondary shares. Finally, central banks, mixed public and semi-public financial institutions (if a state is a main shareholder), or multilateral lending agencies can also buy the secondary shares.

The Banco del Sur is the largest development bank in the region after the Brazilian Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social, BNDES). To  withdraw this very important capital, shareholder countries have different deadlines depending on their economic solvency. Thus the three main countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela will provide 20 percent of the subscribed capital one year after the agreement but they have up to a year after ratification to provide the capital. The remaining 80 percent of the capital will be provided in four annual equal and consecutive deposits. These three countries endorsed  for $7 billion USD shares. Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay will provide no less than 10 percent of their shares after ratification during the first year and the remaining 90 percent in nine annual deposits equal and consecutive with the possibility to accelerate these deposits.[12] The UNASUR member states can buy up to $3 billion USD shares.

Each of these countries can provide access loans for an amount up to eight times their subscribed capital, while the three founding countries  and largest subscribers cannot obtain loans exceeding more than four times their promised capital. The principal shares will be paid in U.S. dollars, or by a payment of up to 90 percent in U.S. dollars and 10 percent in local currency for each share. Whichever the method of payment chosen, 20 percent will be effective capital and the remaining will be used as capital guarantee. If the bank faces financial difficulties, the capital guarantee may be required and must be paid in cash.[13]

Banco del Sur operates in accordance to three main bodies.[14] The first one is the Ministers Council, incorporated by the ministers of economy, finance, treasury or equivalent member state officials. The Ministers Council is aided in this task by a board of directors, composed of one representative of each member state, appointed by the Council of Ministers after being proposed by the country. The second is the Executive Board, whose members are the shareholders of the bank (with each member having the right to name a director). Also, directors are nominated by minor shareholders, and hold voice, but no vote. Finally, Banco del Sur counts with an Executive Board integrated by the representatives of the member states. It selects a president that serves as the bank’s legal representative and who chooses the Executive Committee. This Executive Committee will be composed of a president and a maximum of three directors (with at least one from a member of states subscribing smaller amounts of capital like Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Suriname, and Uruguay). Each member state has one vote. Loans over $70 million USD require a two thirds vote of the Directors and should represent more than 66 percent of the main shareholders of which Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela account for 85.7 percent. This illustrates the importance of these three countries within Banco del Sur and also reflected in the capital of the Bank.[15]

Contra-hegemonic Project or Another Hegemonic Project? The Ambiguous Role of Brazil

At the time that Banco del Sur was founded, severe tensions between the main actors became an issue. The Bolivarian countries were looking for a radical change and a redefinition of regional finances. Other more moderate countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, wanted to make a regional financial system, not reinvent it.[16] The argument focused on several key issues, such as the possibility of financing large private corporations, or prioritizing sustainable and environmentally friendly local entreprises. The loan’s conditionality was potentially another obstacle to be overcome. The underlying question was: should Banco del Sur work with traditional practices similar to international lenders or not impose any conditions for the loans? Finally, the debate focused on the need to finance Banco del Sur through member states’ financial reserves or through bonds and thus foreign capital. On these three questions, the same divisions appeared between ALBA member states and the other countries. Bond issuance was not retained as an option and Banco del Sur could count on only $3.5 billion USD, based on member states’ capital, and priority was given to large industrialization and infrastructure projects.

The main problem of Banco del Sur has been Brazil’s hegemonic attitude. Brazil already had its own Development Bank, the BNDES, which has a capital of $50 billion USD, exceeding Banco del Sur by nearly 15 times. Brazil has had a very passive attitude during the negotiations and did not even attend preparatory meetings for the Banco del Sur founding treaty. The Brazilian government seem to have  no interest in promoting Banco del Sur with a panoply of new projects due to its national interests. In fact, the BNDES already financed foreign-based projects. The BNDES belongs to Brazil whereas, Banco del Sur does not. Because the project did not hugely benefit Brazil’s national interest, Brasilia demonstrated little regard.

Deficiencies and Limitations of the Banco del Sur: Discussions of a Regional Currency

The fact is that the Banco del Sur’s capital is very limited and insufficient to fill the needs of the region. However, Banco del Sur does not impose any conditions to its loans – a very important difference compared to Washington-based lenders. Additionally, Banco del Sur does not play a particularly important role in the autonomy of local currencies against the U.S. dollar, which remains the reference currency in Latin America’s financial system. Currently, Latin American countries must attract foreign investment while orienting their economy towards export to the United States as a means to attract U.S. dollars (the only currency accepted on international markets for goods and services). Without the U.S. dollar, Latin American countries would not be able to import raw material, technology, and services, while supporting their effort to export to the U.S.. Financial crises occurred historically when these countries could not consider to pay their debt loans (held in the U.S. dollar) because they could not attract enough of this currency, and their own local currencies were devalued. Discussions on a new regional or global financial architecture in order to replace the U.S. dollar are not new. Banco del Sur does not address the idea of a regional currency, the control of foreign reserves, or the establishment of intra-regional trade in regional currencies in order to reach financial stability. There are no common fiscal, monetary, or exchange rate policies proposed in order to assure macroeconomic stability.[17]

Economists, mainly based in the United States, propose two other opposing strategies. The first is to create a supranational currency to replace national currencies, based on the European model of the Euro, in order to substitute the U.S. dollar. The second strategy  proposes  the adoption of one national currency as a regional currency that would lead to the dollarization of Latin American economies, with an asymmetric monetary union advocated by many orthodox economists.[18]

One of the fundamental functions of a regional bank would be to retrench on capital volatility. This overall objective seeks here to promote local investment and the promotion of local economies, preserving the sovereignty of local currencies, and protecting the region against speculative attacks and external financial shocks. All these goals cannot be reached without a fbank filling its duties as currency manager. The Banco del Sur could have extended its role as a central bank; a regional transmitter, creator of currency, and coordinator of macro-economic policies. But the option chosen was to focus on a much smaller role as a single international lender.[19]

A supranational currency promoted by the Banco del Sur could result in reduced dependence on the dollar. With such a mechanism, the only two other currencies allowed to operate in the region would be national and regional currencies. This function of a central bank, as well as a development bank, would not replace the central banks of member countries for their original roles. Rather it would act as a central body that provides, coordinates, and monitors monetary transactions involving capital controls at both the national and regional level. This possibility would be a very concrete way to fight against the dollarization of Latin American economies and against the ebb and flow of foreign capital that causes economic bubbles, and helps to prevent capital volatility.[20]

Due to Brazilian and Argentinian opposition, the Banco del Sur was never turned into a regional central bank causing some countries to propose another option. That is how the far more ambitious Banco del ALBA was born.

The Goals, Capital, and Institution of the Banco del ALBA (BA)

ALBA is an integration platform built on the principles of solidarity, complementarity, cooperation, and justice against the current neoliberal integration model that has been promoted by the United States since the 1980s and 1990s by means of the Washington Consensus. This consensus is a neoliberal pro-free trade package of economic measures designed by the Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations, in Washington DC, to induce crisis-wracked developing countries, and to expand the power and influence of the private sector.[21] After several rounds of negotiations, the funding phase of the Banco del ALBA was signed on January 26, 2008 during the VI summit of ALBA in Caracas, Venezuela, by the five member countries at the time: Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Dominica.[22] Its headquarters are located in Caracas, and a branch has been established in Cuba. The creation of the ALBA was also in opposition to the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). ALBA is a political, economic, and social alliance that promotes independence, self-determination, and self-identity of the people who compose it, as part of a process to oppose the north American hegemony.

This bank initiative was a second attempt to promote regional development against U.S. primacy. The basic objectives of the BA are to fund development projects in key sectors of the member countries’ economy. The purpose was to improve productivity, job creation, innovation, invention, development, and production lines, so that this will be done to protect the environment and to preserve natural resources; to fund programs and development projects in the social sector; to expand and connect the infrastructure of member countries in order to improve and guide national production to ensure, among other things, sovereignty and food security; to promote and create and administer refundable or non-financial funds oriented to strengthen economic, social, and environmental policies; as well as to create and administer emergency aid in case of natural disasters and other special funds; and finally to develop and promote the practice of fair trade goods and services.[23]

In order to achieve these goals, the BA has to be able to assign credit and engage in other financial transactions for businesses. The BA also must be equipped to provide cash services to government agencies in addition to international partners to the ALBA member countries. Its internal operation is based on equal representation for each country and a democratic system of decision-making. The financial capital at the beginning of the BA was $1 billion USD. Each member has contributed according to its financial ability. The initial capital is much less than that of the Banco del Sur, which was $7 billion USD. The bank’s governing body is the  Ministerial Council (composed of the ministers of economy, trade, finance, and the chairman of the central bank of each member country); the Executive Management Board (elected representatives for 3 years); the CEO (legal representation of the bank) and the  General Manager (appointed by the Council of Ministers with the executive authority to manage the bank).[24]

A Common Virtual Currency for Regional Exchange – A Potentially Revolutionary Approach

Compared to Banco del Sur, the most important novelty from the BA is the use of a new international currency called Regional Compensation Unique System (Sistema Único de Compensación Regional, SUCRE) in reference to the lost currency of Ecuador, the SUCRE.[25] This could be part of an integration tool, led by ALBA member states, towards a more decisive monetary edifice. This regional compensation system was a mechanism set up in October 2009, at the same time as the creation of ALBA through a constitutive treaty ratified on the same occasion.[26] This system is based on the use of a virtual currency called SUCRE that registers the transactions between member states’ central banks. This virtual currency allows for tracking importation and exportation between two countries with the only dues being the difference (negative or positive) in local currencies. Such a system allows the member states to avoid using the U.S. dollar for their regional trade requirements. During the last bilateral meeting between Ecuador and Venezuela and during other speeches at regional and global forums, Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador, spoke about the absurdity of using an extra-regional currency for regional trade and currency repatriation.[27] We can therefore consider this plan as a system of economic and financial integration among the rubric of member countries: Ecuador, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Uruguay in 2013. The common aim is to promote the use of SUCRE for intra-regional trade, to reduce asymmetries between member states, and to propose mechanisms to reduce transaction costs. It is a first step towards macroeconomic policies under the coordination and the path toward economic integration. The inspiration for this Latin American project was the 1950-60 European Payments Union, occuring when the European Union was still the European Economic Community (EEC). SUCRE was also inspired by the creation of the European Currency Unit (ECU), the Euro forerunner. It is also influenced by the draft “Bancor” Keynes proposed in the wake of the Second World War.

Keynes’ Bancor and the International Clearing Union

British economist, John Maynard Keynes, proposed the creation of a “global bank, which he called the International Clearing Union (ICU),” which would issue its own currency, the Bancor, exchangeable at fixed rates with national currencies.[28] The Bancor was thought to be a unit of account among nations, to be used to measure a country’s trade deficit or trade surplus.[29] Every country would have an overdraft facility in its ICU Bancor account, limited “to half the average value of its trade over a five-year period.”[30] The member states of this ICU would need a powerful incentive to clear their international accounts. To solve this issue, Keynes proposed that any country with a large trade deficit (equating to more than half of its Bancor overdraft allowance) would be charged interest and obliged to reduce the value of its currency as well as to shrink measures overtaken in order to prevent the export of capital. These conditions can look similar to those of IMF loans, but in fact, Keynes proposed very strict conditionality for the country with an important positive credit balance, and the ICU would charge interest on more than half the size of its overdraft facility at a rate of 10 percent.[31] These creditor countries would also be obliged to increase their currency value and promote the export of local capital. If these measures were not effective, the surplus would be confiscated. Because of this strong incentive, the most powerful countries would automatically clear other nations’ deficits. This system would promote the reduction of financial crises, due essentially to imbalance of trade among nations accumulating a trade deficit and a debt with a high cost to lender nations.[32]

New Paths Against U.S.-based Development Lenders

It is very difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the SUCRE given the limited time in which it has been actively in use. It can be stated, however, that Latin American leaders are satisfied with its initiation. Indeed,  trade of  SUCRE increased to 1.5 billion in 2012, compared to 246 million in 2011 and only 10 million in 2010. The estimated regional trade in SUCRE in 2013 continued to increase. The Venezuelan government has stated that the total amount exchanged in SUCRE was $850 million USD turned over during 2013.[33] A great victory of SUCRE is the announcement of the incorporation of Uruguay Monératire Regional Council, the first integration of a non-ALBA member state country to this mechanism.[34] This opens the path for a gradual evolution of Banco del ALBA influence in Latin America, which if it continues to grow, could become a model for intra-regional trade, integration, and macro-economic policy coordination in South America.

The relevance of creating a second development bank two years after the creation of the Banco del Sur is questionable. However, the BA was created to improve on the Banco del Sur and guard against Brazilian influence on the latter. Additionally, the Banco del Sur was not considered sufficient in order to fill the ALBA member state’s objectives of integration. The Banco del Sur did not intend to create a monetary union or coordinate macroeconomic policy, which the BA does. It was also thought that the reserves available to the Banco del Sur were insufficient for the development of the region. While the Banco del Sur focused on financing infrastructure and industrialization projects, the BA proposed to go further and increase both economic and financial coordination. These two different paths lead to more independence from U.S.-based lenders and their conditional loans, all while strengthening sovereignty and investment in Latin America without the support of the United States or Canada.

By: Clemént Doleac, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs.

Please accept this article as a free contribution from COHA, but if re-posting, please afford authorial and institutional attribution. Exclusive rights can be negotiated. For additional news and analysis on Latin America, please go to: LatinNews.com and Rights Action.

Featured image by: Presidencia de la Nación Argentina [CC BY 2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

[1] The official websites of these organisms can be find here : for the CAF http://www.caf.com/es/paises-accionistas , for the WB http://www.worldbank.org/,  for the IMF http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm and for the IADB http://www.iadb.org/en/inter-american-development-bank,2837.html

[2] AAGARD Alexia “Prestamos condicionados del FMI” in Seminario de Integracion y de Aplicacion – Licenciatura en economia, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Economicas. 2010. Consulted on http://crecimientoeconomico-asiain.weebly.com/uploads/1/2/9/0/1290958/prestamos_condicionados_fmi.pdf on November 12, 2014.

[3] GIGLI Juan Manuel, “Neoliberalismo y ajuste estructural en América Latina” consulted on http://www.juangigli.com/wp-content/uploads/ajuste_estructural_juan_gigli.pdf on November 12, 2014.

[4] ARRIOLA PALOMARES Joaquin, El fracaso de los programas de ajuste estructural en America Latina, consulted on http://www.uca.edu.sv/revistarealidad/archivo/4e525c3274f7celfracaso.pdf on Noember 12, 2014 and SIERRA LARA  Yoandris, «Los impactos de la globalizacion neoliberal en América Latina” on RCI-Net Globalizacion on Abril 2012 consulted on http://rcci.net/globalizacion/2012/fg1357.htm on November 12, 2014. and Ochoa García, C. Globalización, Neoliberalismo y Porvenir

[5] HAGBRINK Isabel “Overview of the Inter-American Development Bank”, Office of External Relations of Norway. Consulted on http://www.norway.org/nr/rdonlyres/1bd8f08a80874f24bdc5d3ba19095b96/27980/hagbrink_isabel.pdf on November 12, 2014.

[6] PONSOT Jean-François, and ROCHON Louis-Philippe, “South America and a new financial architecture”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics /Winter 2009–10, Vol. 32, No. 2 155.and REGUEIRO Lourdes, BARZAGA Mayra, UNASUR:proceso y propuesta, à consulter sur http://www.fedaeps.org/IMG/pdf/Libro_UNASUR.pdf le 20/11/2013 and MARSHALL  Wesley C. and ROCHON Louis-Philippe, “Financing economic development in Latin America: the BS”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics /Winter 2009–10, Vol. 32, No. 2 185.

[7] Ibid.

[8] BRIEGER Pedro, « De la década perdida a la década del mito neoliberal » Publicado en La globalización económico-financiera. Su impacto en América Latina (AAVV),  Ed. CLACSO, Buenos Aires 2002. and Rodríguez Asien, E.: “El BS y el Banco del ALBA” en Observatorio de la Economía Latinoamericana Nº 93, febrero 2008. Texto completo en http://www.eumed.net/cursecon/ecolat/la/

[9] CADTM, El Banco del Sur: Avances y desafíos, Date de mise en ligne : Martes 7 de octubre de 2008.

[10]  REGUEIRO Lourdes, BARZAGA Mayra, UNASUR:proceso y propuesta, à consulter sur http://www.fedaeps.org/IMG/pdf/Libro_UNASUR.pdf le 20/11/2013

[11]  Jean-François Ponsot, and Louis-Philippe Rochon, “South America and a new financial architecture”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics /Winter 2009–10, Vol. 32, No. 2 155.

[12]  REGUEIRO Lourdes, BARZAGA Mayra, UNASUR:proceso y propuesta, à consulter sur http://www.fedaeps.org/IMG/pdf/Libro_UNASUR.pdf le 20/11/2013  and  Jean-François Ponsot, and Louis-Philippe Rochon, “South America and a new financial architecture”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics /Winter 2009–10, Vol. 32, No. 2 155.

[13]  Ibid.

[14] This part of the article is based on REGUEIRO Lourdes, BARZAGA Mayra, UNASUR:proceso y propuesta, à consulter sur http://www.fedaeps.org/IMG/pdf/Libro_UNASUR.pdf le 20/11/2013

[15]  REGUEIRO Lourdes, BARZAGA Mayra, UNASUR:proceso y propuesta, à consulter sur http://www.fedaeps.org/IMG/pdf/Libro_UNASUR.pdf le 20/11/2013  and  Jean-François Ponsot, and Louis-Philippe Rochon, “South America and a new financial architecture”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics /Winter 2009–10, Vol. 32, No. 2 155.

[16]  Ibid. and REGUEIRO Lourdes, BARZAGA Mayra, UNASUR:proceso y propuesta, à consulter sur http://www.fedaeps.org/IMG/pdf/Libro_UNASUR.pdf le 20/11/2013

[17]  FERRARI-FILHO  Fernando (2014). A regional arrangement proposal for the UNASUR. Revista de Economia Política.

[18]  SALAMA Pierre, La dollarisation : Essai sur la monnaie, l’industrialisation et l’endettement des pays sous-développés, Paris, La Decouverte, Coll. “Agalma” fevrier 1989, postface de Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira (102 p.).

[19]  GNOS, C.; MONVOISIN, V.; PONSOT, JF. 2011. “Proposal for a regional clearing Union in South America”. Proceedings of the IV International Congress of the Brazilian Keynesian Association, Rio de Janeiro, August.  And FERRARI-FILHO  Fernando (2014). A regional arrangement proposal for the UNASUR. Revista de Economia Política.

[20]  SALAMA Pierre, La dollarisation : Essai sur la monnaie, l’industrialisation et l’endettement des pays sous-développés, Paris, La Decouverte, Coll. “Agalma” fevrier 1989, postface de Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira (102 p.).

[21]  GORE Michel, “The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing Countries » World Development, Volume 28, Issue 5, May 2000, Pages 789–804. ;  ASIEN Rodríguez, E.: “El BS y el Banco del ALBA” en Observatorio de la Economía Latinoamericana Nº 93, febrero 2008. Texto completo en http://www.eumed.net/cursecon/ecolat/la/   ; WILLIAMSON, John: What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in: Williamson, John (ed.): Latin American Readjustment: How Much has Happened, Washington: Institute for International Economics 1989.

[22]  Site officiel de “la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblosl” (ALBA-TCP) : www.alba-tcp.org

[23]  Ibid.

[24]  ASIEN Rodríguez, E.: “El BS y el Banco del ALBA” en Observatorio de la Economía Latinoamericana Nº 93, febrero 2008. Texto completo en http://www.eumed.net/cursecon/ecolat/la/

[25]  SALAMA Pierre, La dollarisation : Essai sur la monnaie, l’industrialisation et l’endettement des pays sous-développés, Paris, La Decouverte, Coll. “Agalma” fevrier 1989, postface de Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira (102 p.). ;   ASIEN Rodríguez, E.: “El BS y el Banco del ALBA” en Observatorio de la Economía Latinoamericana Nº 93, febrero 2008. Texto completo en http://www.eumed.net/cursecon/ecolat/la/

[26]  Site officiel de “la Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América – Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblosl” (ALBA-TCP) : www.alba-tcp.org

[27]  MAZZEI Umberto, “Correa: Freedom without justice is akin to slavery”. Speech pronounce at UNCTAD Raúl Prebisch Lecture, in ALAI, América Latina en Movimiento, 2on Octuber 27, 2014. Consulted on http://alainet.org/active/78347&lang=es on November 10, 2014.

[28]  PONSOT Jean-François, and ROCHON Louis-Philippe, “South America and a new financial architecture”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics /Winter 2009–10, Vol. 32, No. 2 155. and KEYNES, J.M. (1944/1980). Activities 1940-1944: Shaping the Post-War World, the Clearing Union. London: Macmillan (The Collected Writings of John MaynardKeynes, Vol. 25, edited by Moggridge, D.). and MONBIOT Georges “Keynes is innocent: the toxic spawn of Bretton Woods was no plan of his”  in The Guardian, on November 17, 2008 on http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/nov/18/lord-keynes-international-monetary-fund consulted on November 20, 2014.

[29]  Ibid.

[30]  Ibid.

[31]  Ibid.

[32]  Ibid.

[33]  Radio Nacional de Venezuela, “Intercambio comercial con Sucre ha alcanzado $850 millones durante 2013 » in RNC en Economía, Publicado 27 agosto, 2013.

[34]  TeleSUR (www.youtube.com/user/telesurtv). «Uruguay firmó carta de solicitud de adhesión al Sucre» (en español). Consulted on November 10, 2014.

One thought on “Development Bank in Latin America: Towards a So-Called Radical Emancipatory Project?

  • January 9, 2015 at 5:07 pm
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    UH? I am still unclear after reading this piece whether de Banco del Sur ever loaned anyone one cent and what is the purpose of the Banco del ALBA other than to serve as central clearing house mechanism for intra-regional trade that competes with the much older and established Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) system. In any event the numbers offered by Venezuela as to trade utilizing the SUCRE in 2013 seem to underscore that even on that score the Banco del ALBA has also been a complete failure. The choice of the photo to accompany the article is telling. Everyone is either dead, out of office, or (with the exception of Bolivia) leads a country whose economy is in shambles.

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