Concessions of a Leftist Party: The FMLN’s Dilemma in the Face of Funes’ Centrist Policies

On June 1, 2010, El Salvador celebrated the first year of Mauricio Funes’ presidency. As the first candidate from the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) ever elected to the presidency, Funes’ victory revived a frustrated and marginalized constituency on the left and renewed widespread hope that social justice and large-scale reform could be achieved through parliamentary means. Since being elected, however, Funes has defied expectations and fears that he might be inclined to implement a radical leftist agenda. Instead, like other moderate leftists in Latin America (such as ex-Tupamaro and current president of Uruguay, José Mujica), he has expressed respect for the traditional institutions of representative democracy. As explained by Eric Zolov, Associate Professor of History at Franklin and Marshall College, “Funes and other moderate leftist leaders have accepted the democratic process as one of compromise.” Not only do these leaders understand that the route to achieving power is through elections, but they also understand that in order to govern effectively, one cannot adhere to any type of extreme political ideology.

Funes’ conciliatory posture, however, has not been maintained without consequence. In reaching out to those on the other side of the aisle, Funes has alienated many within his own base and raised speculation that he has lost touch with the founding ideals of the FMLN. As Funes continues down a politically sensitive path toward the center of the political spectrum, it is essential to examine the present trajectory of the FMLN as well as how the Salvadoran left is responding to his middle-of-the-road policies.

From Guns to Governance

The FMLN is El Salvador’s most prominent left-leaning political party. Formed in 1980 as a coalition of revolutionary guerilla bodies, the FMLN originates from an amalgamation of the Salvadoran Communist Party, the Revolutionary Workers’ Party, and the Popular Liberation Forces. Despite its ideological diversity, the FMLN, named for the1930s Communist Party leader and political activist Farabundo Martí, has consistently maintained its leftist allegiance. But ever since the Salvadoran civil war that began in the 1980s and the divisive debate over whether to combat military rule peacefully or violently, the party has struggled to unite many distinct political philosophies under one concise set of goals and objectives. Even after the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords ended the civil war and converted the FMLN into a legal political party, the difficulty of translating diverse ideologies into coherent political practices continued to hinder the FMLN’s hopes of political ascendance.

After the emergence of numerous internal splits during the 1990s, the FMLN won more legislative seats in the 2003 elections than any other party. One year later, its candidate and Secretary General of the Communist Party, Schafik Handal, received 35.6% of the vote, losing the presidential race to ARENA candidate Antonio Saca by a significant margin. Salvadoran sociologist Dr. Francisco Acosta approximates that “the FMLN can only muster up about 30-40% of the populous vote.” In other words, an FMLN candidate would need even broader support in order to achieve success. In 2009, Mauricio Funes acquired such support through striking a compromise among a number of El Salvador’s leading political figures. His rise to the presidency marked the first time an FMLN candidate had been elected to the nation’s highest office, suggesting that the party’s internal struggles have been at least temporarily resolved. In courting support from such a broad base, however, Funes induced a wide range of expectations, some of which would prove difficult to fulfill.

The Enigma of a Political Compromise

Funes’ tactics for victory came through the unification of three important political actors: the FMLN, the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) and the Amigos de Mauricio, a group of ex-Christian Democrats who helped with the funding and networking of the campaign. Funes was able to create this amalgam of upper class conservatives and former guerrilla members, groups who two decades ago stood in rank opposition to each other during the civil war, but who now have merged to create a centrist coalition.

Each integrant of the campaigning triumvirate had the goal of attracting voters from specific social sectors, thus diversifying the vote. The Amigos aimed at attracting the support of upper-class figures traditionally loyal to the ARENA party. Miguel Menéndez, the wealthy owner of several Salvadoran corporations and a member of the movement, said in an interview with El Faro, “My whole life I’ve voted for ARENA. I am a man of the right, however, now I support the FMLN candidate…because Mauricio changed my panorama.” Menéndez, whose company, Mecafé, generated $1.14 million in revenue in 2009, was in charge of gathering the support of the private sector. Specifically, he guaranteed corporations that Funes would not enact debilitating economic policies which could jeopardize foreign investment in the nation. Funes has followed through on this promise not only by maintaining close economic ties to the United States, but also by refraining from assigning hard-boil FMLN representatives to manage fiscal policy.

The “Amigos” were faced with political juxtapositions. Funes appointed Carlos Cáceres, a board member of a Salvadoran coffee conglomerate, to head the Treasury. He also chose Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former FMLN guerrilla commander, to run for the Vice Presidency, while appointing Colonel David Mungía Payés as Defense Minister. Colonel Payés is a 1973 graduate from the infamous School of the Americas and also the former Chief of Intelligence and Commanding Officer of the Batallón Belloso, one of the deadliest rightist military squadrons during the civil war. Ironically, Sánchez and Payés, though former enemies, are now political allies and colleagues under Funes’ new coalition.

The electoral diversification that drove Funes’ campaign allowed the FMLN to capture 51.32% of the votes, paving his road to victory. Such a political transformation has undoubtedly caused concern among those on either end of the political spectrum, including the FMLN. As Professor Zolov explains, these “ultras [on the left] play an important role in reminding the leaders of their radical roots,” and when elected leaders’ policies deviate from these roots, it can trigger grave internal discontent.

Funes’ New Coalition: A Potential Challenge to the FMLN

During his first year in office, Funes quickly established himself as a centrist and a problem-solver. As Dr. Hector Perla, Professor of Latin American studies at University of California at Santa Cruz, explains in an interview with COHA, Funes’ governing stance has often suggested a propensity toward pragmatism, even to the near preclusion of ideology. In fairness to Funes, the Salvadoran legislature exerts structural limits upon the executive branch that impede its ability to implement a decidedly leftist or rightist agenda. Two-thirds of the vote (56 of 84 seats) is required for passage of a law, and though the FMLN has more seats than any other party (35), it still lacks a majority in the 84-seat legislature. Compromise with the center-right ARENA party, represented by 32 seats, is thus integral to any legislative success. Funes, through his bureaucratic and technocratic approach, not only has achieved the necessary legislative support, but he has also created a solid base, as indicated by his high poll numbers. Many groups that lack a concrete political allegiance support Funes, while others who had previously aligned themselves with ARENA have shifted left in his favor.

One of the most remarkable bases of support has come through the formation of the Movimiento Ciudadano Por El Cambio, modeled after the Amigos de Mauricio. The Movimiento began as a citizens’ movement to ensure that Funes would uphold his promises of social change. Initiated and led by Funes, the Movimiento claims no political allegiance; rather, its purpose is “to make sure the promised campaign platforms are accomplished,” as stated by a representative of the movement, José Ángel Reyes. Yet, this political compass follows a basic party-like structure and has a presence in all 14 of El Salvador’s departments. The Movimiento seems to be forming a part of what recently has been developing in Salvadoran politics as a result of splits within the country’s political parties. Earlier last week, the Democratic Christian Party (PDC) saw three of its congressional members renounce their affiliation with the party and claim their independence. This will contribute to the rapid demise of the PDC because it reduces its influence in the Legislative Assembly to near-zero. Furthermore, concerned about the cohesiveness of its coalition, the FMLN has asked the PDC to resolve its internal problems so as not to jeopardize the coalition’s overall influence.

Funes also has seen the formulation of a support base composed of former guerrilla combatants who were previously ignored. The president has already made an effort to reassure them that the government has not forgotten their efforts, and, as a result, veteran guerrilleros have seemed fit to demonstrate support for Funes’ objectives. In an article that appeared in El Mundo, the Association of Salvadoran Civil War Veterans (ALSAVEG) made a statement of support for Funes, calling his government one with “character to transition into a governance that intends to drive [the] country through new forms of administration and functioning.” Moreover, the president of the association, Tomás Rajo, alluded to the fact that FMLN party members hold various government positions, which further makes Funes’ administration into what they call a “co-government.” Yet, the men of ALSAVEG insist that they are not to be automatically associated with the FMLN despite their background as guerrilla soldiers. Members of the FMLN have posited that Rajo and his followers have only been able to make such statements due to the fact that they have been offered government positions in their corresponding departments.

The Catholic Church is another entity that “looks upon the government of Funes with good eyes,” as stated by Archbishop José Luis Escobar Alas. The support from the church, however, can also be judged as demonstrating support for democracy as a whole. Although the church backs Funes, the Archbishop made it clear that Funes’ goals should include not only the continuation of democracy but also the alleviation of crime rates that threaten social welfare.

Funes’ main base comes specifically from those who support his policies, not his FMLN affiliation. In other words, these backers have digressed from their original parties, declared themselves independent, and have come to favor Funes’ overall approach to governance. This contradiction in ideologies has made “the government of Funes and the government of the FMLN two different entities,” as stated by The Nation. Funes’ moderate policies may be catalyzing the potential to go “rogue” within other political entities, therefore threatening the FMLN’s vital new feature: the coalition.

Funes’ Alienation of the FMLN Base

While Funes’ centrist policies have attracted a new group of followers, they have also alienated much of the previous FMLN base. In a recently published article in the Salvadoran press, Medardo González, general coordinator of the FMLN, said that the party aspired to bring to power a “truly red” president in 2014. González’s implication that Funes is not such a president reflects a widely held resentment toward Funes for what many FMLN supporters perceive as a betrayal of the party and an intolerable divergence from its ideological roots. González’s declaration also served as a response to Funes’ recent condemnation of the FMLN as an organization of moral hypocrisy. In Funes’ defense, he has implemented various social reforms aimed at alleviating El Salvador’s key issues of crime and poverty, particularly through his recent poverty-reduction plan. But for many, Funes’ relatively small-scale reforms are not enough. His lack of action has been disappointing for those sectors of the population who, previously marginalized under ARENA, had regained hope in the political process with the FMLN victory in 2009.

In addition to having isolated much of the traditional FMLN base, Funes has developed an overtly rocky relationship with the party’s leaders during his first year. He disappointed FMLN colleagues with his apparent unwillingness to implement sweeping social justice reforms, and he has also taken stances that defy as well as trouble those of the FMLN on numerous issues. In the last few weeks, tension has risen as Funes has directly challenged the FMLN on two very important issues, siding instead with the ARENA party and other members of the Salvadoran right. First, he spoke out against a legislative initiative to minimize privatization of Salvadoran phone companies. The FMLN-led initiative would have given the government a larger role in overseeing the activities of phone companies, but Funes controversially struck down the legislation. Symbolically, this decision marked Funes’ respect for corporate privatization, though his opponents assert that it may come at some expense to the middle class.

Other than the phone company incident, Funes also declared that he would not open an investigation into past cases of government corruption. Given El Salvador’s extensive history of political corruption and the FMLN’s long-awaited hope that justice would ultimately be served on tainted wartime leaders, this was a particularly controversial decision to have to stomach. Its implications for the FMLN—a party founded in opposition to military rule—cannot be understated. In making this decision, Funes further separated himself from the party while disillusioning many in its base who had hoped that their needs would finally be given an audience.

Funes and the Military: An Unlikely Alliance

Many of Funes’ new allies have been drawn to his side by his pragmatism and willingness to compromise, but his relationship with the military deserves more extensive discussion. As has been explained, the FMLN was formed in opposition to the organized military, yet Funes has made a concerted and successful effort, if anything, to court the military’s support. The military coup in Honduras that deposed democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya just one year ago, showed that military coups, though dormant for decades, are not an extinct political practice in Latin America. For a country like El Salvador, where the military has long exerted an inordinate amount of political influence, the prospect of a military coup seems still very plausible. But contrary to widespread assumption, Funes’ agenda actually has empowered the military and dangerously broadened its role, a worrying notion for most FMLN loyalists and a bitter disappointment to aging veteran guerillas.

On a policy level, Funes’ most significant decision affecting the Salvadoran military was his unprecedented expansion of the military’s role as an internal police power in El Salvador’s battle against drug trafficking. According to Dr. Acosta, the 1992 Peace Accords reduced the military to a protector of borders, a relatively obsolete task in today’s globalizing world. But Funes, in direct violation of those accords, has incorporated military officials into domestic police roles. In doing so, he has revived the military while drawing its members into his political support base. In this sense, Funes’ presidency has not only redefined the role of the military in a way not having been seen in almost two decades, but it has also returned the military to its previous position of political prominence. As a result, Funes is extremely popular among the armed forces; however, this alliance has had heavy costs for the FMLN and El Salvador to have to bear. First, Funes’ willingness to defy Salvadoran law in order to empower the military suggests an authoritarian streak that frightens those on all sides of the political spectrum. Second, his expansion of the military could leave future civilian leaders vulnerable to military overthrow. Finally, by detaching himself from his party, he has only augmented pre-existing tension between the FMLN and the military.

Besides dangerously expanding the military’s domestic role, Funes has also opted not to revoke the 1992 Amnesty Law⎯one of the few countries not to do so⎯that exempts from prosecution those involved in atrocities carried out during the civil war. During his campaign, Funes frequently invoked the words of Archbishop Oscar Romero, an empathetic symbol of social justice whose death marked the end of nonviolent protest against the military government. Since being elected, however, Funes has been less inclined to associate himself with the origins of the FMLN, a tendency exemplified by his unwillingness to annul the 1992 Law. Unlike his extension of the military’s policing powers, this decision has few tangible implications. But on a symbolic level, Salvadorans seeking justice have once again been deeply disappointed as Funes has opted to break with his party in favor of his alliance with the military.

The Costs of Revived Relations with the United States

In addition to forming an improbable alliance with leaders of various centrist groups, Funes was also the first FMLN presidential candidate to gain public support from the U.S. government. Since the civil war, U.S. policy toward El Salvador has predominately relied upon a neoconservative ideology that has reduced the FMLN to a purportedly destructive and destabilizing communist force in the region. NACLA reports that as recently as 2004, U.S. government officials cautioned Salvadorans against electing a “radical left regime that favors Venezuela and Iranian terrorism.” But in 2009, after significant pressure from Professor Perla and many other Latino academics, the Obama administration offered cautious support for whichever candidate won the race. White House support was likely integral to Funes’ victory in a country where U.S. opinion is held in high regard and where nearly $4 billion in remittances from the U.S. are received annually. Since taking office, in an effort to reassure the Obama administration that it made the correct decision in remaining neutral, Funes has vigorously debunked the claim that the FMLN would dismantle CAFTA and disassociate El Salvador from the free trade and privatization inherent in globalized capitalism. Contrary to neoconservative fears, Funes, who claims to model his presidency on those of Barack Obama and Brazilian President Lula da Silva, has taken no steps toward undermining free trade with El Salvador’s neighbors or toward limiting privatization within the country’s borders.

Many are skeptical of the U.S.’ budding relationship with El Salvador, particularly following Funes’ meeting in March with President Obama. In his remarks on that occasion, Obama commended Funes for what he called a “pragmatic and wise approach to the situation in Honduras,” and stressed his desire to strengthen relations between the two nations. President Funes’ remarks struck a similar tone of respect and cooperation. But just weeks after the meeting, the IMF granted Funes an unprecedented loan to subsidize his poverty-reduction program, and many speculate, on what appears to be solid grounds, that both monetary and verbal support from the IMF and the U.S. come with a price tag in the form of policy-related expectations. Professor Perla believes that the U.S. sees an opportunity in El Salvador to facilitate the creation of a new centrist political party that could challenge ARENA and the FMLN. A political party modeled on the pragmatism of Funes would likely resemble the current manifestation of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in Brazil and other examples of what many U.S. scholars term the “good left.” While the creation of such a party could aid stability in the country, it would likely be detrimental to the FMLN’s future political aspirations.

Farabundo’s Future

During both his candidacy and his presidency, Mauricio Funes has successfully courted support from those to the right and left of the center. Consistently unwilling to directly associate himself with the FMLN—he refuses to wear red at rallies and other events—Funes has instead embraced the Movimiento Ciudadano Por El Cambio and its message of reclaiming the “critical conscience” of the country by transcending party loyalties. Despite Funes’ insistence that the Movimiento defies party ideology, many within the FMLN are concerned that Funes’ new coalition will become an organized party intent on challenging ARENA and the FMLN in presidential and legislative elections, and that he intends to do so by espousing a Mr. Clean strategy aimed at removing politics from the word politicize.

If Funes’ new coalition is consolidated into a distinct political party, the future for the FMLN may be bleak. According to Professor Perla, the establishment of a new centrist party would be the “worst-case scenario” for the FMLN. Medardo González and other FMLN leaders aspire to bring to power a “truly red” candidate in 2014, but if Funes’ new party can provide a viable centrist alternative, elevating a leftist to the presidency could be an arduous task. As an increasing number of organizations and interests continue to ally themselves behind Funes’ pragmatism, the FMLN may be forced to make a difficult choice between preserving its leftist roots and maintaining its political prominence. Founded in binary opposition to injustice, the FMLN must now find a way to reconcile ideology with practice, maintaining its commitment to social justice and economic equality while also recognizing the importance of compromise and even concession to the realization of progress and growth.