Reginald Dumas has written a detailed, if not an essential, account of his tenure as U.N. Special Adviser on Haiti in order to illuminate some of the events following the forced resignation of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 2004 and his subsequent flight from the country. Appointed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the wake of the coup, Dumas brought his diplomatic background in his native Trinidad to the undeniably challenging task of restoring law and order to one of the world’s most persistently troubled nations.
In a seemingly objective tone, Dumas documents the institutional shortcomings as well as the personal politics that characterized the international response to the removal of Aristide from power. He analyzes the various interpretations of the ambiguous note signed by the ill-fated Haitian leader that was used to claim that Aristide’s resignation was entirely voluntary. While he appears to discredit the self-interested interpretation of events held by Washington, Dumas characteristically avoids taking a forceful position on the treatment of Aristide and his heavily disputed departure from the country. Though Dumas acknowledges that he himself had never met Aristide, he has no qualms summing up the ousted president as a “polarizing figure,” before giving voice to the dramatic range of conflicting opinions held of Aristide, domestically and abroad. However, Dumas followed what he found to be the balance of Haitian public opinion by ultimately coming down against Aristide.
His ostensible respect for the nation he served under the auspices of the UN is nevertheless undermined by his unqualified support for interim Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, an island outsider and erstwhile resident of a Florida gated community at the time of the coup. Latortue was appointed to the position of interim Prime Minister by an extraconstitutional “Council of Sages” of elite Haitians hand-picked by the U.S., France, and the Organization of American States (OAS); the decision was made not only in violation of the Haitian constitution but also in disregard for the interests of ordinary Haitians. Despite his avowed preoccupation for allegations of human rights abuse under the Aristide presidency, Dumas easily overlooks far more grievous violations sanctioned by Latortue in favor of the “easy personal and working relationship” between the two. By portraying Latortue as merely a victim of circumstances, “trapped between competing forces and interests over which, unelected and a ‘foreigner’ from Florida with much perceived international baggage, he could exercise little moral authority,” Dumas’s account serves to condone the Latortue administration and sanitize the oppression and violence that resulted from the coup.
In his memoir, Dumas unconvincingly positions himself in opposition to a UN bureaucracy which he depicts as more interested in pursuing petty personal quarrels and turf wars than an effective peacebuilding strategy on the island. Through extensive documentation of the internal processes relied upon by the UN, he chronicles his frustrations and occasional clashes with some of his colleagues. Dumas expresses particular concern with regard to the Security Council and its “one size fits all” model of peacebuilding, which was predictably employed by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), at scant benefit to the Haitian people. Emphasizing the need to better adapt policies to specific local contexts, Dumas argues for the composition of MINUSTAH and comparable bodies in the future to be weighted more toward civilian than military personnel, with increased orientation toward social and economic development. Consistently critical of the disproportionate clout of the developed North on questions of great consequence to the developing South, Dumas portrays the UN Security Council as insensitive to recommendations formed closer to the ground, from such regional bodies as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the OAS. However, as a relatively high-level actor in the conflict chronicled in his memoir, his own role remains at times difficult to discern.
Dumas attributes his perennial inability to fulfill his ever well-intentioned goals to institutional inertia, doffing any personal responsibility for the UN’s failed initiatives in Haiti during his tenure. His scrutiny of bureaucratic limitations and competing interests governing international decision-making regarding Haiti marks the strongpoint in the book’s analytical achievements, but just as often it devolves into a device to escape culpability for his own transparent shortcomings as UN Special Advisor to Haiti.
