The memoranda presented below relate to the political and social turmoil affecting Bolivia. The first focuses on the upcoming July 18 natural gas referendum and its implications on President Mesa’s political mandate and on his vocal indigenous opposition. The second broadens this analysis by examining the socio-economic problems that have engulfed Bolivia over the last several decades.
As indigenous groups flex their political power throughout the nation, ties between much of the citizenry and their officials are being sorely tested. In recent years, the government’s neo-liberal policies have alienated a large segment of the country’s powerful indigenous community, causing a swell of protest. Peaceful protests in 2003 turned violent and led to the ouster of former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and cost 120 lives after senior government officials authorized the use of deadly force. The demonstrations were a reaction to the widespread discontent with the government’s failure to eliminate the corruption that plagues Bolivian society as a whole and skepticism among the impoverished native people over how fair the distribution of the profits from the sale and exportation of its natural gas resources would be. Current President Carlos Diego Mesa Gisbert, who pledged to give Bolivians a voice in the country’s economic future, scheduled a referendum on July 18, 2004 that will produce a verdict regarding the future of the country’s natural gas export. The first national referendum in 50 years will address one of the toughest decisions facing the country today. Conflicts between the Bolivian government and much of the indigenous leadership still exist as the question of the country’s future gas exports joins the forced reduction of coca plantings spreading discontent.
Historical Background: Shaping the Country’s Present and Future
In 2003, Bolivia suffered one of its most violent crises since its 1952 revolution, which first brought democracy to the country in modern times. Protests last February and October (the latter known as “Black October”) left approximately 120 people dead. While there had been longstanding tensions between the indigenous majority of the country and the government for a number of years, these protests were triggered by a plan to increase taxes and a proposal to export gas to the United States and Mexico through a pipeline across Chilean territory.
One of the most controversial and influential opposition leaders, Evo Morales, is the declared head of a coca-grower federation and the leader of the leftist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS). Alongside Morales is Felipe Quispe (a.k.a. “Mallku,” the leader of the Pachakuti Indigenous Movement or MIP), who purportedly organized two violent demonstrations intended to “defend” Bolivia’s natural gas interests.
Despite the initial civility of the protests, things turned ugly when the military responded with deadly force against the crowd. At the climax of the demonstrations, the protesters rejected the government’s proposals regarding the sale and transit of its natural gas and demanded the resignation of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. His subsequent abrupt resignation was undoubtedly due to the out-of-control street demonstrators that broke out across the country, in addition to other incendiary events happening in Bolivia at the time (including a death threat against him from the protestors), which proved too daunting for the beleaguered Sánchez de Lozada to bear.
Planning One’s Way into Trouble
Ironically enough, it was the same constituency who brought Sánchez de Lozada’s political party to power that later forced him to resign. In the early 1950s, the indigenous Bolivians threw their support behind Victor Paz Estensoro, a former five-time President of Bolivia, as the leader of their cause. Paz Estensoro belonged to the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) – the same political party as Sánchez de Lozada. During his final term (1985-1989), he introduced the 1008 Law regarding cocaine eradication and the prosecution of drug traffickers. Tensions emerged with the coca-growers and the indigenous felt La Paz’s cold shoulder.
When hyperinflation struck the country in 1985, Goni (as Sánchez de Lozada was popularly known in Bolivia), then the Minister of Planning, and Columbia University Professor Jeffrey Sachs came up with a plan called “Shock Therapy.” This proposal advocated economic deregulation and put an end to years of government interventionism. Consequently, a “free market” was set up practically overnight. At first, the plan seemed well suited for Bolivia’s fragile economy, but it was marred by its neglect of the lower social classes. In a rather shortsighted path to economic recovery, the country lowered its central spending and laid off a large number of workers (mainly indigenous miners). Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada became president in 1993 and served until 1997, when a landmark democratic election reinstated former dictator Hugo Banzer Suarez (1971-1978) as a constitutional president. His term was slated to end in 2002, but he died from cancer in 2000, elevating Vice President Jorge Quiroga to the presidency. In the 2002 election that Sánchez de Lozada regained the presidency, defeating second-place candidate Evo Morales by only 1.5 points.
After Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation, Mesa’s accession brought a period of tranquility to Bolivia. Nonetheless, the indigenous population remained skeptical about the improvements promised by the Mesa administration. Their distrust was founded on the popular perception that Mesa’s administration offered only the same ineffective policies sponsored by the Sánchez de Lozada administration.
“¡No a la exportación de gas!”
In the 1950s, there were proposals to export Bolivia’s natural gas to Brazil, although this proposal did not materialize until the Banzer presidency in the 1970’s. The leadership of Bolivia, the second largest hydrocarbon producer in South America (52 trillion cubic feet), decided at that time that gas exports were the best way to strengthen its economy. Due to its limited industrialization and lack of infrastructure, Bolivia was unable to profitably exploit the gas domestically; exporting it as an extractive raw material was a far better option. Despite some minimal protests from the opposition, gas exportation began to contribute substantially to the country’s increasing holdings of foreign currency, though some of it was later embezzled by venal government officials. However, when Sánchez de Lozada proposed a new plan to export gas to the United States and Mexico by way of a pipeline through Chile, Bolivia’s traditional enemy, turmoil erupted: peaceful protests quickly turned violent and ended up terminating the presidency of Sánchez de Lozada.
Indigenous Bolivians saw the gas pipeline through Chile as a threat to their natural treasure. Their deep hatred for Chileans dates back to the Pacific War (1879-1884) when the forced cessation of Bolivian territory, including the port of Antofagasta, spawned ongoing disputes over land rights and access to the Pacific Ocean. The proposed pipeline would give their longtime enemy undue participation in Bolivia’s natural gas trade.
Do the Means Justify the End?
An alternate route for the pipeline, which would pass through Peru, has been put forward as a substitute for the pipeline crossing Chile. The Chilean pipeline would be more cost-effective, but it faces smoldering opposition from most Bolivians due to their deep-seated antipathy towards Chile. The Bolivian government will have to strike a difficult balance between choosing the most economically feasible option and alleviating the emotional pitch of its people on this issue.
Shifting Gears: Looking Out for the Greater Good?
With a sudden slide across the spectrum regarding the gas exportation issue, Evo Morales now seems to be facing up to the realities of Bolivia’s situation with a more sober point of view. He acknowledges that supporting Bolivia’s official economic agenda would strengthen a later presidential bid should Mesa not reach the end of his five-year term in 2007. Though some have lost their respect for Morales, viewing him now as a little better than an opportunist, he is still able to attract a large group of followers.
Cocaine Production Plummets
For several decades, Bolivians have been bullied by Washington and the international lending agencies into imposing severe restrictions on coca production in Bolivia. Former President Jaime Paz Zamora (1989-1993) argued that the coca leaves cultivated in Bolivia should not be automatically associated with the artificially altered cocaine product. Instead, they are regularly used for indigenous medicinal preparations, tea, and as a substance to cope with the high altitude disease known as soroche. Coca leaves have been thus used for a thousand years and there is no reason to implement such drastic “security measures” – especially when they fail to target the root of the problem.
In comparison with the volume of coca processing 20 years ago, U.S. pressures have effectively caused local production to plummet. Even though the output this year increased compared to last year’s figures, it remains at one of its lowest levels in the past two decades.
The recent boost in production is inspired mainly by desperation. While the cocaleros obtain their wealth mainly from cocaine production, when the U.S. started to implement its restrictive measures in Bolivia, the government was not prepared to risk losing international monetary aid and investment by allowing the cocaleros to not comply with these restrictions. However, this often nominal compliance is gradually evaporating in the face of economic hardship. The primary motivation for growing coca leaves – the large financial gain – will always be able to outweigh threats.
The Vertiginous Abyss
The poorest country in South America, Bolivia struggles with many issues that jeopardize the country’s political, social and economical stability. The upcoming July 18 referendum will undoubtedly be a pathway towards the country’s future. By giving the populace a voice, the government is placing its faith in the democratic process. Given the apolitical identification of the Mesa administration, it is very difficult to distinguish between the political right and left in this discourse. Many indigenous leaders are changing sides (as Evo Morales did), usually depending on their own self-interests. Nonetheless, many view the situation with a certain skepticism and predict that another “Black October” is in the making. Despite Mesa’s significant backing, there is still the distinct possibility that his government could meet the same fate as that of Sánchez de Lozada.
