Thank you,

Sheyla

On Context and the Continued Possibility of Extradition

Both critical individuals write above as if my case against Sanchez de Lozada is based solely, or in large part, on the U.S.-Bolivia extradition treaty. These are instances of extremely selective interpretation. Indeed, in my article I mention the treaty in only one place.

Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada can still be extradited, whether or not the seemingly permissive US-Bolivia extradition treaty dictates his return to Bolivia. From a February 6, 2007 TIME article: “The U.S. Ambassador in Bolivia, Philip Goldberg, stated…that the extradition of Sanchez de Lozada is “theoretically possible.” (http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1586707,00.html)

Extradition is possible, and I argue that there is a strong case for its execution. This involves a palpable normative aspect which, in some respects, challenges certain hegemonic orthodoxies of thought. To be clear, however, this is the crux of recent developments in Bolivia.

Both critical comments appeal to a sense of justice—though surely not Rawlsian distributive justice—and proper perspective, yet neither individual hazards to even obliquely address the foundational issue of my case: Sanchez de Lozada’s political recklessness, which precipitated his downfall and consequent exile.

My more careful critic, “Maubagut”, writes: “[Sanchez de Lozada’s] actions to restore law and order, save the lives of innocent hostages and protect the citizens of La Paz were necessary, proper, and legal…To have done nothing would have endangered far more lives, and would have been the subject of condemnation by others.”

First, his rhetoric here regarding “sav[ing] the lives of innocent hostages” is deceptive, for reasons I address below. Most importantly, however, the commenter fails to register that the “subject of condemnation by others,” like myself, is how the Sanchez de Lozada administration compromised Bolivia’s “law and order” in the first place, thereby “endanger[ing]” the well-being of La Paz, the stranded tourists, and Bolivia’s fragile political institutions.

Yet it takes two to tango, so what of the responsibility of the masses of protestors? By attempting, among other contentious economic policies, to sell-off Bolivia’s natural wealth at unconscionable prices , the Sanchez de Lozada administration egregiously breached the fiduciary trust of the people—especially those citizens living in poverty who depend on public services. (See, for instance, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-06-24-bolivia-enron_x.htm)

In other words, the Sanchez de Lozada administration broke the social contract. This was especially reckless in view of Bolivia’s recent history of post-2000 social unrest (see Chris Sweeny’s COHA article “From Rightist Chaos to Leftist Constitutionalism…”).

Indeed, we can interpret Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada’s former administration as exemplary of a wider syndrome afflicting the Andean region wherein the state has, during the past two decades, been, “first and foremost, the executor of policies (such as a security regime focused on anti-drugs measures, neoliberal reforms, establishing a political regime of [poorly installed] representative democracies) that often were imposed from abroad, leading to deteriorated relations with society and ‘a failure to incorporate, represent, and respond to vast segments of the population for which the state is increasingly distant, if not alien’. (p .2)” (see Ton Salman’s excellent review of State and Society in Conflict: Comparative Perspectives on Andean Crises, eds. Paul W. Drake and Eric Hershberg. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006, in the European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 85, October 2008)

Maubagut contends that a failure on Sanchez de Lozada’s part to use the military would have been the subject of condemnation by others. I contend that a failure on the part of Bolivia’s citizenry—especially those living in poverty—to rid themselves of Sanchez de Lozada would have been the subject of condemnation by their fellow citizens, as well as by future generations of Bolivians.

A Note on the Philosophy of Law, Politics, and History—with General and
Anecdotal Applications

As an advocate of universal human rights, I rely upon the law. I do not, however, revere or fetishize it in the sense that a legal positivist would. I thus do not subscribe to the Burkean political philosophy that my critics, whether out of principle or convenience, appear to abide by. I provide in my article the details of the U.S. civil actions against these former public servants in order to disseminate important information—not to wallow in legalese.

I do not invoke Edmund Burke’s political philosophy and the circumstances surrounding his most famous writing promiscuously; the events of the past months have made it clear that Bolivia has undergone a revolution. (Let us here remember that the archconservative Burke supported the U.S. revolution mistakenly—he thought the colonies were fighting for British liberties, not in fact to found a new republic.) And so, on rare occasions, laws otherwise essential for law and order must temporarily be called into question.

I also find it useful to bear in mind the historians’ maxim that the proper study of history is not only the attempt to reconstruct and interpret events, but also the thoughts and motivations of actors.

Thus, in extending support to the Sanchez de Lozada administration during the events of 2003, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the U.S. State Department both acted primarily out of political pragmatism. If Sanchez de Lozada was forced to “resign” (flee) due to illegal and unwarranted protests, a principled decision by the OAS would have been to insist upon his restoration with force commensurate with their prior expressions of “full and decisive” support.

Simple intuition tells us that a council composed of heads of state, such as that at the OAS, will as a rule of thumb denounce and lament all civil unrest and incipient revolution. This is primarily, though not totally of course, out of self-regard and the preservation of present power structures. History teaches us this on a grand scale; European heads of state tried to use the Concert of Europe to collectively stifle widespread civil unrest.

Regarding the U.S. reports Maubagut references, we should appreciate how “transregional ‘security’ [regimes]…co-shaped the current crises.” More specifically on this point, how “[d]rugs defined as a security threat…was one of the key elements in the configuration of a ‘regional security architecture built on U.S., [and]not necessarily Andean objectives’ (p.79).” (again, see Salman’s review of Drake and Hershberg, eds. in ERLACS 85)

U.S. motives are further belied when we recall the words of U.S. assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Otto Reich, after “the U.S. government encouraged a military coup in Venezuela against the elected populist president, Hugo Chavez…Reich called ambassadors from Latin America to his office after the coup and stressed that ‘the ouster of Mr. Chavez was not a rupture of democratic rule because he had resigned’ (p. 209)” (Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2004)

We should compare the abovementioned quote with Maubagut’s rhetorical arguments concerning Bolivia’s “coup.”

I do not wish to attempt to eviscerate the OAS’s legitimacy, nor the role that this institution has in developing more participatory forms of democracy throughout Latin America. And I am not of that camp that holds that the U.S. can do no good.

But let us not be naïve and reify power structures/relationships as given by Nature, while ignoring fundamental dynamics of power. These principles are foundational to any moral, multi-level inquiry in political economy and law. Let us always ask this basic question: Who benefits? On this matter, Linda Weltner’s comments are insightful.

We can view both the reports/interpretations of the OAS and the U.S. State Dept. in this light, and with due skepticism.

While there have always been strong intellectual and pragmatic reasons for invoking the principle of prudence, while hewing to the ancien regime, I must agree with Morales when, upon Sanchez de Lozada’s exit, he stated that it was “a day of dignity…for the Bolivian people.” My critic Maubagut would likely call this an error or an inaccuracy, a point to which I now turn.

More On “Maubagut”

Maubagut claims that my article’s “credibility is seriously called into question because it is filled with numerous errors and inaccuracies.” He then accuses me of indulging in “dramatic license.” In attempts to highlight my supposed “numerous errors and inaccuracies,” however, the examples marshaled by this commenter do little more than to highlight the fundamentally contested facts and interpretations surrounding the events in question. The “official” U.S. State Dept. and OAS documents which this commentator depends so heavily on are of limited determinacy in this instance, for the reasons explicated above.

Moreover, Maubagut’s rhetoric and myopic mode of interpretation open him/her to the very accusations previously mentioned.

The following examples quote Maubagut, while I respond in a following paragrapgh. I’ll abstain from the trite and intellectually insulting “MYTH” vs. “FACT” format.

Ex: 1) “ …the actions taken by Sánchez de Lozada and his defense minister were legal, responsible, and necessary in order to rescue trapped hostages…The author takes dramatic license.”

Trapped hostages? Notwithstanding the redundancy of this phrasing, Maubagut’s use of the word “hostage” imputes an intent on the part of the protestors to use the “stranded tourists” (an accurate phraseology the commenter employs a few lines latter) as bargaining chips. Clearly, the stranded tourists were coincidental to the events in question. Dramatic license indeed.

Ex: 2) “There was no “gunning down” of scores of anti-government protestors. Rather, Sánchez de Lozada, acting within his executive mandate to restore law and order in the face of violent protest, sought to end the violent road blockades which had shut down La Paz for several days.”

This is an old story, shorn of any context—a context that I address theoretically at the outset of this response, and which can be found in any tolerably objective history of Bolivia. Obviously, I tend to agree with the COHA staff when they write that Bolivia has been characterized by “centuries of structural oppression and humiliation faced by [the country’s] indigenous and working class majority.” (“A Brief Recent History of Bolivia and the Rise of President Morales” January 2009) Furthermore, I will reiterate that it was the professional (political) recklessness which precipitated the events of 2003.

Ex: 3) “The protestors were not wielding “mostly sticks and stones.” Rather, contemporaneous photos and reports from the local media as well as U.S. State Department cables confirm that the protestors were armed with Molotov cocktails and rifles.”

Maubagut’s wording here again is disingenuous. A quick look leads the reader to believe that a sizable minority, or even a majority of the protestors were armed with homemade bombs and rifles. When tens of thousands of protestors mobilize in a country where they have good reason to believe that they will encounter violent suppression, it is improbable that everybody will go unarmed. This in no way means that my assertion that protestors wielded “mostly sticks and stones” is a “myth.” It is an intuitive and most probable conclusion: The majority of the protesters carried sticks and stones, if they, as individuals, carried anything at all.

Ex: 4) “Bolivian democracy has suffered under Morales. Since taking office in 2006, Morales has systematically consolidated power in the Executive, undermined the country’s judicial independence… “

As this is Maubagut’s response to my “myth” that “The legitimacy of [Bolivia’s] democratic processes has not been seriously undermined and there is no reason to deny that Morales represents an authentic majority of Bolivians,” the commenter rather missed my point. I was demonstrating that since Morales came to office, the elections and referendums in Bolivia have been deemed by observers to have been legitimate reflections of the will of the people—overwhelmingly and historically so.

Thus, Maubagut’s attack on the credibility of my article rings rather hollow. It also exposes this individual’s unmitigated bias. And I am relatively unconcerned that our political, legal, and perhaps moral philosophies are incommensurable.

The abovementioned commenter does, however, argue with some force that Morales allegedly fomented the political and social impasse in question out of pure self-interest, when peaceful alternative solutions—which would have been deemed acceptable by his constituents—were available.

Accordingly, if Maubagut so considers Morales to be a political thug endangering Bolivia, and if the commenter likewise is supremely confident in Sanchez de Lozada’s lack of culpability, then a tribunal with international observers (as I recommended) would, on this account, have to vindicate Sanchez de Lozada, or otherwise be declared illegitimate, null, and void.

Maybe Maubagut’s abiding concern for justice and Bolivia’s political institutions will motivate him/her to agitate for such a venue. As is so often said, Sunlight is the best disinfectant.