It’s been just over a year since Tabare Vázquez, an oncologist and former mayor of Montevideo, was elected as Uruguay’s first left-leaning president, breaking nearly two centuries of two party rule, and one brutal decade of military control. Vázquez heads the Broad Front Party (Frente Amplio), an umbrella group of 18 political parties ranging from the former Tupamaro guerrillas to Christian Democrats. Vázquez is routinely mentioned as one of its members in articles discussing the “pink tide” or the surge of leftist leaders who have been democratically elected all over Latin America in the last six years. He has been embraced by Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, and has restored diplomatic relations with Cuba.

In many ways, the political habitat surrounding Vázquez’s election was more revolutionary than his actual policies. Vázquez appears to be following the foot steps of Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula de Silva in being elected from the left, and ruling from the center. Although Vázquez enjoys a higher approval rate now than while running for president, he and his Economic Minster Danilo Astori have leaned towards the “neo-liberal” policies which they once routinely condemned. Last month, Astori announced that Uruguay would seek a bilateral trade agreement with the U.S., which, if successful, would violate certain regulations of MERCOSUR, the trade bloc between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. Uruguay is also currently facing protests from Argentina and international environmentalists because of two European-owned paper mills currently being built on the Uruguay River, which separates the two countries.

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COHA: How leftist was Vázquez as the mayor of Montevideo?

Thomas J. Dodd: I always have looked upon Tabare Vázquez and his colleagues as pragmatists. I wouldn’t say they had a leftist agenda, that’s too strong. He and his colleagues were working in the largest municipality in the country, containing half the population, so they had to be pragmatists and not ideologues. When I assumed the ambassadorship in 93, I felt it was best to start from that point on, rather than looking backwards, principally because the country still had a long and difficult healing process and remained very sensitive. It would have been useless to get back into the details of the Tupamaros and the era of urban guerilla warfare, and I had the feeling from Vázquez and from those who worked with him that it was time to move on, and get into the management of the city government, became the Frente had to be as much a rural party as an urban one.

COHA: Did the transition from leftist to pragmatist cause strife within the Frente Amplio?

TD: People were very upset that the Frente’s agenda was being compromised. One of the main reasons people were troubled was because there were still unresolved cases of “disappeared” Uruguayans that were not being dealt with.

COHA: Did the Frente’s efforts in blocking privatization of some state-owned enterprises, such as water and energy, establish them as an anti “Neo-Liberal” party?

TD: It most certainly did, it was very anti-market. Within the Frente were people like Danilo Astori. He was a moderate, one of the most pragmatic that I met; he saw the feasibility of privatization in general, but was more careful on the specifics of what state entities would be privatized.

COHA: Vázquez ran for the presidency unsuccessfully in 1994 and 1999. In 2004 did Vázquez seem to use growing discontent for the Batalle regime and frustration from the Argentine economic crisis to run as a more leftist candidate?

TD: Yes, but when I say leftist, I mean populist. As in the case of most of the left in Latin America today, these are hard core pragmatists, ideologies are out, I don’t think it holds much weight anymore; in order to play politics and win elections, these people have to modify, moderate and compromise some of their positions, I think that’s what Vázquez has learned. As mayor, Vázquez also built on the discontent and formed alliances with moderates from the Nationalist party, especially to build support in rural areas.

COHA: What is Vázquez’s relationship with the other major leftist leaders in Latin America today, namely Chávez and Castro?

TD: From observing him for four to five years, I would say he is cherry picking Chávez and Castro. There is a substantial middle class in Uruguay; they have a strong propensity to be conservative on a lot of issues, so he’s not necessarily going to get behind Castro and Chávez’s tail for the wag. But, nationalism has a long root in Uruguayan history, so he’s playing it selectively. He’s certainly not with Castro and Chávez when he talks about breaking away from MERCOSUR and signing a bilateral trade agreement with Washington. Vázquez is a very hard person to read; he’s not an effusive leader or gregarious, he’s very careful, cautious, methodical and disciplined. He’ll be able to go up on the same platform as Chávez, Kirchner and Lula, but he also well knows which side his bread is buttered on-trade and export, which is what that country needs to focus on; that’s where he’s a pragmatist. He is however, watching Lula very carefully, they are close.

COHA: How much will the recent environmental-based disputes between Uruguay and Argentina over the two European-financed paper mills being built in Uruguay threaten the relationship between the two countries?

TD: It’s a good case of one of the continuing nagging disputes over the direction of foreign investment in these MERCOSUR countries. My sense is that there is a lot more division over a general list of subjects between the Uruguayans and Argentines than either country is willing to admit. There is still bitterness from the economic meltdown that happened in Argentina, under President Menem, when it leaped too fast into privatization and too much into corruption.

COHA: How has Uruguay been marginalized within MERCOSUR?

TD: What Uruguay wanted in MERCOSUR was to become its secretariat, while continuing to play a mediating role between Argentina and Brazil, because it simply cannot compete with Argentina and Brazil when it comes to raw exports. In the past, Uruguay has been too economically weak to set the agenda for MERCOSUR.

COHA: How would a bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. benefit Uruguay?

TD: What Uruguay would like to provide the U.S. would be in the form of the service industry for United States products, to put coke into bottles, or provide bottles for the coke. Uruguay wants to move away from cotton and meat and move to a more service-oriented sector, with more diversification of its agricultural sector. Since Uruguay’s land and climate is not the best for agriculture, there is not much they can do with it. The push for a FTAA-type trade agreement could cause a serious rift in the party, because in the national assembly, you’ve got some pretty tough old Frente people, but in the long term, Vázquez, Astori and other moderates, know they can’t hold on to the old Frente agenda.

COHA: Is Vázquez looking mainly to free trade and foreign investment to rebuild Uruguay?

TD: Yes, I think the hand behind this is [Danilo] Astori. But Vázquez is not giving up on the effort to maintain some degree of state control and influence over these public enterprises, because he’s got people from his party who are working in these entities. Politically, he can’t easily abandon his coalition’s preference on this issue.

COHA: Does Vázquez have the Uruguayan public behind him?

TD: Yes, he’s not a charismatic figure; he doesn’t exude that much warmth. What gives him his popularity is that he conveys the impression of being careful, cautious, and pragmatic. He’s not going to blow out one side and say something on the other, this is what gives him his credibility and is what Uruguayans are looking for, in light of the recent Argentine melt down.

COHA: Does Vázquez care about being considered part of the “pink tide,” or of a greater left-leaning movement?

TD: I think he wants to be a pragmatic leftist who can get things done- things which the previous parties in Uruguay couldn’t do because of corruption and inefficiency. I think it matters more to him to be perceived as someone who can get things done, rather than simply as a leftist.