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Council On Hemispheric Affairs |
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Monitoring Political, Economic and Diplomatic Issues Affecting the Western Hemisphere |
Thursday,
August 11 2005
LEGAL MEMORANDUM FROM COHA
Unfinished Business: Why Luis Posada Carriles, an Admitted Cuban Exile
Terrorist, Should Face Justice in Venezuela
On October 6, 1976 a bomb on Cubana Airlines Flight 455 between Trinidad and Havana exploded, killing all 73 people on board. Luis Posada Carriles, a 77-year-old anti-Castro Cuban exile and foreign fugitive, is allegedly the mastermind behind the atrocity, an accusation which he has selectively acknowledged. Posada’s curriculum vitae is enough to make many notorious terrorists feel that they are little better than novices. For four decades he has planned, executed or otherwise participated in bombings, assassination attempts and covert insurrections in the service of his extremist causes. In 1985, while being tried in Venezuela for his role in the Cubana bombing, he escaped from prison and went straight to work with paramilitary forces in El Salvador. He also participated in a series of hotel bombings in Havana in 1997, killing an Italian tourist, and, in 2000, he attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro while the Cuban leader was visiting Panama. He was arrested and convicted for the latter crime but was pardoned and released in May of 2005 in an unaccountable move by the outgoing president of Panama, Mireya Moscoso, for which she was fiercely attacked in the Panamanian press.
Currently, Posada is held in a federal facility in El Paso, Texas, after being charged with illegally entering the United States. Meanwhile, Venezuela is seeking his extradition. Posada’s presence in the U.S. poses a delicate problem for the White House, which will have to decide between enforcing its zero-tolerance policy against terrorism or appeasing its influential Venezuelan and Cuban-exile constituents in Southern Florida, where many see him as a counter-revolutionary hero. Ironically, Posada is seeking asylum in the U.S., relying on his claims of innocence, his ancient relationship with Florida’s governor Jeb Bush and his employment as a mercenary in the service of the U.S.-backed Contras fighters in El Salvador.
A Misinterpreted Legal History
The complexities of Venezuelan law have helped to confound press
coverage of the Posada case for a number of years. While the majority of
media accounts have reported that he was acquitted twice in Venezuelan
courts, this version of events does not withstand scrutiny. The distinction
is quite important, as the merits of Posada’s asylum request would
be bolstered were he able to show the acquittals. Though the details of
his court records do prove somewhat elusive, this much is known: Posada
was first tried before a military tribunal, which acquitted him of the
crime of treason. However, a higher military court found that the lower
one lacked jurisdiction and annulled the entire case, which was then handed
off to the civil courts. They would have prima facie jurisdiction over
Posada, as he was at the time a citizen of Venezuela. Initially, the prosecutors
in the civil case declined to try him; their replacements, however, saw
fit to bring homicide charges against Posada, and it was during this period
that he escaped from prison. Since Venezuela does not reach verdicts
on defendants in absentia, the litigation was stalled, while a warrant
was issued for his arrest.
To Posada’s potential benefit, many have interpreted this lack of a verdict to mean that two Venezuelan courts have found him innocent of terrorism. However, neither of the legal actions against him carried any precedential effect. The military tribunal annulment effectively wiped the slate clean, resetting the entire judicial process and leaving all parties situated as if no legal action had ever occurred. Nor did the initial prosecutors’ failure to act on the case in the civilian courts have any effect. There are several reasons that prosecutors may decline a case, including lack of evidence, bribery, insufficient resources and political motivation. In the final analysis, Posada was in the process of facing prosecution for a major crime at the time when he escaped from Venezuela. Venezuela now wants to exercise its sovereign right to try him, but first must overcome the bias introduced by the press, whose inaccurate reporting may have inadvertently lent Posada an ersatz veil of innocence.
Extradition versus Deportation
Generally speaking, extradition is controlled by treaty, that is, with
some exceptions, there needs to be an existing bilateral agreement between
the requesting country and the country holding the fugitive. Such agreements
define and govern the process between the two countries and vary by
country. The U.S. has extradition treaties with both Cuba and Venezuela,
which were ratified in 1905 and 1923, respectively. Extradition requests
are handled by the State Department, whereas deportation cases are treated
administratively by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
or in court proceedings before an immigration judge, which has been the
case with Posada.
While Cuba has declared in the past that it has no extradition treaty with the U.S., and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has stated that it “does not generally remove people to Cuba,” neither of these positions appear to be totally accurate. According to the State Department’s Treaties in Force database, the U.S.-Cuba extradition treaty of 1905 is still valid and effective. Additionally, as recently as 2003, the U.S. extradited 12 Cubans to their homeland. However, despite its interest in the case, Cuba is not requesting jurisdiction; rather, it is calling instead that Posada be extradited to Venezuela, where he can be tried for his role in the ’76 airliner bombing.
On May 13, 2005, Venezuela issued a provisional arrest request for Posada’s extradition. It was rejected by the State Department as providing too little documentary evidence of Posada’s guilt. Venezuela responded with a statement that it would make a formal request for extradition and provide ample documentation in support of it. The State Department then said that it is not ruling out the possibility of granting the formal extradition request, but the general tone of hostility coming from its press office in ensuing days over the issue renders such an award seem most improbable. This is particularly the case as bilateral relations between the two countries rapidly deteriorate, and as Miami’s Venezuelan hardline exile community exercises its increasing political leverage over relations between the U.S. and Venezuela.
While it might reflect a lapse in international protocol, a failure to extradite Posada at this time would not necessarily indicate that he will never have to face justice in Venezuela. The much less politicized solution to the problem would be deportation, a process controlled at the judicial level rather than by the Secretary of State. Since Posada is a citizen of Venezuela and is in the U.S. illegally, it would make sense to send him back to Venezuela, where the authorities can decide what to do with him.
Deportation to Venezuela
is likely to be the most expedient way for the U.S. to handle the Posada
case,
and Judge Abbott, who will be hearing the case
on August 29, may have little discretion in this matter. Section 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(3)(B)(i) of the U.S. Code states that any alien who has engaged
in, solicited or incited a terrorist activity or is a representative of
a terrorist organization, is inadmissible to the U.S. Posada does not fall
within the narrow exceptions to these clauses, and with the wealth of evidence
- much of it coming from his own past admissions to the press - pointing
to his guilt for each of these violations, justifying his acceptance as
a legal immigrant would be nearly impossible. Furthermore, even if he can
successfully argue that he is a U.S. citizen by virtue of permanent residency
(an argument his lawyers are expected to make due to his previous, though
remote, stay in Florida), under the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, he
could be stripped of his citizenship if the government determines that
he is guilty of certain human rights offenses. Torture and extrajudicial
killings under color of authority are the main grounds for these violations,
and given Posada’s self-acknowledged extensive background in terrorism
and covert operations, it is quite conceivable that such violations could
be established. Finally, Posada is also wanted by authorities in El
Salvador, who have issued a warrant for his arrest for document fraud.
This further militates against granting him asylum and also gives the
court the option to deport him to another nation - one that, compared to
Cuba or Venezuela, enjoys a cordial relationship with the U.S.
Barring High-Level Intervention, the Outcome Should be Predictable
Posada’s immigration case appears to be straightforward. With the
preponderance of the evidence weighing against him (hearsay is admissible
in immigration proceedings and Judge Abbott has even ruled that his conviction
in Panama can be used against him, regardless of the pardon), all the court
has to do is apply the law, which would deny his admission to the U.S.
and deport, rather than extradite, him to Venezuela. Alternatively, evidence
suggests that Posada used a false passport to enter the U.S. just prior
to the botched assassination attempt in Panama, and Abbott may throw the
book at him for using fraudulent documents to enter the U.S. for terrorism-related
purposes - an offense punishable by a sentence of up to 25 years in prison.
Either way, Posada’s future lies in the court’s hands, and
any intervention by the White House on behalf of his case would be considered
offensive. However, such political maneuvering is not unprecedented; in
1990 President George H. W. Bush overruled his own Department of Justice
and had Orlando Bosch - a known international terrorist and Posada’s
former partner-in-crime in the airline bombing- released from a Florida
prison and granted asylum. Bosch now enjoys his mysteriously granted freedom
in Miami. In today’s post-9/11 milieu, a similar move by the current
administration would seriously undermine the credibility of the Bush doctrine.
This
analysis was prepared by COHA Senior Research Fellow Joshua Soren
Graae.
August
11, 2005
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Legal
Commentary 05.17