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Council On Hemispheric Affairs |
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Monitoring Political, Economic and Diplomatic Issues Affecting the Western Hemisphere |
Wednesday,
August 10, 2005
COHA MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESS
With Bolivia Still Seized by Unrest and Instability, there are Lessons
to be Learned about Autonomy from Nicaragua’s Comparative Experience
• Bolivia’s political crisis somewhat subsided with President
Carlos Mesa’s June resignation but efforts by the indigenous majority continue
and are in part aimed at holding a constitutional assembly to re-write the constitution
and re-nationalize the gas industry. Meanwhile the country’s eastern region
continues to demand greater autonomy.
•
The Department of Santa Cruz, the economic hub of Bolivia because of its abundance
of natural resources (including the proximity of the nation’s huge hydrocarbon
reserves), intends to hold a referendum on autonomy in order to protect its resources
from being under the control of the central government, if plans to re-nationalize
the gas reserves are carried through by the proposed constitutional assembly.
The push for autonomy is creating an even more divided Bolivia, with an emphasis
on race and class permeating Santa Cruz’s motivations for self-rule.
• Nicaragua which also had to deal with a divisive autonomy movement provides
a comparative study to better comprehend the possible outcome of the current
unrest
rattling Bolivia.
• Bolivians need to re-evaluate the negative effects of the autonomy movement
in order to be certain to treat all economic and social sectors fairly, so as
to
avert a major strife.
Bolivia’s ongoing political crisis seems to have subsided temporarily
following President Carlos Mesa’s June 5 resignation. In the face
of the protests and blockades that paralyzed the country’s economy,
Mesa had failed to adequately respond to the seriousness of the indigenous-led
manifestations. Although much of the Bolivian and U.S. press claim Evo
Morales, the Movement toward Socialism (MAS) presidential party candidate
was the instigator of the recent political upheaval, in fact he was a relative
latecomer to the popular agitation that was led by numerous community-based
organizations headed by indigenous leadership, with the participation of
teachers, miners, coca growers in the Yungas and labor activists in El
Alto and the Altiplano. There is no question, though, that Morales, whether
or not deservedly, has become the iconic face of the indigenous movement
to the outside press.
Among its demands, the dissidents also call for re-nationalization of the
natural gas industry (while MAS called for a 50 percent tax on hydrocarbons
for export), a reform of the constitution to include amplified rights for
native people and a referendum on autonomy for the eastern region of the
country. In Mesa’s place, the ex-head of Bolivia’s Supreme
Court, Eduardo Rodriguez, assumed the presidency. On July 5, Congress and
President Rodriguez announced that elections will be held by December 2005.
As demands for a constitutional assembly continue and a conservative championed
autonomy movement gains momentum in Santa Cruz, plans could be in the works
for a constitutional assembly and a national vote on regional autonomy
a year from December’s elections.
Santa Cruz Makes Its Move
The residents of the Department of Santa Cruz in Bolivia’s prosperous
eastern region, known as cruceños, decided earlier this summer to hold
a referendum on August 12, in order to achieve greater autonomy from the central
government. According to the U.S. State Department and the Bolivian Embassy,
the referendum has been pushed back until next July. According to
the BBC,
the region, also known as
the media luna, accounts for 33 percent of Bolivia’s economic
output, but, according to the National Institute of Statistics of Bolivia,
accounts
for only one quarter of Bolivia’s population. The area also contains
the majority of Bolivia’s natural resources such as arable land, oil,
soybeans, sugar and gas reserves, which, combined with the gas reserves in
the Department of Tarija, are calculated as being the second largest in South
America. Tarija has aligned itself with Santa Cruz in the push for greater
autonomy.
Bolivia in Crisis
The conflict over who should control the gas revenues and how they should be
divided between foreign companies and the national government has been a sensitive
issue since the hydrocarbon industry was privatized in the 1990s at the urging
of the IMF and the World Bank. Prior to this, Bolivia and foreign companies
shared a 50/50 split of profit of gas revenues, with gas and oil sales accounting
for 40 percent of the national government’s revenues. In October of 2003,
then President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (“Goni”) proposed
a bill to accelerate privatizing the country’s natural gas reserves mainly
for export through Chile to California, critics claimed that his scheme would
only make some foreign investors and a few local politicians involved in the
deal. The bill sparked a wave of protests by various groups, similar to those
of last June, which called for a more balanced sharing of profits between foreign
investors and the Bolivian government, while some of the indigenous and political
left called for the re-nationalization of the entire hydrocarbon industry.
To quell the protesters, Goni deployed the armed forces, resulting in sixty
people killed in a conflict now known as the “gas war.” Now under
extreme pressure, Lozada resigned the presidency and his vice president, Carlos
Mesa assumed the post.
The autonomy movement has gained momentum in recent months due to the new hydrocarbons
measure passed on May 17, 2005, which Congress passed without Mesa’s
signature. The bill originally was introduced in a national referendum held
last July. Under the law, foreign companies holding gas concessions in Bolivia
would have to raise their payments on taxes and royalties from 18 percent to
50 percent paid to the government. The new law also called for the reestablishment
of the state oil company, which earlier had been privatized. The higher payments
would provide more revenue for the Bolivian government but as the indigenous
have long experienced, more revenue for the government does not necessarily
mean more funds spent on its citizens. The gas industry is still under the
control of foreign interests, which has sparked cries for re-nationalization
of the industry. At the same time, critics charge that the higher payments
could deter new foreign investment in the region as some capital sources already
have threatened to pull out of the country, much to the chagrin of many cruceños.
The new law also called for the reestablishment of the state oil company, Yacimientos
Petrolíferos Fiscales de Bolivia (YPFB). The reestablishment had been
delayed in recent weeks and residents in the town of Camiri in the Department
of Santa Cruz held a general strike on August 3. The strike ended, with a pledge
coming from the presidential palace to reinstate the oil company in the coming
weeks. At the same time, the Federation of Municipal Associations (FAME) and
the Executive Committee of Bolivian Universities (CEUB) are planning to stage
yet another protest on August 15 if the government doesn’t agree to assign
20 percent of a new gas and oil tax to municipalities and 5 percent to higher
education. Finance Minister Waldo Gutiérrez said this demand would be
impossible to meet unless municipalities agree to take over completely paying
for health and education services.
The Autonomy Movement Begins
The struggle for autonomy began as a movement by local cruceños business
owners, farmers and landowners who complained that they were receiving too
little from the central government in return for the foreign currency being
earned by the country from the sale of natural resources found in the region
and the disproportionate percentage of taxes paid by Santa Cruz to La Paz.
According to the pro-autonomy movement, Nación Camba, cruceños
are demanding an associate free state status that includes the right to self-determination
and sovereignty over the economy, territory, culture and natural resources
of the region. Nación Camba has the support of municipal governments
in the immediate area, and institutions such as the Santa Cruz Civic Committee.
State Department official David Boyle told COHA that the autonomy question
resurfaced as a reaction to the recent protests and talk of gas nationalization.
A recent poll by El Deber, a Santa Cruz newspaper, has found that 75 percent
of Bolivians favor re-nationalization of the gas industry. If, in the constitutional
assembly that has yet to be held, nationalization is put on the table and passes,
then foreign investors could decide to pull their holdings out of the country,
although others argue that this would be an unlikely scenario. Foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Bolivia already has sagged in the last few years due to
the country’s political instability. Some cruceños believe that
if the region had greater autonomy, they would be better able to thwart nationalization
and persuade foreign investors to remain in the region. One group of inhabitants
of Santa Cruz, the Guaraní Indians, have aligned themselves with the
indigenous movements in the Altiplano which are demanding nationalization of
the gas industry.
A Divided Bolivia
Bolivia is to a shocking degree divided along ethnic lines with, according
to State Department figures, about 62 percent of the population being indigenous
(Aymara, Quechua and Guarani), with 38 percent being of European and Mestizo
descent. Land and wealth is overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of European
elites, while two-thirds of the population lives in poverty. Since colonization
through independence and into contemporary Bolivian history, the indigenous
have existed as second class citizens who have been for the most part excluded
from the country’s political and economic life. While Bolivia is a country
rich in resources, and with the continued presence of major foreign investors,
it remains still the poorest country in South America and the third poorest
in the Western hemisphere. The present political turmoil stems from a desire
to drastically reverse these conditions, with the indigenous people believing
that nationalization is the critical first step.
Nación Camba accuses the central government and the western part of
the country of exerting its power through outdated colonial traditions which
allow “internal colonies” like Santa Cruz to be exploited for their
natural resources. Nación Camba claims that the people of Santa Cruz
have inherited a four hundred year struggle for self-determination starting
with the invasion and control of the territory by the Spanish conquistadores.
The Santa Cruz region, the most developed part of Bolivia, has the highest
Human Development Index in Bolivia, with a literacy rate above 93 percent.
The relatively high concentration of those with European backgrounds may explain
these impressive rates since its residents historically have been far better
off than the indigenous population. Recently, Santa Cruz has been able to rapidly
develop due to the presence of foreign investors involved in extractive and
other commercial activities.
As often is the case, race issues underlie the autonomy debate. There has been
a push throughout the entire country to reform the constitution to include
a proclamation that Bolivia is a multi-ethnic state that gurantees fundamental
rights to the indigenous population. Although Nación Camba acknowledges
this concern, it is clear that the small, elite-controlled part of the country
does not want to continue to bear what it regards as the unfair burden of having
to subsidize the impoverished majority. Most of the country supports re-nationalization,
yet cruceños are opposed not only to re-nationalization of energy sources
but also to higher payment increases on foreign investors. However, if some
lasting formula can be found for a balance to be struck between nationalization
and higher payments on foreign investments, Bolivia’s natural resources
could provide a valuable opportunity for access to the global market and in
the process help alleviate the high poverty levels normally afflicting the
country.
The Department of Santa Cruz strongly supports an autonomy referendum, either
on a departmental or national level. The question remains, however, if the
referendum passes, will the minority voice of the Gauaraní population
who opposes it feel extremely alienated? What happens to Bolivian unity then?
It may be true that many cruceños feel exploited due to the draining
of resources by the central government which, they insist, disproportionately
uses them to subsidize the population of the far less productive, more heavily
populated western part of the nation. But the cruceños indignation is
somewhat self-inflicted; it is not possible for one region of the country to
claim the nation’s patrimony, which happens to be located on its terrain,
as exclusively its own. Every country, for that matter, contains parts of the
natural domain more favored than others.
The nation of Bolivia, not just the Department of Santa Cruz, was formed under
a brutal, colonial agenda in which people and resources were and still are
unceremoniously manipulated. An easy argument can be made that the state’s
natural resources belong to the Bolivian population collectively, who, historically,
has been subjected to the full spectrum of the volatile geo-political forces
at work in the nation, such as colonialism, imperialism, free-market reforms
and globalization.
Lesson’s learned from Nicaragua’s Autonomy Movement
Bolivia is not the only country in Latin America to be confronted with autonomy
issues. Throughout recent decades, Nicaragua also has struggled with questions
of separatism, and comprehending Nicaragua’s autonomy movement possibly
could help gain insight into Bolivia’s current political strife. In 1987,
under the new Sandinista constitution, the country’s Atlantic/Caribbean
coastal region was granted autonomy from the central government. The coastal
region’s diverse population, known as costeños, is a mix of Afro-descendents,
Mestizos and various indigenous groups. For most of Nicaragua’s colonial
history, the coast was under the control of the indigenous Miskito. In 1894,
the country’s authoritarian president, General Zelaya harshly re-incorporated
the region into the rest of the country, when it came under the control of
the national government. Since that time, costeños have waged an intermittent
struggle to regain control of their territory, culture, natural resources and
economy.
The Costeños
In the 1980s, amid fighting a civil war against the U.S.-trained, armed and
financed opposition group, the Contras, the Sandinista government was desperately
in need of costeño support. To win our allegiance, the Sandinistas re-wrote
the constitution, proclaiming Nicaragua as the first multi-ethnic state in
Latin America. The constitution’s Law 28, known as the autonomy provision,
divided the coastal region into two parts and granted them the right to self-governance.
According to John Hodgson, an autonomy movement leader and local scholar, in
his article, Issues that Limit the Development of Coastal Autonomy, the law
embraced the concept of “unity through diversity,” ensuring that
all coastal ethnic groups maintained the right to representation on the Regional
Council, the coastal area’s highest governing body, regardless of the
nature of its population, size or level of development.
Since the drafting of a new constitution in 1987, the autonomy movement has
moved slowly, as the law has been only episodically enforced. While some of
its successes include the creation of multi-lingual schools and an autonomous
university, as well as the carrying out of elections for Regional Council representatives,
its failures unfortunately far outweigh its achievements. Though the coastal
region contains the highest concentration of natural resources (fisheries,
forests, hydrocarbons and minerals) in Nicaragua, the costeños’ weak
presence on the Regional Council have kept it the country’s poorest,
most under-developed area. National political parties dominate the body pushing
the costeños and their local interests to the sidelines. Coastal people
historically have had a very low level of participation in civil society, which
has lead to extremely weak local parties that are unable to stage successful
electoral campaigns representing their self-interests against national political
parties. Hodgson observes that since the concept of autonomy undermines the
notion of national interests, the country’s big political parties are
unlikely to agree to strictly enforce an autonomy measure. Without more support
from the national government, the struggle to make coastal autonomy a living
reality will crawl rather than race.
Unlike in Nicaragua, where the autonomy movement ostensibly has operated within
the parameters outlined by the national government, and essentially with popular
support, Bolivian cruceños intend to gain autonomy regardless of popular
support. However, as is clear from Nicaragua’s experience, without the
support of the central government, autonomy and its supposed benefits will
be very difficult to attain. Even if Santa Cruz achieved its own autonomy,
it is unclear whether the department could politically insulate itself from
Bolivia’s influential national parties, especially given the intensification
of migration from other parts of Bolivia to Santa Cruz.
The Challenge of Autonomy
An autonomous Santa Cruz would also have to face up to the difficulty of obtaining
international recognition as an independent state entity. In the case of Nicaragua,
though the coast was granted legal autonomy and local control of its natural
resources, the international community has failed to acknowledge its independent
status. Foreign investors interested in coastal resources still work through
the central government, not the Regional Council, as a medium to secure their
economic interests. Even more so, if Santa Cruz’s autonomy is not considered
to be legitimate by the Bolivian state, it will likely be accorded even less
recognition by foreign companies and foreign countries, than its Nicaraguan
counterpart. It seems clear that to be recognized as a legitimate sovereign
entity, a region must begin with the support of the central governing body
in which the territory falls. The people of Santa Cruz would be well advised
to acknowledge that successful nation-building requires the support of not
just a handful of private entities, but of the central government as well as
the community of nations, along with local entities, which autonomy-minded
local commercial interests are not likely to easily attract.
National parties do not present the only challenge to autonomy; internal conflicts
within an autonomy movement can also derail efforts to achieve success. An
important observation made by the aforementioned Hogdson is that the various
Nicaraguan coastal groups have been unable to make themselves into an influential
force because several of them remain deeply divided. The seeds of the division
were planted in 1987 in the form of conflicting visions of autonomy. While
some supported the pluralist idea of autonomy whose motto was “unity
through diversity,”- other groups wanted the condition to apply exclusively
to indigenous costeños. Inter-cultural autonomy eventually triumphed,
but various costal groups still interpret autonomy in a way that is exclusive
and self-serving, including many Miskitos who equate autonomy with the rebirth
of the hegemonic rule they exercised from the 17th to 19th centuries. At the
same time, some Mestizos claim that an autonomous status naturally belongs
to them, which only ended with the annexation of their territory in 1894. Furthermore,
some costeños desire complete succession, while others want complete
integration with the central government.
The problem of competing notions of autonomy has also surfaced in Bolivia.
Some indigenous groups oppose any push for autonomy that would incidentally
provide more revenue to foreign investors. As more and more indigenous residents
of the Altiplano migrate to Santa Cruz, it will become more and more difficult
to decipher the demands of this rapidly evolving multi-faceted segment of society,
as distinguished from those members of the elite who clearly would economically
benefit from a change of status.
Cruceños need to find a way to unify conflicting factions in order to
arrange for a soft landing on the autonomy issue. In Nicaragua, the demands
of such elements were reconciled by guaranteeing each ethnic group at least
one seat on the Regional Council. While well-intentioned, this system has accomplished
very little. For example, one member of the Garifuna population’s representation
on the council has done nothing to balance the Mestizo’s overwhelming
elected majority, who typically support the national parties. If autonomy is
granted to Santa Cruz, in order to be successful, it will have to create a
new system that does more than only guarantees a minimal degree of token representation
to dissenting factions.
In the June 19th edition of the Santa Cruz newspaper, El Deber, former President
de Lozada commented on the autonomy struggle and admitted that there is a social
and ethnic problem in Bolivia: “I think that would be the end of
Bolivia. Now, of course its [autonomy] is feasible: with a third of the population,
they [Santa Cruz] have hydrocarbon resources and soy production and cattle-raising,
with attractive markets for its products in neighboring countries.” In
other words, Santa Cruz’s self sufficiency and its blessings in the form
of its natural resources, makes independence a conceivable possibility. As
such, Bolivia’s current political crisis necessitates far greater compromise
amongst the different ethnic groups of the country, which is especially true
considering the not-so-distant possibility of civil war, in the case of Santa
Cruz opts in that direction.
According to the Interpress News Agency, Bolivia’s armed forces have
publicly stated that they would not accept any division of the country. Thankfully,
as the State Department’s Boyle observed, during the unrest in June,
the armed forces sided with the constitutional government in seeking to negotiate
a peaceful and legitimate political solution to the recent instability, unlike
the uncontrolled escalation of events that unfolded during the “gas war.” Nevertheless,
Latin America’s armed forces, including Bolivia’s, have a long
history of maintaining national stability and security through, if need be,
resorting to extremely violent measures. According to the Bolivian constitution,
the armed forces’ “fundamental mission is to defend and conserve
the independence of the nation and the security and stability of the state.” If
Santa Cruz’s autonomy referendum passes and comes to be forcibly implemented,
a civil war in Bolivia could very well follow. As for now, the struggle being
seen is who will decide who will control the country’s resources continues.
The outcome of a possible civil strife due to autonomy demands and an inability
to compromise on the issue of re-nationalization, payments of foreign investors
and indigenous rights would not only be detrimental to the population and economy
of Bolivia, but inevitably to the cruceños’ cause as well.
This
analysis was prepared by COHA Research Associate Melissa Nepomiachi.
August
10, 2005
For
More Information
Ballvé Teo. "Far
from Over: Bolivia on the Brink of Civil War—or Revolution." Americas.org
10 June 2005.
http://www.americas.org/item_19790
"Bolivian Right
Declares Virtual War." Scoop Independent
News. 3 June 2004
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0506/S00063.htm
"Camiri Strikes Over Oil Deal." Americas.org. August 7 2005.
http://www.americas.org/item_21120
Gomez, Luis. "Santa Cruz and Its Sedition: Power and Autonomy in Bolivia." Counterpunch.org.
29 January 2005.
http://www.counterpunch.org/gomez01292005.html
"Goni asegura que una división sería el final de
Bolivia."El
Deber 20
June 2005.
http://www.eldeber.com.bo/20050620/nacional_4.html
Nacion Camba: http://www.nacioncamba.org/quienesomos.htm
Nicaragua and Autonomy: http://www.yorku.ca/cerlac/URACCAN/Nov24-97.html
Schultz, Jim. "Political Crisis Erupts in Bolivia Over
Oil Ownership." Pacific
News Service.19
May 2005.
http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=4805a676cefd60167d027f0472dfcccb
Schultz, Jim. Oct
17, 2003 "Behind Bolivia's Gas War."Pacific News Service. 17 October 2003.
http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=8e7890e37f836788252aaac364cf501d
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