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Council On Hemispheric Affairs
Monitoring Political, Economic and Diplomatic Issues Affecting the Western Hemisphere
Memorandum to the Press 03.55
Friday, August 15, 2003

 

Likely Ill-fated President-elect Takes
Office Tonight at Ceremony in Paraguay

 

• President-elect Nicanor Duarte Frutos’ Colorado Party has already acquired a tattered image after searing corruption scandals blistered its last two presidencies.

• Finance Minister, Dionisio Borda, may be the ticket to real reform in Paraguay and, if given the freedom to pursue effective economic policy, his continued presence will be a test of Duarte Frutos’ seriousness in enacting reform.

• Facing a deficit of over $200 million, around 39 percent of the country’s GDP, the president-elect doesn’t have the necessary budget to get the country through the rest of the year.

The new cabinet is confident that with the help of Borda, the International Monetary Fund and other foreign lenders will approve of Duarte Frutos’ economic reforms, thus providing desperately needed disbursements.

 

Given that the dominating Colorado Party of Paraguay has spent the last fifty-five years emptying the National Treasury, mixing party with public funds and hatching scores of corruption scandals, one would assume that the electorate would have chosen an opposition party candidate for their country’s highest office in the most recent election. Apparently not, as the Colorados are about to successfully install yet another president, despite the party’s corrupt and violence-ridden history. Although the last two presidents — both Colorados — were impeached, the candidate of this dominant but deeply divided party has triumphed once again, despite the fact that he played a crucial role in prolonging the administration of his predecessor, the second president in a row to face impeachment on corruption charges. The Colorados have held on to their hegemonic power in part because the state is the biggest employer in Paraguay; thus, these workers vote to keep the Colorado Party in power mainly so that they can keep their jobs. However, despite the checkered past of incoming president Nicanor Duarte Frutos, his anti-corruption campaign rhetoric and his assertions that “Paraguay must break with its political past,” have raised modest hopes that he will stand up to the tradition of dishonesty and fixed courts which preceded him. Duarte Frutos has also won popular approval for his frequently expressed distaste for privatization and “Washington Consensus” structural adjustment policies, which are axiomatically imposed upon economically struggling poor countries as a prerequisite for receiving loans from the World Bank and the IMF. But although Duarte Frutos mounted such sentiments during his campaign, his zeal for big reform initiatives in a corruption-ridden country whose economy is based largely on an illegal commodity import/export market has raised doubts about the feasibility that conditions will rapidly change. Skeptics feel that Duarte Frutos may be performing the same song and dance as did the leaders before him and that soon his broad-ranging commitments will get the cane.


THE GIANT LEAP OF FAITH


Tonight, Paraguay’s political and economic elite as well as several high profile South American and Asian political leaders will celebrate Duarte Frutos’ triumph in Asunción, the country’s capital. A new president and an apparent new hard-line approach to the country’s most pressing problems theoretically could represent an open door to a reformed Paraguay. But after the inaugural ceremony is over, the new head of Latin America’s most corrupt country and South America’s second poorest nation must get to work, and Duarte Frutos will immediately be under intense pressure to act on the reform promises he made during his campaign. Outgoing President Luis González Macchi was one of Paraguay’s most corrupt leaders and without doubt, one who has done some of the worst damage to the Colorado Party’s image. Fervent in making commitments to change, Duarte Frutos has created high expectations, but now he will be forced to try to meet them. Previously, he had asserted, “We’re going to fight so that Paraguayans can feel proud of their leaders and their country.” Now the battle begins.

Although the ceremony will center around Duarte Frutos, another man may actually be the most important figure in determining the fate of this administration. Finance Minister Dionisio Borda’s status in the cabinet will be the yardstick by which Paraguayans and the international community should judge the new president. Borda is one of the leading experts on the Paraguayan economy and a hugely important contributor to academic debates on the democratization of Paraguay. Because the nation’s politicians do not change their stripes easily, Duarte Frutos’ bringing Borda on might suggest one of two things: Borda is either meant to be a temporary window dressing to help the machine survive yet another onslaught, or more optimistically, Duarte Frutos is serious. Borda’s presence and freedom to pursue effective policy will be a key indicator of the probity and intentions of Duarte Frutos’ government. If the administration constrains Borda, it is likely he will resign in frustration; if Borda leaves, his departure will indicate that Duarte Frutos is indeed giving Paraguay the same obnoxious Colorado mauling as did his predecessors.


THE ELECTION SHOWS SOME DEPARTURE FROM THE PAST


In the April 27 general elections, Duarte Frutos, a former sociology professor, lawyer, journalist, and education minister, won 37 percent of the vote and defeated four other candidates, including Julio ‘Yoyito’ César Franco, a former vice president who resigned last October and then ran as the candidate for the main opposition party, the PLRA. The 64 percent of registered voters who turned out at the polls also elected 45 new Senate members and 80 new deputies, but for the first time in its leadership, the long-time ruling Colorados fell just short of a majority in Congress. Though half of the 2.4 million registered voters are Colorado members, only 37 percent voted for Duarte Frutos, the lowest percentage for one of its presidential candidates in the party’s history. This hardly resounding victory, coupled with a low voter turnout, indicates that Paraguayans are becoming increasingly disillusioned with their country’s oligarchy, as the country sinks deeper into recession and more corruption and tax fraud cases surface — most of them involving ranking government officials. According to several sources, the tax evasion rate lies somewhere between 60 and 70 percent. There is no personal income tax except for highly paid executives, so tax revenue comes from value-added taxes and corporate taxes. As a consequence, many Paraguayans, in desperation, turn to the informal economic sector to make a living.

Cigarettes and counterfeit Nintendo games are among thousands of smuggled products imported and exported illegally through Paraguay’s notoriously porous borders. Paraguay is a convenient transshipment site for cocaine and for precursor chemicals because of its proximity to Bolivia and its many small airstrips found in the eastern part of the country. Officials in Brasília also express considerable concern that Paraguay is becoming a major source of illegal firearms for the drug gangs terrorizing São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Contraband traffic now accounts for around one fifth of economic activity in the country. Acquiring reliable figures for official GDP and per capita income is no small task. Duarte Frutos has included in his proposed reforms the rebuilding of a lawful economic system, considered a crucial measure by major domestic and foreign corporations which are sustaining severe losses as a result of the contraband economy. If he welcomes Borda’s counsel on this, he can succeed, and foreign investment, which has practically ceased in recent years, may return to give the economy a much-needed jumpstart. In addition to seeking a new tax collection system, Duarte Frutos has vowed to root out the official corruption that, according to many sources, costs the country roughly $5 billion each year. The bottom line is that the corruption and the economic slump are mutually reinforcing; thus, campaign promises by yet another Colorado president become difficult for the average Paraguayan to take at all seriously.


A SLOPPY PAST

Although opposition to the Colorados among Paraguayan legislators is growing, Duarte Frutos’ opponents were nonetheless too divided on election day to clinch the executive position. Thus, Paraguay’s PRI-like Colorado Party, long the vehicle of the authoritarian Stroessner regime, will continue its multi-decade leadership for another five-year term. The Colorados have maintained themselves in office through a mixture of military coups, dictatorships, state employment control, political patronage, and corruption cover-ups. The party gained power from the Liberals in 1948 following the successful coup that drove out military dictator General Higinio Morinigo. An armed territorial conflict with Bolivia — the horrendous War of the Chaco (1932 – 1935) — created an enormously powerful war veterans movement which rebelled against the ruling liberal elite over the handling of the war and the poor treatment meted out to veterans. A civil war caused disaffection with the Liberal Party’s handling of the conflict, which consequently breathed new life into the Colorados, opening space for General Alfredo Stroessner to take over in 1954. Stroessner was an important officer in the Chaco War, and it was not difficult for him to slide into the presidency after displacing President Federico Chávez via a military coup. Chávez was elected, although one should recall that there was a tradition in Paraguay of the Colorados and Liberals arranging limited election contests. With an ever-solicitous Colorado Party defending him, which included senior military officials who were required to join, Stroessner was able to maintain his repressive, highly centralised and isolationist rule from 1954 to 1989. During his reign he created the so-called “iron triangle” in which the dictator allied the ruling Colorado Party, the military and the state apparatus into a commanding entity. The “iron triangle” secured and prolonged his dictatorship and allowed Stroessner to transform the office of the president into a position with nearly complete power over political and economic developments. The Colorado monopoly over the state gave birth to the crippling political patronage still flourishing in Paraguay today.

In 1989, Stroessner was ousted in a palace coup headed by his son-in-law, General Andrés Rodríguez, who won the presidency for the Colorados in a hastily held election to satisfy pressures from democratizing Argentina and Brazil. But political and constitutional reform did not come until 1992 in the form of a new constitution that radically decentralized the country's system of government, establishing a clear division of executive, legislative and judicial responsibilities and vastly improving protection of civil rights.

In addition, a clause that previously allowed the ruling party to control two thirds of the legislative seats, was eliminated. This clause has been put to more use since the divisions in loyalty regarding General Lino Oviedo, the outsider political boss of former president Raúl Cubas Grau. Oviedo had staged a coup in April 1996, the goal of which was to oust then president Juan Carlos Wasmosy. The public staunchly rejected this military general’s actions, yet the event illustrated that even after Stroessner was kicked out of leadership, the military remained very much a part of Paraguayan politics. Oviedo continued to arm wrestle Wasmosy for power over national policy and various appointments to political offices, but Wasmosy struck back with military backing and a mandate that the general resign. This incited public demonstrations centered around support for the president and a desire to sustain what progress had been made in the post-Stroessner period toward democracy. In 1997, through nationalistic speeches that fell in line with traditional Paraguayan politics, Oviedo was able to secure the presidential candidacy from the Colorado Party members for the 1998 presidential election. However, after a 1998 military court conviction made Oviedo ineligible for elected office, his running mate Raúl Cubas Grau assumed the Colorado candidacy, going on to win the election with the slogal “Cubas in office, Oviedo in power.” Oviedo remained a powerful presence as Cubas’ political boss. Cubas efforts to pardon the general were overturned, but they led to significant divisions in the Colorado Party, which, in large part, is what led to the intra-party warfare and supposedly to then vice president Luis María Argaña’s assassination. The Oviedo factor continues to destabilize Paraguay and its politicians, and it led to the loss of a legislative majority for the Colorados in this year’s election. Oviedo’s National Union Movement of Ethical Colorados (UNACE), split from the Colorados and formed its own party. Oviedo’s splinter party is the missing element of the Colorado vote. Without a majority in Congress, the Colorado Party and Duarte Frutos, its standard bearer, will be limited in their ability to employ the political cronyism rampant under the previous administration.


MACCHI: A PIG IN SLOP

Luis González Macchi, the outgoing president, managed to evade a Senate conviction in his impeachment trial, but not without smearing the party’s image and causing further internal factionalism. He was accused by his own party of illegally purchasing a stolen BMW and siphoning $16 million in public funds from the Central Bank, depositing the money in his own New York Citibank account. Such revelations infuriated the Paraguayan population, one third of which lives under the poverty line. Although the Senate voted 25 to 18 in favor of removing President Macchi from office, they lacked the two thirds majority — 30 votes — necessary to secure a conviction. One of the reasons the Colorados maintained Macchi in office was their desire to prevent a Liberal Party member from rising to the presidency. Julio César ‘Yoyito’ Franco would have replace Macchi had the Senators voted him out. Their reluctance to do so indicates the degree to which the Colorado Party has turned into a highly consolidated industry, willing to suffer their leaders’ dishonest behavior before being pressed to relinquish any power.

Congress had appointed President Macchi on March 28, 1999, to replace President Raúl Cubas Grau, who had resigned from office just before the Senate was expected to convict him on charges of moral culpability in the death of then vice president Luis María Argaña. Argaña, one of Oviedo’s political enemies, cooperated with Wasmosy (who both Oviedo and Argaña hated) to make sure Oviedo was disqualified. Deadly street protests had erupted following the assassination of Cubas’ vice president. Cubas, along with the infamous General Oviedo, was suspected of plotting the murder. Although Macchi turned out to be a poor replacement for Cubas, the country was already suffering from years of economic mismanagement, an expanding contraband economy, and the backlash from economic hardships experienced by its bigger neighbors — Argentina to the west and Brazil to the east. The constitution was unclear on who should take over in the event of the death of the vice president and the resignation of the president. Macchi obtained an incredibly fast ruling from the Argañista-dominated Supreme Court, saying that the president of the Senate should take over — creating constitutional precedent on the fly. Naturally, the PLRA and PEN weren’t pleased. Neither were those who used their bodies as bullet shields for the congressmen impeaching Cubas. The Brazilians put pressure on Macchi to calm things down. Subsequently, Macchi’s administration had to confront a series of destabilizing efforts, including repeated demonstrations and work stoppages, when it shortchanged payments to public employees. Macchi was threatened twice with impeachment proceedings that never materialized. However, the third occasion did not prove to be a charm for the president, and on December 5, 2002, Macchi had to face formal impeachment charges. He was acquitted by a narrow margin in the Senate, but not without the help of a key party leader.


DUARTE: A WORDSMITH OR A CAN-DO MAN?


“I want to be a president that recovers the country's credibility, a president that is respected by the international community,” said the new president-elect the day after the results came out. While President Nicanor Duarte Frutos has made promises to clean house, the last four incoming presidents have said the same thing and failed through incompetence, corruption, and a lack of caring. In addition, Duarte Frutos’ support for Macchi’s remaining in office during the latter’s impeachment proceedings has raised suspicions within his own party and certainly with the opposition. After other Colorado legislators brought impeachment allegations, Duarte Frutos continued to be one of Macchi’s closest allies, in spite of the latter’s shaky allegiance to the administration as a whole. Duarte Frutos had spoken out frequently against corruption and the havoc it has wreaked on Paraguay’s economy and political system, but as the Party’s president, he led the squad to prevent the Liberal vice president, Yoyito, from becoming de facto president. He gathered up enough extra votes and Macchi survived, but not without raising considerable doubts concerning the overall intentions of those leading the country, which has acquired the dreadful status as the world’s third most corrupt country. Duarte Frutos acknowledged in a BBC interview that the Colorado Party had corrupt members, but he argued that they were democratically elected and thus had a legitimate role to play. “Either we all lift up this country with the oxen we have on hand, or nobody will lift it up.”


ECONOMIC WOES


Last year, Paraguay’s GDP fell 2.2 percent, the worst year for the economy since 1983, when GDP fell three percent, a development that reflected nearly a decade of economic instability. Corruption, tax evasion, bank defaults and closings, unsuccessful attempts to acquire loans from international financial institutions, and the residual effects of Argentina’s 2001 financial debacle as well as Brazil’s currency devaluation, have greatly hindered efforts to get the economy moving again. The Ministry of Finance, using data from Paraguay’s Central Bank, has confirmed that the recession Paraguay entered in fiscal year 2002, is the worst in 20 years. Last year, Paraguay’s currency lost one third of its value, fiscal debt reached $140 million or 3.2 percent of GDP, and the trade deficit soared to $606.7 million. The government can barely finance public works or pay the salaries of its own 230,000 civil servants. It also has yet to pay out pensions which are due to the veterans of the Chaco War and their families.

Duarte Frutos’ choice for finance minister, the well respected, Dionisio Borda, has said that external and internal government debts must be paid in order to restore confidence, therefore the administration must pursue an agreement with the IMF. Just last November, Paraguayan Economy Minister James Spalding and Central Bank President Raúl Vera resigned during heated negotiations between Asunción and the IMF over a $200 million loan needed to repay part of its debts due this year and pay the salaries of government employees. The IMF accused the Paraguayan authorities of failing to push through the “necessary adjustments” required to attract more IMF funds. Although Paraguay’s loan request remains on a “stand-by” basis on the grounds that the government has not yet proven to the agency that it can safeguard a large loan from being mishandled, Duarte Frutos’ well-advertised fight on corruption, as well as Borda’s presence in the Cabinet, may serve to persuade the IMF that the country is credit-worthy. In fact, the new administration has already staged the first attack in this battle. President Macchi had appointed new officials to the Social Security Institute and the National Development Bank to aid his successor in his anti-corruption efforts, and already five people have been charged with defrauding the Paraguayan government of roughly $500,000. This may seem to be a smallish amount, but, when put into the context of the annual deficit, it is in reality quite a noticeable percentage. In addition, the vice president, Luis Castiglioni, has asserted that the judiciary will back the administration on anti-corruption actions and a special Auditor’s Office will be set up to track government spending.


TRADE AND LOANS


Paraguay’s diplomatic and economic allies will likely play a large role in spurring economic reform. Taiwan, for example, has had strong diplomatic relations with and financial ties to Paraguay for almost half a century, but a $400 million loan the Asian country made to Paraguay has been virtually exhausted. Given Taiwan’s interest in granting aid in exchange for Paraguay’s maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic of China, the country is likely to continue its strategic lending. Duarte Frutos’ new foreign minister, Leyla Rachid de Cowles attested to the importance of this relationship, saying that Paraguay will continue to pursue political and economic openings as well as establish a strong presence in East Asia.

Perhaps even more important than overseas allies are Paraguay’s regional allies, specifically the fellow members of the Common Market of the Southern Cone, also known as MERCOSUR. Foreign Minister Cowles has said that MERCOSUR is a top priority for Paraguay, for both strategic as well as economic reasons. Argentina and Brazil’s large economies have experienced recent upswings, exhibiting enhanced prospects for closer, more beneficial regional integration. Duarte Frutos plans to focus on negotiations concerning the Free Trade Area of the Americas as well, but he will have to do this with care, since his fellow MERCOSUR members would prefer to discourage a dominant U.S. role in the region’s movement to improve economic integration.

Finance Minister Borda, who expresses confidence that the IMF and other multilateral organizations will endorse the actions of Duarte Frutos’ administration, has stated that the administration was “determined to engage in an all-out fight on evasion and informal trade, both in the public and the private sectors.” But should the record of patronage and the misuse of public funds continue, Paraguay will never even see that multimillion-dollar carrot that the IMF is dangling before its eyes. To the contrary, the IMF or other lenders will only consider financing a loan to Paraguay if Duarte Frutos follows through with his commitments to “restoring trust in the country in order to make this a predictable state.” Because political card games and misuse of public funds have been so intertwined in the past, Duarte Frutos’ supposed heavy-handed approach to economic reform and to massive corruption will be checked and observed as it is carried out. The last thing Paraguay needs is more of the same economic contractions and political sleaziness, but in recent years Colorado presidential campaigns have always featured and emblazoned an anti-corruption banner. Once political victory was assured, however, the flag was always quickly lowered.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

 

This analysis was prepared by Courtney Kistler, COHA Research Associate.

Issued August 15th, 2003

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