Lagos Humiliates Chile by Not Standing
Tall Over its Iraq Vote
• By crucifying his UN
ambassador, Juan Gabriel Valdés, Chilean President Lagos impales
the legendary Chilean diplomat on a Cross of Free Trade
• White House strategy
of giving a cold shoulder to Chile because it did not back Bush Iraq
strategy at the UN, was based on the assumption that Santiago eventually
would demonstrate that it was not being led by a latter day O’Higgins,
but by a group of craven politicians
Not a Proud Day in
Chile’s History
Concertación coalition—comprised
of several self-serving political parties headed by the Christian
Democrats, but also including the Radical Social Democrats, the Socialist
Party, and the Party for Democracy—has ruled Chile since the
end of the brutal Pinochet dictatorship, with its candidates serving
as the country’s presidents since the country came under civilian
rule. Since the end of the Pinochet era, Concertación policies
have been marked by a slavish deference to Pinochet and the Chilean
military, as well as Pinochet’s anti-democratic constitution.
Concertación presidents also have exhibited an almost obsequious
desire to harmonize their policies with those of the U.S.
While many had hoped that the
leader of Chile’s Socialist Party, Ricardo Lagos, who was the
country’s third democratically-elected and first socialist president
since Pinochet stepped down, would be able to eradicate the very active
ghosts of Chile’s dictatorial past, he has instead maintained
the tendency of Chile’s ruling politicians to grovel before
its military as well as to automatically defer to its relationship
with the United States. As the deadline for the ratification of the
elusive U.S.-Chile free trade agreement approached, the urge to cater
to Washington’s dictates claimed one more victim: Juan Gabriel
Valdés, a Princeton Ph.D. who was widely viewed as being among
Chile’s most illustrious intellectuals and most gifted foreign
policy thinkers, who had the independence of spirit to stand by his
convictions that the UN must control the pace of the confrontation
with Iraq. He did this by opposing the U.S.’s unilateral stand
in favor of a preemptive attack against Baghdad before the UN Security
Council, on which he represented Chile as its ambassador.
Valdés' Downfall
When Chile assumed its seat
on the UN Security Council at the beginning of the year, the United
States assumed it had gained a malleable ally in its quest to impose
its Iraq strategy on that body. What it soon found, however, was that
in addition to Germany, France, and Russia, it had to contend with
several small but doughty UN delegations (Chile and Mexico) which
were willing to buck Washington’s demand that its professed
friends must support its tenet that Iraq must be attacked without
delay. In fact, at the time, Santiago was careful to cultivate a middle
ground, however, not endorsing either the American or French proposals
in March, but rather crafting a position more in line with Canada’s
middle-of-the-road approach.
There was a difference, however,
in that, as in Mexico, Lagos had to follow domestic public opinion
in Chile which overwhelmingly was opposed to any rush to war in Iraq.
This brought Chile to oppose the strategy of the U.S.-led “coalition
of the willing,” which was sponsoring the second resolution
which eventually was withdrawn due to a lack of votes. But there was
another factor: Chile had to also placate Washington in order to achieve
its long sought bilateral free trade pact with Washington. When the
outspoken Chilean UN ambassador didn’t harmonize with these
verities, he eventually paid the price. On May 7th, Lagos announced
that Valdés would be reassigned as the Chilean ambassador to
Argentina, and that Heraldo Muñoz, would be taking his place,
effective June 1, 2003.
Reliable sources had let it
be known that Valdés had been more aggressive and resolute
in presenting Chile’s case in front of the UN than the Lagos
administration had desired. Both William Brownfield, the U.S. ambassador
to Chile, and Inocencio F. Arias, the Spanish ambassador to the UN,
had complained to Santiago about Valdés’s lashing tone
and feisty tactics in arguing against the U.S.-U.K.-and-Spanish positions.
At the climax of tensions, Valdés took the principled step
to let it be known that he would rather resign than agree to any instruction
from Lagos requiring him to vote for the U.S.-UK resolution authorizing
war on Iraq. Members of the big business-financed Chilean opposition—who
were also influential in Concertación—described Valdés
as being “persona non grata” in Washington and as an impediment
to improved trade ties with the U.S.
Lagos’s sudden repudiation
of Valdés, who he has known all of their lives and who comes
from one of Chile’s most illustrious families, must be seen
as an act of the Chilean president bending his knee to Washington
in order to properly bring to an end the U.S. punishment of Chile
for its “defiance” over the Iraqi issue. Since Chile’s
opposition over Iraq had become well-defined at the UN, the Bush administration
has been dragging its feet in arranging for the formal signature of
the long-awaited US-Chile free trade agreement, which had been initialed
by both sides but not signed, and had been scheduled to be sent to
congress several months ago on an accelerated basis by the White House.
Just before the UN vote on Iraq and after 12 years of episodic discussions,
(in which Valdés was one of the negotiators), Washington finally
was about to fulfill its pledge to Chile on free trade, on the terms
that Bush and Lagos had agreed upon December 11, 2002.
The Politics of Free
Trade
Now that Lagos has propitiated
Washington’s wrath over Iraq by removing Valdés, the
White House now is attempting to downplay the punitive nature of its
stalling over finalizing the treaty, claiming that the agreement in
fact was being bogged down by the lengthy and complex translation
process and not by any resentment against Chile. But in leaks from
the Bush administration, however, officials have ceased even bothering
to deny the connection between trade and politics. Both U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick and his deputy Peter Allgeier have
admitted to the press that the administration had been disappointed
in Chile’s performance at the Security Council, and that the
direction of U.S. trade policy towards Santiago was part of the larger
foreign policy review being directed by the State Department and the
NSC. Such words were an affront to the underlying philosophy that
accompanied the founding of the Office of the USTR, as was explicitly
spelled out at the time, that trade issues would never be held hostage
to other U.S. foreign policy considerations, or be used to blackmail
or intimidate other nations.
Any claims that Chile’s
pending trade agreement with Washington has not been a casualty of
the Bush administration’s myopic conception of vengeance as
a factor in its international relations, is further undermined by
the analogous experience of Singapore. That nation’s completed
a twin trade agreement under similar ground rules as Chile’s,
with the United States. Bush signed the US-Singapore deal on May 6th,
however, and promptly sent it to Congress for ratification. The difference
in treatment is without doubt due to the fact that Singapore was an
eager supporter of Bush’s “coalition of the willing”.
In snubbing Chile and embracing Singapore, the Bush administration
was effectively rewarding a traditionally strongman government that
frequently ignores the will of its people, while penalizing a country,
Chile, that has made substantial progress in democratizing its basic
institutions.
Valdés’
Replacement
By ousting Valdés, Lagos
is trying to appease the White House so as to expedite the signing
of the pending free trade agreement and putting it into effect. Unlike
the outspoken Valdés, the Bush administration likes his replacement.
Heraldo Muñoz, a member of the Socialst Party and a former
classmate of Condoleeza Rice at Harvard, who is being seen –
at least by some administration figures – as much more friendly
to American interests. U.S. Ambassador Brownfield publicly called
the appointment, good news, stating that Muñoz was a very good
friend. It only took a couple of hours after the announcement of Valdés’
replacement for the Bush administration to reaffirm its commitment
to a its free trade agreement. As the Washington Post quoted Bush
in the immediate aftermath of the announcement, “We have an
important free trade agreement with Chile that we will move forward
with." Of course, no explicit date was given for the finalization
of the agreement, as at the time, Washington still needed to ensure
backing for the Security Council vote that would lift sanctions against
Iraq. In a rather indicative sidebar, although Valdés reassignment
was not scheduled to go into effect until June 1, he was replaced
by an alternate, Cristián Maquieira, on May 22 on a de facto
basis, just before the Security Council was to vote on removing Iraqi
sanctions.
Of course, Lagos has denied
any connection between Valdés’ replacement and the free
trade agreement. He maintains that Valdés was reassigned for
personal reasons, as the UN ambassador has long-desired a position
closer to home. He also has invoked the translation process as the
reason for the trade agreement’s delay, affirming the U.S.’s
commitment to it even more than Bush himself has acknowledged. These
overtures rang somewhat hollow, however, as the announcement of the
diplomatic replacement came the day before the House Energy and Commerce
subcommittee was scheduled to begin hearing testimony on the US-Chile
FTA.
As a major corruption scandal
stains the Lagos administration and hampers its efforts to reform
Chile internally, an even bigger skeleton is now out of the closet:
Lagos’s shameful lack of backbone has transformed Chile into
Latin America’s southernmost banana republic, leaving Juan Gabriel
Valdés being far more a latter-day Bernardo O’Higgins
in fighting for his country’s interest than the country’s
president. For the Concertación coalition, it too was prepared
to engage in any self degrading tribute to Washington which was required
— even one of Chile’s most distinguished national figures
— in order for Chilean businessmen to achieve a free trade pact,
even if it meant selling the nation’s honor by a socialist for
U.S. trade dollars, to the deafening applause of Chile’s CEOs.”
This analysis was prepared
by Lisa N. Perry, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric
Affairs. Issued 16 May 2003