Washington Unmakes Guatemala, 1954
by Matthew Ward, COHA Research Fellow
Understanding
the
In the summer of 1952, the State Department authorized
the CIA to provide funding to an exiled Guatemalan military officer, Col.
Carlos Castillo Armas, in his attempt to overthrow the constitutionally elected
government of Jacobo Arbenz. Castillo Armas, who had been an Ubiquista and
Arañista military officer in the Guatemalan army and having largely ignored
the tumult that surrounded the fall of Ubico and his henchman Ponce, became
increasingly disillusioned with the direction in which his government being
steered by Arévalo. As presidential competition to succeed Arévalo heightened
between Francisco Araña and Jacobo Arbenz, the military heroes of the Revolution
of 1944, Castillo Armas placed himself firmly
in the more right-wing Arañista camp. When Araña was assassinated in 1949
and a brief anti-government Arañista revolt ensued, Castillo Armas in Mazatenango
overseeing elections for the new Chief of the Armed Forces at the time lacked
the courage to return to the capital and join or lead the revolt. Shamed by
his failure to act, Castillo retired from active service in order to begin
actively plotting a revolt that would restore his lost honor. The attempt
to seize the Base Militar that ensued can be seen as
nothing but foolish pride; in November, 1950, with only a handful of men and
a few junior accomplices within the base, Castillo Armas attempted to storm
The source of the
initial proposal to finance Castillo Armas is unclear. Prior to the 2003 release
of U.S. intelligence documents regarding the program, the conventional, and
indeed the sole source regarding this matter came from Matthews’ World in Revolution.
[3]
Matthews, a New York Times correspondent, based his account on the 1953 testimony
of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward Miller.
According to Matthews, the Castillo Armas plan was presented as a fait accompli to the Truman administration
by Nicaraguan dictator Gen. Anastasio Somoza, who traveled to
Declassified evidence released in 2003 shows that
the CIA had, in fact, been closely watching Castillo Armas for a number of
years before Somoza went to
An internal CIA
memo of
The dilemma of
the Truman administration is neatly summarized in NSC-141, written in 1952
and referred to by one of its authors as “the
intellectual last will and testament in this area of security policy of the
Truman administration to the Eisenhower administration.”
[12]
Grounded in the assumptions of the now infamous
NSC-68, which had preceded it, NSC-141 was confident in its objectives but
failed to provide concrete recommendations for achieving its goals:
In Latin America we seek first and foremost an orderly political
and economic development which will make the Latin American nations resistant
to the internal growth of Communism and Soviet political warfare…Secondly,
we seek hemispheric solidarity in support of our world policy and the cooperation
of the Latin American nations in safeguarding the hemisphere through individual
and collective defense measures against external aggression and internal subversion.
[13]
These were the obstacles that Bedell Smith and Allen
Dulles would have to overcome in order to be successful in promoting a policy
of covert intervention in
In November, 1951, Deputy Director Allen Dulles and
King met with representatives of UFC, who indicated to the CIA officials that
UFC was prepared to offer the CIA the use of its finances, resources and facilities
to aid in any program the CIA might devise to combat the spread of Communism
in Guatemala, adding that they were prepared to go to “any lengths.”
[14]
By early 1952, the CIA had settled on a plan to
support Castillo Armas’ revolutionary movement. On March 12, Stuart Hedden,
Inspector General of the CIA, consulted with UFC’s lawyer, Thomas Corcoran,
who indicated that UFC would support Castillo Armas, and that it desired CIA
participation.
[15]
In May of 1952, after reviewing Castillo Armas’
plan, the CIA was determined to act. What would be critical was how to extract
authorization from the State Department for the implementation of the plan.
Somoza’s arrival in
It would not behoove the CIA, however, to approach
Somoza directly to procure his services. Doing so would risk exposing the
CIA’s role in cultivating Truman’s approval as well as exposing the policy
divisions in the
A short time later, Somoza presented “his” plan to
rid
The recently declassified record highlights another
error in Matthews’ account. He contends that the entire Somoza process occurred
without the knowledge of State. However, the State Department was consulted
by the CIA, but was misled regarding the extent of proposed
In a conference with Miller and Mann, Dulles and
Hedden posed three questions:
1. Would the State Department like to see a different government
in
2. Would the State Department oppose a government established
by the use of force?
3. Does the State Department wish CIA to take steps to bring
about a change of government?
[24]
To Allen Dulles’ pleasure, Miller and Mann responded
positively to his first two questions and expressed tacit approval of the
third. Director Smith, who would be ultimately responsible for any decision,
was less sanguine about the de facto
authorization obtained by his deputy. After Allen Dulles reported to him on
the meeting, Smith decided to telephone Under Secretary of State Bruce to
confirm that authorization was forthcoming from State. According to other
CIA officials, Allen Dulles averred that he received a positive response.
[25]
Throughout this affair, Allen Dulles had been notably
underhand in his dealings with most of the people involved, displaying his
flair for arcane subterfuge. His questions to Miller and Mann had been deliberately
obtuse, and his satisfaction with a similarly cloudy response indicates that
he was simply interested in rubber stamp approval from the two officials to
pursue the course on which he was already set, rather than on their informed
opinion. However, Allen Dulles’ intrigue would prove the undoing of PBFORTUNE
as, despite playing the game like a grand master, he took one gamble too many
in the eyes of the State Department. As far as the State Department was concerned,
the plan would not include any direct
Two events conspired to spike Allen Dulles’ plans.
According to Matthews, Miller was approached by a CIA representative who asked
him to initial a paper on behalf of the Munitions Department of the State
Department. Not knowing what he was being asked to approve, Miller refused.
The declassified record shows that Miller’s concern with the documentation
intended for the Munitions Department had been piqued by events elsewhere,
however. A series of indiscretions on the part of some of the Latin American
participants in the operation had led State Department officials to question
the plausibility of disguising the
The United States has subscribed to principles in the UN
and the OAS which are inconsistent with military adventures of this kind,
and we would find it difficult to fight aggression in Korea and be a party
to it in this hemisphere…Furthermore, the proposal was, as a practical matter,
reckless since it would not be possible to maintain secrecy as is illustrated
by the fact that the Department already has received vague press inquiries
concerning the plan.
[26]
Likewise, Miller was approached by Dominican Ambassador
Thomen, who wished to confirm information received from Somoza that “understandings”
had been arrived at with Truman.
[27]
When Somoza’s son Tachito was foolish enough to
ask Miller when the “machinery” would be arriving, all the pieces suddenly
fit in place.
[28]
Not only did the Latin American indiscretions highlight
the risk that U.S. involvement would become evident, confirming the Americans’
“general belief that no Latin American can be trusted to keep his mouth shut,”
but it also became clear that the CIA had arranged transportation of arms
without informing State.
[29]
Miller and Mann went to see Acheson and Bruce, who
furiously summoned CIA representatives report to them at the State Department.
Allen Dulles sent his subordinates Wisner and King
to the meeting chaired by Bruce, at which he severely upbraided them. Wisner
and King presented Allen Dulles’ prepared statement:
It had been the understanding of the Agency that the State
Department had approved of the Agency's project to provide certain hardware
to a group planning violence against a certain government; that some question
had apparently arisen as to whether State does approve; that the fact of the
Agency's not having kept the Department informed of the developments in the
project was not considered by the Agency to be any reason for doubting that
the Department still approved because it had been understood that the Department
did not wish to be kept informed of the detailed plans. In the Director's
view, the Agency is purely an executive organization of the Government which
carries out missions and conducts activities in support of the foreign policy
objectives of the Government. The State Department has the primary responsibility
in the field of foreign policy and accordingly, the Agency would do nothing
that is considered by the State Department to be contrary to its policy determinations.
If the State Department disapproves of this particular project, the Agency
will take immediate steps to bring to a halt its participation in all phases
of the matter deemed objectionable by the State Department.
[30]
Bruce explained to the CIA representatives that the
State Department found the international trafficking of arms to be objectionable
because they were not convinced that such an operation could safely be conducted
clandestinely. “He stated that the Department can raise no objection to any
monetary contribution which the Agency might make as it knows that the Agency
is constantly passing money for purposes which the Department could not approve
of and must do this in order to operate, but it feels that money can be passed
securely.”
[31]
Arms, however, were another matter and Bruce could
not recall a time when he had approved the operation, contrary to Allen Dulles’
contention that he had. In a final attempt to save part of their organization’s
program, Wisner and King tried to cajole Bruce with the risks of inaction,
contending that “a revolutionary
movement against the target is likely whether we support it or not, and that
if it fails, American policy will be seriously prejudiced.”
[32]
However, Bruce
was in no mood to broker discussion. By
this point, his boss Acheson had become thoroughly opposed to the Guatemalan
affair. After Truman’s announcement that he would not seek reelection, Acheson
felt his last months in office had been rendered a “virtual interregnum.”
[33]
As a result, Acheson
was entirely unwilling to run the risk of a blown operation and the concomitant
damage that would affect hemispheric solidarity
and the standing of
The abortion of PBFORTUNE—particularly at such a
late stage—was a major embarrassment and setback for the CIA officials who
had determinedly advanced it. Defeat in the bargaining game entailed a number
of costs. By attempting to transport arms without the authorization of State,
Allen Dulles had seriously jeopardized his organization’s and his personal
standing with State, forcing him to go into damage-control mode. As such,
Wisner and King were forced to abase themselves before their interdepartmental
superiors, admitting that “the Agency is purely an executive organization
of the Government” and that “the State Department has the primary responsibility
in the field of foreign policy.”
[34]
The ignominy of the result might have had lasting
consequences for these players had the situation been different, but within
a few months the administration and intra-governmental political situation
changed.
There were other costs for the aborted operation
brought up in a series of debriefs within the CIA. Col. J.C. King, Chief of
the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, was particularly disappointed
by the cancellation of the plans. A lower ranking officer to Allen Dulles
and Bedell Smith, King had been directly involved in the implementation of
Allen Dulles and Smith’s grand plans. He pointed out to Allen Dulles that
the CIA had incurred certain responsibilities towards those in the field who
had committed themselves and been hung out to dry. King advanced the proposition
that “the Department of State might very well change its position in the near
future because of the explosive situation in the
Why had these CIA men been so determined that U.S.–Guatemala
policy should take such a pointed thrust? Although we noted earlier that the
CIA was generally more concerned about Communist activities in
For many within the CIA, there was a much more immediate
reason to support a policy of covert intervention in
Compounding this threat was the fact that, in its
early years, the performance of CIA intelligence gathering was poor. From
1947–1953, many within the CIA were deeply troubled by the future prospects
for their organization. They worried that its inefficiency and relative lack
of power might cause it to become a victim of the antagonisms of the FBI and
G-2, among others. For these men, and particularly for those who had joined
the CIA directly from OSS, such as Deputy Director Allen Dulles, one way to
justify the continued existence of the CIA would be to expand its operational
capacities to include the kind of guerrilla, commando and propaganda units
that the OSS had used to great effect during the war.
Supporting the maturation of the CIA into an organization
capable of implementing covert operations were two factors. Men such as Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell and
Walter Bedell Smith argued that in the new world order, where the balance
of power was centered around two diametrically opposed nuclear powers, localized
conflict would be the only way to combat the Communist threat effectively
without seriously elevating the threat of a nuclear holocaust.
[39]
Under a provision in the CIA Charter authorizing
it to “perform other such functions and duties related to intelligence affecting
the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time
direct,” the influence of these men led to the creation of the CIA’s Directorate
of Plans in 1948, the genesis of a covert paramilitary unit that would provide
CIA with the capabilities to affect localized conflicts. This move strengthened
the organization’s bargaining advantages by providing it with the means not
only to advise on policy but to implement it. However, it was not until 1953
that the Directorate of Plans would be allowed to fulfill its role of conducting
a covert operation. As a result, considerable pressure to adopt covert operations
had emanated from the CIA between 1948 and 1953, with
The CIA’s organizational aims were given a significant
boost by the victory of Eisenhower and the Republicans in the 1952 presidential
elections. Truman’s problems in Korea had provided welcome ammunition for
the Republicans—who had been excluded from power for more than 20 years—and
the party line came to rely heavily on criticisms of the Democrats for being
“soft” on Communism: Eisenhower’s running mate, Richard Nixon, described the
extended period of Democratic rule as “20 years of treason.”
[40]
The 1952 campaign had been run on this criticism
and had featured promises that the Republicans, if elected to power, would
do more than simply “contain” Communism; they would “roll back the Iron Curtain.”
[41]
Concurrently, the Eisenhower administration, and
particularly Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, were eager to placate
the ultra-right-wing constituency of Senator Joseph McCarthy. While attitudes
towards McCarthy differed, the result was similar: McCarthy must be appeased
or at least not antagonized. The confluence of these factors rendered a dramatic
response to developments in
The concept of covert action also fitted very neatly
with the Eisenhower administration’s plans. Having derided the level of military
expenditures under Truman, the Eisenhower administration’s outlook and electoral
promises compelled them to seek cost-effective methods of taking forward the
war against Communism. As John Foster Dulles told his new Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot: “I want you to devise
an imaginative policy for
Behind these national and organizational interests
were a number of personal motivations. Each of the players in the ensuing
bargaining game had their own reasons for support or opposition to a policy
of covert action. An analysis of these factors lends significant credence
to the bureaucratic politics paradigm’s contention that government decisions
on are rarely made on national interest considerations alone.
Although early analyses of Eisenhower the president
tended to paint him as a somewhat ineffectual leader, overly concerned with
consensus and “bullied” by his forthright and determined Secretary of State
John Foster Dulles, the work of revisionist scholars such as Blanche Wiesen
Cook and David Capitanchik have precipitated a re-evaluation of this view.
[46]
It was Eisenhower’s operating style and the abnormalcy
of his relationship with John Foster Dulles that precipitated such a condemnation
of his presidency. Eisenhower was what Neustadt would have described as a
“President-in-sneakers,”
[47]
a man most comfortable working behind the scenes,
pulling and pushing members of his administration towards policy goals: intent
on consensus and on reasoned and varied opinion but never subservient towards
the views of others. Eisenhower appeared to be the absentee president because
his voice was rarely heard in intra-governmental debates and, very often,
his final policies reflected those advocated by his Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles. However, this conception ignores the fundamental nature of
Eisenhower’s presidency and his relationship with John Foster Dulles. Eisenhower
believed in allowing his officials to develop and debate their opinions, but
he retained the power of final arbitration for himself. As Eisenhower assured
Swede Hazlett in 1954, “[John Foster] Dulles never made a serious pronouncement,
agreement or proposal without complete and exhaustive consultation with me
in advance and, of course, my approval.”
[48]
Eisenhower’s approval would generally be given in
informal discussions in the Oval Office, rather than in the more public arena
of NSC discussions. Hence we find a president who retained absolute control
of his administration while leaving very few indications of his hand in events.
The contention that John Foster Dulles dictated politics in the Eisenhower
administration is likewise simply an overt manifestation of personality on
the appearance of the political dynamics of the Eisenhower administration.
John Foster Dulles was bullish, dogmatic and opinionated. His voice was regularly
raised on issues of national policy, and his public appearances were characterized
by verbosity. He was not a particularly popular figure within the administration.
However, his relationship with Eisenhower was good. Eisenhower was one of
the few people who genuinely liked John Foster Dulles; “I admire tremendously
his wisdom, his knowledge in the delicate and intricate field of foreign relations,
and his tireless dedication to duty…with strangers his personality may not
always be winning, with his friends he is charming and delightful.”
[49]
Moreover, despite some of their overt differences,
Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles were fundamentally in accordance as regards
These personal beliefs and foreign influences caused
Eisenhower to commission the now famous International Information Activities
Committee, better known as the Jackson Committee after its chair, William
Jackson. The Jackson Committee’s far-reaching findings postulated that
Holsti describes John Foster Dulles as an “unabashedly
ambitious politician operating in the harsh world of politics.”
[56]
He was incredibly aware of his political lineage:
his grandfather John Watson Dulles had been Secretary of State under Harrison
and his uncle, Robert Lansing Dulles, Secretary of State under
John Foster Dulles’ unshakeable belief in the supremacy
of American politics and culture was based on his religious zeal, nationalist
fervor, intellectual authority and firmness of belief.
[57]
These traits have long been considered by political
theorists as major determinants of an imperialist outlook. As Max Weber attested:
It goes without saying that all those groups who hold the
power to direct common conduct within a polity will be most strongly imbued
with this idealist fervor of power prestige. They remain the specific and
most reliable bearers of the idea of the state as an imperialist power structure
demanding unqualified devotion. In addition to the direct and material imperialist
interests…there are the indirectly material as well as the ideological interests
of strata that are in various ways privileged within a polity and, indeed,
privileged by its very existence.
[58]
Thus, as Salz puts it, nationalism is one of “the
strongest driving force[s] of state imperialism.”
[59]
For those, such as John Foster
Dulles, who believed strongly in the worth of their nation’s politics, culture,
values and aims, imperialism was not only useful politically, it was desirable
intellectually as a means of expanding their nation state’s international
influence.
John Foster Dulles’ sympathy for dynamism and desire
to construct a new world order was evident in his political actions following
the end of World War II. Participating in the San Francisco Conference, John
Foster Dulles drafted part of the preamble to the UN Charter before serving
as a delegate to the UN. Some analysts have pointed to discordances in his
views towards policy under Truman; in the early years, John Foster Dulles
had supported the Truman administration’s policy of containment vis-à-vis the
John Foster
Dulles soon became one of the most extreme spokesmen in the Republican campaign
to discredit the Democrats for weakness in foreign policy. On joining the
Eisenhower administration with his brother, Allen—already the champion of
covert action—he too became enamored with the idea of covert operations as
his means of “roll[ing] back the Iron Curtain.” John Foster Dulles’ affinity
for covert action was already clear at a briefing by Kermit Roosevelt on his
successful covert operation to overthrow Dr Mossadegh of
John Foster Dulles and his brother Allen had long
shared a close working relationship. They developed their early careers at
the famous
Where John Foster Dulles laid himself open to accusations
of pandering to McCarthyism, Allen, like Eisenhower, had very little sympathy
or time for the radical views of the Wisconsin Senator. John Foster Dulles,
a virulent anti-Communist, was eager to placate McCarthy’s right-wing constituency
and had hired a close McCarthy associate, Scott McLeod, as Personnel and Security
Officer for the State Department to verify the loyalty of all government officials.
Richard Bissell, a close friend of the Dulles family and an increasingly powerful
figure in the U.S. government, highlighted the difference in the brothers’
attitudes towards McCarthyism: noting John Foster Dulles’ lack of protectiveness
towards his department, Bissell mused that while it may have been due to a
lack of courage or, perhaps, “calculated politics,” “the real cause seemed
to me his somewhat cynical attitude towards his fellow human being, which
stood in great contrast to his brother’s. I have always felt that to some
degree Foster shared McCarthy’s deep suspicions about people who had taken
unpopular positions that could be construed as insufficiently anti-Communist.”
[67]
Allen, conversely, “was more receptive to a wider
spectrum of beliefs and backgrounds than his brother was.”
[68]
An anti-Communist, certainly, Allen Dulles should
nonetheless not be mistaken for a black and white crusader of his brother’s
ilk.
Much of Allen Dulles’ perspective may have derived
from the nature of his wartime service. As Director of European espionage
for the Office of Strategic Services, Allen had been exposed to all the vagaries
of European politics and people during this turbulent period. His role in