3

Washington Unmakes Guatemala, 1954

by Matthew Ward, COHA Research Fellow

3. An Act in Defense of National Security?

If, as the evidence suggests, the United States was more concerned with Communism in Guatemala than with the mistreatment of U.S. economic interests in the country, was this then a case of political imperialism or was it an understandable reaction to valid national security concerns? The crucial element of imperialism, as opposed to hegemony, is the deliberate dictation of another country’s internal affairs. In the classical realist conception of the Westphalian order of international relations, states operate in an anarchic international environment in which each state maintains a formal equality due to the concept of state sovereignty. The concept of state sovereignty centers on the inviolable autonomy of each nation-state to determine its own domestic affairs. While states may compete with each other for influence in the international arena—forming alliances and trading blocs etc.—the conduct of internal politics is the sole preserve of the nation-state. Realist theory recognizes the impact of power on international relations. Thus, a hegemonic state may be able to influence the external behavior of other states through its ability to coerce, convince or induce other states to act in a manner that serves the hegemon’s interests. While empires have differed greatly throughout history in the method of their control—from the direct control of a country’s political institutions evident in the British Empire’s colonial rule to the de facto control of the Western Hemisphere by the United States in the nineteenth century described earlier—they each retain this essential function:

Empire is the rule exercised by one nation over others both to regulate their external behavior and to ensure minimally acceptable forms of internal behavior within the subordinate states. Merely powerful states do the former, but not the latter. [1]

Therefore, if a dominant nation acts in a coercive manner towards a smaller state to influence its external behavior, it is acting as a hegemon. In these terms, realists justify international conflict if it is conducted in order to protect national interests. However, if a state can be demonstrated to have acted predominantly to influence the internal affairs of a smaller state, whose external behavior is of little concern to the dominant state, then this is more clearly a case of imperial hubris.

3.2 The National Security Question

If Communism was the real cause of concern in the United States—rather than the economic travails of its private business concerns—was there a case to argue that the United States was then acting rationally towards Guatemala, in realist terms, to protect its national security? Was the perceived existence of a Communist state so close to the territorial boundaries of the United States a direct and immediate threat to the peace and security of the nation? The public recriminations emanating from Washington seemed to indicate that it was. Senators, Congressmen, reporters and the Executive Body united in the 1950s to condemn the spread of Communism in Guatemala, the threat that this posed to the political integrity of the hemisphere and the security dilemma which this posed for the United States, whose strategic interests in the Caribbean were inalienable to U.S. domestic security. [2]

3.3 The Establishment of a Dictatorship of the Proletariat

Under the Arbenz administration, U.S. officials had become increasingly concerned by the growing influence of the PGT in Guatemala. In a relatively short space of time, the PGT had made considerable progress in establishing itself as a political entity. It had gained legal status, established a labor school, begun printing a newspaper, gained four seats in Guatemala’s Congress and gained the confidence of the president of the republic. Its influence on the political life of the country appeared obvious. PGT members had gained the leadership of two of the country’s three main trade unions. PGT adherents were prominent in the government’s propaganda and information machinery, which now frequently criticised the United States and voiced support and solidarity for Communist peoples across the world. Most damningly, Communists had been crucial in the drafting of the Agrarian Reform Bill, which threatened U.S. interests, and were the group that was most active in expediting its implementation. This, the United States feared, was affording the Communists an opportunity to supplement their electoral support, which remained mostly urban, with the support of the peasant masses. The extent and reach of Communist influence under Arbenz caused serious consternation in U.S. circles.

Certain critics have argued that Communist influence in Guatemala was not great: The PGT was a small party: generous estimates of its strength place its membership at no more than 3,000 (the real figure was probably closer to around 500); in a Congress of 56 members, the PGT had only four representatives (less than the opposition); nobody sympathetic to the Communists sat in Arbenz’s cabinet; and they enjoyed limited electoral support—even their charismatic Secretary General was unable to win the congressional election in which he ran. It would seem reasonable to conclude from this that the CIA’s contention that the PGT enjoyed “virtual dominance over national political and economic life” [3] in Guatemala may have been an overstatement of fact on the part of a paranoid anti-Communist state or one seeking to justify its policy of imperialism. [4]

However, under Arbenz, the Communist Party was demonstrably gaining increasing influence. During this period, it gained legal status, under the new name of the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, or Guatemalan Workers’ Party. The party’s Marxist daily newspaper, Octubre, began to circulate. Arbenz allowed Communists to participate fully in the country’s democratic process, inviting them into government, condoning the election of four PGT deputies to Congress and appointing several confirmed Communists to powerful administrative positions. Worse, a groundbreaking study on Guatemala by Piero Gleijeses [5] showed that Arbenz was more deeply committed to Communism than these few overt signs would indicate. Based on consistent testimony from varied list of sources, Gleijeses adduced that Jacobo Arbenz was ideologically committed to Communism and that, although no Communist Party members served in his cabinet, Communists made up his “kitchen cabinet”—those to whom he most readily turned for advice, support and reassurance. [6]

Arbenz’s story is one of intellectual self-discovery, of a reformer who at first “could [not] have explained what it meant to be a reformer or how or what one should reform,” [7] but who suddenly discovered, within the words of Karl Marx, the elucidation of his hopes and dreams for the fate of his country. At the same time, Arbenz began to form close and enduring friendships with members of the Guatemalan Communist movement, most notably with Jose Manuel Fortuny, who became his closest confidant and advisor. “In Fortuny, Arbenz found the brother he had never had, the complement of himself, a man with whom he felt totally at ease, ‘without having to wear a mask, relaxed,’ sharing the most intimate thoughts, both personal and political.” [8] By the time Arbenz was running for the presidency, Fortuny was writing his speeches, and when Arbenz presented the centerpiece of his presidency, the Agrarian Reform, as a fait accompli to an unsuspecting Congress, it was because he and his “kitchen cabinet” of PGT members had prepared it without the aid of any of the other revolutionary politicians.

It is notable that the United States was exceptionally well informed of these and other instances of Communist influence in the Arbenz administration. Gleijeses’ findings regarding communist influence in Guatemala are largely confirmed by the evidence in the newly declassified record. A 1952 NIE noted that “the Communists already exercise in Guatemala a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength,” [9] while an internal CIA memorandum of the same year observed that “the Guatemalan Communists are small in number, but their influence in both government and labor is substantial.” [10] U.S. officials were aware of the reasons for the Communist success: the Communists were efficient and honest where others were corrupt and opportunistic; and Arbenz had increasingly come to rely on the honesty, integrity and efficiency of the party, and on its ability to help him realize his program of reform. As Ronald Schneider, whose CIA-sponsored study on Guatemala brokered little pity for the fate of the revolution of 1944, explained:

The Communists…impressed Arbenz as the most honest and trustworthy, as well as the hardest working of his supporters…As the politicians of the other revolutionary parties lapsed into opportunism and concentrated upon getting the lion’s share of the spoils of office, the Communists’ stock rose in the president’s eyes. The Communists worked hardest in support of the President’s pet project, agrarian reform, and were able to provide the background studies, technical advice, mass support and enthusiasm which the project required. The struggle for the enactment of agrarian reform became a dividing line in the eyes of Arbenz; those who opposed it were his enemies and those whose support was only lukewarm dropped in his esteem…In contrast to the other politicians, the Communists brought him answers and plans rather than problems and constant demands for the spoils of office. [11]

These truths were self-evident, both in Guatemala City and in Washington. Ambassador Schoenfeld reported to his government “the lack of ideological firmness and the opportunism which prevail in the leftist administration parties and the consequent improbability of the crystallization of a vigorous anti-Communist left at the present juncture in Guatemalan politics.” [12] Bill Krieg, the Embassy’s Chargé D’Affaires was somewhat less erudite in his appraisal: “The revolutionary parties were groups of bums of first order; lazy, ambitious, they wanted money, were palace hangers-on. Those who could work, had a sense of direction, ideas, knew where they wanted to go, were Fortuny and his PGT friends; they were very honest, very committed. This was the tragedy: the only people committed to hard work were those who were, by definition, our worst enemies.” [13] Even Che Guevara, traveling through Guatemala just prior to his historic meeting with Fidel Castro, complained, “Four revolutionary parties form the base of the government, and all of them—except the PGT—are divided into two or more factions which fight among themselves more furiously than against the traditional feudal enemies, forgetting in their own dissension the real objective of Guatemalans.” [14] Compounding the political vacuum in the Central American republic was the even inferior state of affairs in which the Guatemalan right-wing found itself. Appraisals of the opposition were damning; “By far the most important reason for the failure of the opposition is its lack of a positive and constructive program for the country;” “the opposition groups…have no positive program of their own,” “this correspondent could find out easily enough what these [opposition] groups were against. But they never showed they stood in favor of something.” [15]

However, the influence of the PGT was greater than this dispiriting picture by its political rivals suggests. The PGT was able to remain strong because it had the confidence of the president, whose program matched PGT’s own and whose influence in Guatemala was unparalleled. One U.S. official remarked that “other Latin American governments…have in the past worked with Communists, generally because of their influence in labor unions. In no other Latin American country, however, has the ruling group in power accepted the Communists with such cordiality into a political partnership including the frequent support of the Communist line by administration media.” [16] The Office of Intelligence Research of the Department of State also noted the close relationship between Arbenz and the Communists: “It is apparent also that Fortuny, PGT's General Secretary, has access to the inner circle of politicians who surround the President. He is credited with drafting the recently passed Agrarian Reform Law which subsequently was steered through Congress under Communist leadership.” [17]

The United States was well aware that in Arbenz’s Guatemala, if not in Arévalo’s, Communists did exercise a significant influence in the national government. As Gleijeses notes, “Just as scholars frequently fail to see the depth of the change from Arévalo to Arbenz, so they have failed to see the change in the U.S. government’s reporting on Guatemala from the late forties to the early fifties.” [18] By the time Arbenz ascended to the Guatemalan presidency, U.S. perceptions of Guatemala had sharpened and were now generally accurate analyses of Communist influence in Guatemala. Time and experience had diluted the bigotries and biases that previously colored U.S. reporting on the Arévalo administration, as “a core of Guatemala hands had emerged” [19] with an informed grasp of the realities of Guatemalan political life. [20]

Nonetheless, by the 1950s U.S. officials harbored few fears that the influence of the PGT in Guatemala would result in the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. As NIE-62 noted, “it is unlikely that the Communists could come directly to power during 1952, even though, in case of the incapacitation of President Arbenz, his present legal successor would be a pro-Communist.” [21] One of the main reasons for this assessment was that the PGT lacked the plans, the intention and the means to affect such a change. A classified CIA report detailing Communist capabilities and intentions filed just prior to the 1954 coup expanded this reasoning:

The PGT’s party literature and the speeches of its leaders continually emphasize that conditions are not ripe for the establishment of the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” that is, the seizure of power by the Communists. Guatemala must first liquidate its “feudal” agricultural social system and pass through “bourgeois revolution” and “capitalist” phase before this evolution can take place. [22]

This reasoning was entirely congruent with Marx, who holds that a period of capitalist development is necessary before conditions are ripe for the establishment of a Communist system of government. U.S. officials were entirely content that this was the true aim of the PGT, and that any change in their long-term political plans was unlikely. As the Department of State noted:

Communist objectives during the comparatively short period of three years of open existence have remained constant. Such alterations and diversions as have occurred were essentially related to the will of an administration which, in the final analysis, has the real power to determine the Communist Party's life or death. [23]

Taken in this light, the intentions of the Arbenz administration were exactly what they were presented as being in Arbenz’s inaugural address:

Our government proposes to begin the march toward the economic development of Guatemala, and proposes three fundamental objectives: to convert our country from a dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy to an economically independent country; to convert Guatemala from a backward country with a predominantly feudal economy into a modern capitalist state; and to make this transformation in a way that will raise the standard of living of the great mass of our people to the highest level. [24]

While Arbenz and his PGT friends saw the establishment of a Communist state in Guatemala as not only desirable but also inevitable, the present would be reserved for the capitalist development of their country without the manifestations of dependence, which were stunting the development of the country. Gleijeses noted that Arbenz and the PGT were notably unconcerned about when conditions would be right for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. When the time came they would know and, according to their beliefs, they would not be alone. Arbenz and his PGT friends ultimately believed that world Communism was inevitable—that at some point all nations on earth would institute equitable conditions of production. In the meantime, what was important was that they focus their energies on developing the productive and social capacity of their backward nation. [25]

Nor did the United States have to rely on the stated intentions of the Communists—a group which it believed was ultimately manipulative and deceitful—to allay its fears of the possible Communist takeover of Guatemala. A significant counterweight to Communist influence existed in Guatemala—the army. A number of the recently declassified intelligence documents cited the reality that the military remained an extremely powerful force in Guatemala and would never allow the establishment of a Communist state; “The Army is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation.” [26] Communist infiltration of the army—at times overstated when it came to other bodies—was non-existent; “There is little or no Communist penetration or influence in the Army,” and “the Communists appear to have made little or no effort as yet to gain control over the Police or the Army.” [27] The army—as was every other military in Central America—was firmly anti-Communist, and was restrained only by the personal loyalty of its members to their president, a well-respected former officer and a national hero. NIE-62 reflected this truth: “In present circumstances the Army is loyal to President Arbenz, although increasingly disturbed by the growth of Communist influence. If it appeared that the Communists were about to come to power in Guatemala, the Army would probably…seize power itself in order to prevent the Communists from gaining direct control of the government.” [28]

Finally, an analysis of Arbenz personally and the Communist party’s electoral swing would have shown that the Communist influence may indeed have diminished following Arbenz’s departure from office. That Arbenz would retire seems clear—he had at several times risked his life to maintain Guatemala’s nascent democratic credentials and had already willingly relinquished his hold on power as a member of the provisional junta of 1944, when he need not have done so and may have found a willing accomplice in Araña. [29] Failing the establishment of a Communist state under Arbenz, the prospect of the Communists gaining power by democratic means was unlikely:

Until the registration of PGT (December 1952) Communist Party members gained a limited number of elected positions—primarily in the National Congress—as candidates sponsored by the dominant government parties. In addition, some crypto-Communists have attained office as members of the progovernment parties. The present strategy of the newly registered PGT is continued reliance upon the "democratic front" support of other parties to provide electoral success. There are four acknowledged Communists presently in Congress. PGT can probably poll its largest vote in Guatemala City, but there it also faces the strongest opposition. In the mayoralty contests of 1951, the independent candidate in Guatemala City, with unusually well-unified, anti-Communist support, won over the progovernment and Communist-backed candidate by 5,000 votes (24,000–19,000). In the most recent congressional election (January 1953), Fortuny, Secretary General of PGT, was defeated as the progovernment candidate in the capital…Independent Communist electoral strength in rural areas probably is not great. [30]

Nor were prospects for increasing their electoral success particularly promising:

There are serious limitations to the Communist position. Although the Communists have enjoyed considerable success in capturing key positions among important groups in Guatemalan society, they have not yet gained a substantial consistent popular following. They must continually contend with an essentially inarticulate and conservative mass. On higher levels they must face the fact that the economic groups which subscribe to the principles of the Revolution of 1944 are not extremists and that many seeming pro-Communist political allies are, in fact, primarily opportunists. [31]

Therefore, the United States had good reason to believe that Communist influence in Guatemala would prove to be transitory and the establishment of a Communist state equally illusory. Richard Bissell, Allen Dulles’ Special Assistant during the Guatemalan coup and later Director of the CIA, would later reflect that, although the United States was convinced that Arbenz was pro-Communist, “a number of people would have questioned whether Arbenz was leading Guatemala towards a Communist regime.” [32]

3.4 Guatemalan Ties to Soviet Russia

In Washington in the 1950s, it was taken as the norm that there was no such thing as an indigenous Communism, but that Communists around the world were committed acolytes of the “international Communist conspiracy.” Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Alexander Wiley announced, “There is no Communism but the Communism that takes orders from the despots of the Kremlin in Moscow. It is an absolute myth to believe that there is such a thing as homegrown Communism, a so-called native or local Communism.” [33] Thomas Mann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under Truman, further clarified matters, in case anyone was unsure what the relation was to Guatemala; “[Communism] was not any economic, doctrinal, or even military matter, it was a political one. This government knew that Communists the world over were agents of Soviet imperialism and constituted a mortal threat to our own national existence.” [34]

For U.S. officials, it was enough to note that there were those who called themselves Communists in Guatemala to conclude that these individuals were, in fact, Moscow’s proxies in the region. Much of this argument reflects the concept of “groupthink.” [35] Irving Janis, a psychologist in the early 1970s, began applying his knowledge of group dynamics and irrationality to questions of foreign policy. The result was groupthink, a theory that explained the ways in which the dominant thought patterns of members of a group tended to be mutually reinforcing as well as tending to suppress dissension. Janis noted that when a group formed, and particularly when the bond between members of the group was strong—a condition which often occurs when members share experiences of high stress or responsibility—members of the group came to value the cohesiveness of the group and began to exhibit a tendency towards conformity in order to maintain group solidarity. This tendency operated on a number of levels and was self-reinforcing. Individual members of the group would be inclined to conform to the dominant beliefs in order to be an accepted part of the group. Also, should a member of the group voice beliefs that were not in accordance with the dominant norms, other members of the group would at first attempt to persuade the non-conformist to reconsider his stand in order that group solidarity be maintained. If this turned out to be ineffectual, however, the conformist members of the group would begin to exclude the non-conformist, in order to prevent the deviance of his views from disrupting unity.

In the rarefied atmosphere of McCarthy-era U.S. politics, this tendency led to a startlingly bipartisan and unconflicted body of thought on the nature of Communism. The “Cold War ethos,” which Immerman described, brokered little discussion on the nature of Communism. [36] There were no relative shades of Communism. Communism had a fundamental nature, it was an international conspiracy directed from darkened rooms in the Kremlin with the sole purpose of enslaving the citizens of the free world in its atheistic, totalitarian web of deceit. Anyone who believed otherwise was deluded. Worse, those who questioned the rigid structure of belief surrounding the phenomenon of Communism must almost certainly be labeled Communist themselves, or at least “fellow travelers,” as this was the modus operandi of the international Communist conspiracy, which prevailed through subversion and manipulation, misleading others as to the true nature of Communism until they had become so entangled as to be unable to extricate themselves. Viewed in these terms, McCarthy was simply the personification of the group dynamic that sought to exclude and vilify those who deviate from the group norm.

The United States demonstrated considerable assurance that events in Guatemala were developing according to Moscow’s direction:

To our students of the international Communist organization it is abundantly clear that what has happened in Guatemala is a part of Moscow's global strategy. All of the signs which have identified similar occurrences elsewhere in the world are apparent in Guatemala. The methods of achieving initial penetration and of enlarging and strengthening those first footholds are the same. The training of leaders and the development of programs through exchanges of persons in strategic positions is identical. The extensive use of popular front organizations effectively controlled by a handful of experts is the same. We also have the reliable evidence of a blind unwavering adherence to the Communist Party line as enunciated in Moscow. As elsewhere in the world the agents of Communism in Guatemala have immediately adopted every public attitude announced from Moscow, regardless of the inconsistencies and local embarrassments which have resulted. As always in these stages of the program the Communist organization has been careful to preserve the appearance of minority representation in the Congress and other comparable organizations. At the same time, they have here, as elsewhere, succeeded in substituting small informal Communist controlled councils for the lawful policy-making bodies. [37]

Guatemala had no diplomatic, military or even economic links to the Soviet Union or any Eastern European nation, except for the few meetings required to purchase arms from Czechoslovakia. [38] The United States was willing to concede the lack of official ties; “There is no official diplomatic representation between Guatemala and Russia. Czech and Polish ministers, resident in Mexico, are accredited to Guatemala, along with other Central American Republics, but their visits to this area are rare.” [39] The U.S. belief that Guatemala was taking orders from the Kremlin was based entirely on wildly unsubstantiated inference and supposition. Thus, innocent trips to world peace conferences, trade union gatherings or even simply to Europe were interpreted as Guatemalan couriers receiving instructions from their Soviet bosses. [40] On hearing such accusations from Peurifoy, Arbenz responded that PGT members “went to Moscow merely to study Marxism, not necessarily to get instructions.” [41] It would seem that even Arbenz overestimated the extent of the PGT’s contact with Moscow; only one PGT member had ever been to Moscow, none had ever seen more than a minor official in the Soviet Union’s Mexico City Embassy, and all enquiries about opening relations between Guatemala and the Soviet bloc had been rebuffed. [42] In fact, the only contact made between the Soviet government and the Arbenz administration was an abortive attempt to buy bananas, which fell through when the Russians learned that Guatemala could not arrange transportation without the UFC. [43] Even when Fortuny traveled to Czechoslovakia to try to expedite the arms deal, interactions between the two nations showed few signs of familiarity. When Fortuny arrived, he was forced to wait a number of weeks while the Czechs made a decision on the sale. As Fortuny surmised, “I decided that the Czechs must be consulting the Soviets.” [44] Even taking such communication into account, the decision took a considerable length of time. Presumably this was because the Russians knew little about the Guatemalan republic and harbored no serious concerns about its fate. At the very least, it is clear that no alliance had been struck between the two nations—Fortuny was obliged to pay for the arms sale in cash. [45] It is interesting to note that Peurifoy had informed his superiors that Fortuny was in Moscow receiving instructions from his Kremlin handlers during this time, and that this presumption was based on the cover story given by the Arbenz administration that Fortuny was traveling to celebrate the thirty-sixth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. [46]

Based on limited, and often false, information, the United States made radical assumptions based on their cognitive predispositions. For example, the devotion of a minute’s silence to mark the death of Joseph Stalin by the Guatemalan Congress—“the only government body in the Western Hemisphere” to do so; [47] the support for the Communist line in many of the administration’s media outlets; and manifestations of anti-Americanism among Guatemalan officials were all translated in U.S. minds into unswerving obedience to the Party line being dictated from Moscow. In fact these acts and posturings reflected a minority belief in the ideological superiority of Communism and a much more prevalent nationalist antagonism directed towards the United States. Disregarding the ideological commitment of certain Guatemalan officials, opposition to Washington had always easily translated into support for Moscow in the Latin American mind. As one Mexican General famously said: “We are all Bolsheviks!…I don’t know what Socialism is; but I am a Bolshevik, like all patriotic Mexicans…The Yankees do not like the Bolsheviks; the Yankees are our enemies; therefore, the Bolsheviks must be our friends, and we must be their friends. We are all Bolsheviks!” [48] Arbenz and his PGT friends may have actually desired to establish some form of relationship with the Soviet bloc. However, this was never a real possibility. For a majority of Guatemalans, support for Communist-line propaganda—such as the accusation that the United States conducted biological warfare in Korea—was simply an opportunity to thumb their noses at their overlord to the north.

Many analysts have pointed to the May, 1954 discovery of a shipment of arms from the Czechoslovakian Skoda plant aboard the Alfhem as the conclusive proof which Washington sought of Guatemala’s “loss” to the Soviet bloc, and that it was this incident that prompted the fateful response. [49] However, this assumption is riddled with error. Declassified documents show that the United States had planned a policy of intervention years before the Alfhem incident. An abortive plan had already been considered in 1952 under the Truman administration. [50] The final decision to implement PBSUCCESS(the CIA operation which ultimately toppled Arbenz), although untraceable in the documentation, had been made at least six months before the secret voyage of the Alfhem in December 1953. [51] Moreover, further evidence within the newly declassified record supports the assertion that the United States made no effort to confirm and was not particularly concerned with establishing ties between Guatemala and the Soviet bloc, except as a useful cover to justify their actions. A paper drafted by the Inter-American Bureau conceded:

In any analysis of the situation in Guatemala it must be recognized at the outset that evidence that the Communist program in Guatemala has been organized and directed in the world capitals of Communism, and that Communism in Guatemala is a part of the world apparatus, must be largely circumstantial. I doubt very much that there is in this hemisphere any writing which would demonstrate these conclusions. [52]

Secretary Foster Dulles even admitted to the Brazilian Ambassador that “we must realize that it will be impossible to produce evidence clearly tying the Guatemalan Government to Moscow; that the decision must be a political one and based on our deep conviction that such a tie must exist.” [53] The limited cognitive effort applied to the question of Guatemalan ties to Moscow did indeed lead to a sub-optimal conclusion: the erroneous and unsubstantiated assumption that Guatemala was subject to the Kremlin.

The willingness of the United States to promote belief in such ties may be, as Ambassador to the Dominican Republic Martin suggests, to be prepared for the worst-case scenario. The Agency, Ambassador Martin reported, “gave rumors [about Communists] in the Dominican Republic a credibility far higher than I would have…In reporting a Castro/Communist plot, however wildly implausible, it is obviously safer to evaluate it as ‘could be true’ than as nonsense.” [54] However, it could also be because Washington felt that a Communist regime in its own hemisphere was cause enough, without the need to establish ties to Moscow. Foster Dulles argues that “we are faced by an unfortunate fact. Most of the countries of the world do not share our view that Communist control of a government is in itself a danger and a threat.” [55] In Chile, in 1973, despite being aware that Moscow was “advising Allende to put his relations with the United States in order…to ease the strain between the two countries” and that “Soviet overtures to Allende… [were] characterized by caution and restraint,” U.S. officials concluded that even a democratic, pacific and friendly Marxist state could not be tolerated in its own backyard. The unwavering belief that all Communist parties were inextricably linked to Moscow is clearly Washington’s misperception. However, regarding Guatemala, this misperception was not erroneously used to justify an irrational policy decision. Rather, it provided Washington with a much needed reason to push a policy that it intended to pursue long before the demonstrated absence of Guatemala-Moscow ties. In this sense, Washington’s theory of the “international Communist conspiracy” reflects the usefulness of misperception.

3.5 Communist Penetration of Central America

One of the major concerns that the United States cited regarding Guatemala’s threat to U.S. national security was that the isolated nation represented a “soviet beachhead,” from which red forces aimed to ultimately destabilize the rest of the continent. A draft policy paper written by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, intended to be set before the National Security Council (NSC), opened:

In Guatemala Communism has achieved its strongest position in Latin America, and is now well advanced on a program which threatens important American commercial enterprises in that country and may affect the stability of neighboring governments. Continuation of the present trend in Guatemala would ultimately endanger the unity of the Western Hemisphere against Soviet aggression, and the security of our strategic position in the Caribbean, including the Panama Canal. [56]

The forcefulness of this opening paragraph suggests the firm belief that the political climate in Guatemala was not looked upon favorably. However, what follows deserves to be quoted at some length as it not only elucidates logically that Guatemala posed no significant threat to U.S. security, military or otherwise, but is also revealing of the sentiment regarding Guatemala that was prevalent in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, the significance of which will be developed further below:

In terms of its own resources and manpower, the contribution that Guatemala can make toward United States security is slight. Although useful sources of a few strategic materials might eventually be developed, present production of such products is of negligible importance to this country. In the event of war, Guatemala, as in the last conflict, could provide the United States with the site for an air base at Guatemala City, but the greater range of modern aircraft may have considerably diminished its present or future usefulness to us. The International Railways of Central America, though of possible value as a trans-isthmian route in event of destruction of the Panama Canal, is a narrow gauge line of limited capacity, easily sabotaged, and has only open roadsteads at the Pacific termini. [57]

The threat that Guatemala posed to the Panama Canal was not merely overstated, it was non-existent. Not only was Guatemala’s potential contribution to the security of the Canal negligible but, even had Guatemala become openly hostile to the United States, the threat it could have posed to the region was insignificant. As Schlesinger and Kinzer noted, Guatemala had no aircraft of its own with sufficient range even to reach the Panama Canal, and only one airbase capable of handling Soviet jets, which the United States could easily monitor. [58] The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs came to a similar conclusion:

Guatemala could endanger United States security, however, were it to give refuge or aid to enemy saboteurs and propagandists, or were it to allow use of its airfields, ports and other facilities and resources by an enemy power. Sabotage to airfields and military installations would be of importance only in relation to the degree to which these are built up and used by United States forces in event of war. Sabotage against the railroads and other United States-owned commercial interests would injure the Guatemalan economy far out of proportion to the adverse effect on the United States war potential. Since Guatemala would be incapable of resisting a strong attacker, denial of Guatemalan facilities and resources to an aggressive enemy power would necessarily fall to the United States. Should the Guatemalan Government assume a hostile attitude in an emergency, the United States could secure the airport and other strategic points against its forces with a battalion or two of well-trained troops. [59]

Indeed, the paper was forced to conclude that “Guatemala is of special importance to the United States primarily for having provided the leading example of Communist penetration in the American Republics.” [60] Communism in Guatemala posed no national security threat to the United States – the threat was political. The influence of Communism in Guatemala and its successes (achieved through consent, rather than coercion) posed a direct challenge to the long-held claim by Washington that Communism was a destructive force which achieved its aims through force and manipulation, rather than a direct challenge to the national security of the United States.

3.6 Conclusion

In summation, Washington was aware that Communists exerted considerable influence in the Arbenz administration but was confident that this would not extend to the establishment of a Communist state. The alleged ties between Guatemala and Soviet Russia were erroneous, but arguably of little importance to the United States. Finally, an analysis of the security threat and potential for subversion of neighboring countries showed that no risk even seemed to exist. Could then, the U.S. government justify intervention on national security grounds? The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs thought not. In its analysis of potential U.S. responses to the Guatemalan situation, the bureau advanced four possible lines of policy: direct intervention, covert intervention, a policy of inaction, and a policy of firm persuasion. The first was immediately discounted as being too detrimental to hemispheric solidarity, as well as causing serious damage to the U.S.’ reputation for respecting freedom and self-determination. Such an action, the Inter-American Bureau concluded, would damage not only its relations with Latin America, but also its standing in the international community and its moral stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. A policy of covert intervention was likewise discarded: “Experience has shown that no such operation could be carried out secretly without great risk of its leadership and backers being fully known. Were it to become evident that the United States has tried a Czechoslovakia in reverse in Guatemala, the effects on our relations in this hemisphere, and probably in the world at large, could be as disastrous as those produced by open intervention.” [61] A policy of inaction was eliminated as being a “false hope.” Instead, the Inter-American Bureau advocated a policy of firm persuasion, which some hope was elicited for its potential, and discussed a number of potential courses of action.

In spite of the bureau’s recommendations, the administration opted for a policy of covert intervention. In fact, there is no record of the Inter-American Bureau’s paper ever being tabled before the NSC, despite its depth, range and accuracy of analysis. The question remains: if intervention could not be justified in these strict national security terms, what then impelled the United States to act in such an aggressive manner against the Arbenz regime?